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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an attempt to resurrect the strategic and philosophical thinking of
Henry Kissinger in order to unlock the Iranian-American impasse. Encounters between
the two countries have been in a state of deadlock since the 1979 Iranian Revolution,
though its genesis dates back, at least, to the American-sponsored coup d’état of 1953.
Within the American foreign policy establishment, no one looms larger than Dr.
Kissinger: his contributions intersect the two worlds of academic diplomatic history and
statecraft at the highest levels of international relations. He was the chief diplomat at a
momentous period. Kissinger―through his writings and public policy―emphasizes
balance of power, raison d’état, and international pluralism. As a result, these are the
scaffolds of this study.
Using these concepts (in addition to others), I bring forth new policy possibilities
for the United States and Iran to adopt, centered around the general and mutual position
of détente. It is my contention that such recommendations could help mollify the deep
and mutual antagonism that undergirds the current stalemate.

3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To my parents Stephan and Illia, thank you for all of your support throughout the
years and providing me with an environment where I was encouraged to follow my
passions. To my mother in particular, thank you for your endless love and kindness; you
have taught me what it means to be a good person. To my father, you have shown me the
value of striving to be a perennial learner and have instilled in me the importance of
adventuring beyond one’s immediate space. To my sister Ella, thank you for all your
energy and passion. I am excited to continue to grow up alongside you and I look forward
to our adventures together. To my grandmother Rossanne, you have showed me the
power of love and generosity and the significance of taking care of those closest to you.
To my grandfather George, you showed me the importance of devoting your life to what
you hold dearest and to never let it go. To my grandparents Katherine and Steven, you
have showed me the gravity of hard work, tenacity, and faith. I love you all very much.
To the professors who have guided me through Macalester College, thank you for
your sustained passion, energy, and devotion. I am particularly indebted to Professor
Ahmed Samatar, who not only guided and assisted me throughout this thesis, but who
also demonstrated to me the importance of ideas, critical thought, and a liberal arts
education. I will dearly miss our conversations in your office―your passion for learning
is admirable and it will never escape me. A special thanks needs to be extended to
Professors Wessam El-Meligi, Andrew Overman, Gregory Lipton, and Jenna Rice
Rahaim. Your presence and wisdom has helped me grow in and out of the classroom.
To my friends at Macalester, I will hold dear the memories we made together.
You all shaped and molded me into the person I am today. Last, but not least, Kate
Miller, you were my favorite distraction and companion throughout the writing of this
thesis. My time at Macalester would have been hollow without your presence. You are a
special human being and I am extremely thankful for the time we have spent together.

4

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context and Subject of Study
The political impasse between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran
is one of the greatest foreign policy conundrums of the last half century. The souring of
relations dates back, at least, to the 1953 coup d'etat, when the U.S. supplanted the
democratically elected leader Mohammad Mosaddegh of Iran for a pro-American puppet
regime headed by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Twenty-six years later in 1979, the Iranian
Islamic revolution, led by Ruhollah Khomeini, used built up bitter civil sentiment around
western imperialism and the Shah to catalyze the forthcoming revolution. Since then,
anti-Americanism has been an official dictum of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy. In
return, the United States has continually casted the Islamic Republic of Iran as a rogue
state for the past thirty-nine years.
The recent ratification of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in
2015 is a noteworthy disruption to U.S. Iranian relations. The deal, however, does not
mark a fundamental alteration. Tehran and Washington both remain apprehensive. If the
nuclear deal underscored an easement of relations, it should be viewed as temporary; the
deal does not guarantee the suspension of Iranian nuclear ambitious into perpetuity, nor
has it curtailed American-Iranian enmity. While Iran’s nuclear ambitions are curbed for
the coming ten to fifteen years, hostilities and tension between the two nations can be
identified in nearly all major conflicts across the Middle East and North Africa: Yemen,
Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Syria. These proxy military conflicts are compounded by the
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political rhetoric of President Donald Trump and his administration’s lack of a coherent
Middle East strategy, let alone a general foreign policy. Moreover, President Trump has
repeatedly expressed his distaste for the JCPOA and his intentions to remove the United
States from the framework. In Iran, the regime is stuck in limbo; the ideas it propagates
oscillate between those that favor an isolationist stance in the name of independence and
those willing to consider international engagement as a mechanism to domestic
prosperity. The former is supported by principlists, who seek to preserve the initial
character of the revolution, while the latter, taking a pragmatic approach, want the
revolutionary spirit to evolve in order to meet contemporary demands and conditions.
Given these conditions, I argue that the United States and the larger international
community should not settle for the JCPOA as the premier arbitrator of Iranian-U.S.
relations, let alone Iranian relations with the wider international community; the nuclear
deal is not a foreign policy, only the product of one. While it is undeniable that relations
between the two countries should be better, are the current socio-political conditions
propitious for enhanced relations? Hence, one must ask oneself this: what is practically
possible to improve relations, rather than what is ideally desirable?
Iranian-U.S. relations can be viewed within a larger narrative of the international
order. At the end of World War II, the United States assumed a role of influence and
stature that was unprecedented. As the the most powerful nation to emerge out of the
WWII era, it had the means to dictate an international order ideal for ‘liberal democracy’
and a liberal economic order. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989, the United
States’ vision for world order proved durable and favorable. The U.S. has remained the
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preeminent guardian of the international order. Its hegemonic position, however, is in
jeopardy.
Hegemony ― in the Gramscian conception ― is defined as a balanced mix of
domination and consent. In the context of this paper, hegemony can be contextualized
and understood by perceiving the United States as the dominator and most other nations
as the consenters. A country must possess preeminent power to be hegemonic, but that is
not the sole condition.n1 To be hegemonic, a nation must receive acceptance from other
nations to be dominant. Assent is bestowed under the conditions of mutual exchange and
compromise. In other words, nations grant legitimacy upon the United States when their
demands and needs are fulfilled to a certain extent. If permission is absent and the U.S.
resorts to pure coercion, dictatorship is all that remains, not a hegemonic balance between
the ruler and the ruled. Similarly, if permission is absent and the U.S. falls into
isolationism, removing itself as the great power on the world stage, hegemony fades.
In this paper, I propose that the United States of America is losing the support
necessary to remain hegemonic. The People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation,
the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Republic of Turkey are all examples of major
nations who are challenging the hegemony of the United States by diplomatic, economic,

 he U.S.’s supremacy and its eligibility for hegemony flows from its economic,
T
political, military, and cultural power. At $19.5 trillion, the United States generates 24%
of global GDP and it is a beacon of innovation. With 177 diplomatic missions around the
planet, America has impressive political reach and influence. The second largest military
on earth, but the most powerful, belongs to the United States, with over 800 bases located
across the world and a military presence in 160 countries. A final example of American
prominence is how deeply American culture - in the form of cinema, music, publishing
and art -permeates throughout the globe. Despite these forms of power, the U.S. is not
automatically a hegemon.
1
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and militaristic means. These Nations are uncomfortable or unsatisfied with American
preeminence; they feel, perhaps, that the U.S. is sliding too far towards pure coercion or
they find themselves in enhanced positions of power. In fact, with the inevitable rise of
India and China, and maybe Brazil and Russia, simply due to their sheere magnitude and
resources, the United States’ power is decreasing in relative terms. The world is slowly
entering an era that will be defined by multiple centers of power―not just by the
unipolarity of the United States.
Regardless, they have determined that their desiderata are not being adequately
fulfilled. This is occurring because of their internal calculations (i.e. they feel
emboldened by their growth in power), the behavior of the United States in the
international arena (i.e. they feel threatened or insecure), or some combination of the two.
Hence, the U.S. is at a pivotal junction: will it resort to a winner-takes-all game of pure
coercion to achieve a desired outcome, will it utilize mutual-exchange and compromise,
or will it retreat into isolationism? Pursuing the second option has the potential to
reinvigorate hegemony, where, arguably, a more stable world is maintained. In addition,
if the second option does not resuscitate American hegemony, it will help the United
States transition to the impending era of global multipolarity. The other two options lead
to paths of uncertainty and insecurity. The affairs between Iran and the United States is
one of the fronts where the future of American hegemony will be decided.
In the case of Iran, I argue coercion is not productive, and, therefore, the time for
creative diplomacy has come. Such a change could reinvigorate American hegemony and
open new opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is arguably the chief
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country in the Middle East2 and the U.S. is the unquestionable regional hegemon in the
Western Hemisphere.3 As such, it is in the interest of the United States and Iran, in the
long run, to amend relations. To make this happen, the U.S. needs to retrieve the
intellectual and strategic thinking of its distinguished foreign policy makers. In this
context, no one looms larger than Henry Kissinger. The following paper will evaluate the
prospect of critically adapting the strategic, intellectual, and diplomatic thinking of Henry
Kissinger to transform the current deadlock.
Henry Kissinger is a unique statesman, unparalleled, perhaps, by all other
Secretaries of State and National Security Advisers. He is a thinker of exceptional
capacity, with personal and intellectual roots in Europe and its international affairs and
philosophical traditions. His greatest achievement was his diplomatic imagination to
rethink relations with the People's Republic of China, which ultimately helped usher the
P.R.C. onto the world stage and the triangular balance of power that followed in its wake.
Moreover, he tactfully maneuvered the isolationist sentiment in the United States during
the 1970s―catalyzed by the Vietnam War―so as to preserve America’s place in the
international order. We are in a similar political environment today, as conveyed by the

Its supremacy is derived from its combined economic, military, political, and religious
might. Iran has the second largest GDP in the Middle East at $425 billion. It has one of
the most powerful armies in the region, only slightly behind those of Turkey, Egypt, and
Israel, and it has a population of 80.26 million people. Moreover, it has had, and most
likely still does have, nuclear ambitions. Last, the Islamic Republic of Iran has immense
religious and political influence in the region, which is largely derived from its position
as the preeminent Shia majority nation.
3
Here, the concept of hegemony follows the definition that John Mearsheimer bestows
upon the term in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: military and economic
dominance over a connected and manageable landmass. According to Mearsheimer, the
United States is the only nation to have ever achieved regional hegemony.
2
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Trumpian slogan “America First.” Finally, his policy of detenté ushered in the lowest
levels of hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States since the beginning of
the Cold War. These three constructions―triangular balance of power, a global United
States of America, and detenté― hold relevance to the United States’ conundrum with
Iran.

1.2 Central Questions
To be clear: this paper explores the potential of Kissinger’s thinking to the
prospect of overcoming the deadlock between Iran and the United States, and ultimately
as an avenue for enhancing American legitimacy on the world stage. With that said, three
central questions arise:
1. What was Kissinger’s approach to international affairs?
2. What are the main sources of the Iran-U.S. impasse?
3. Could Kissinger’s intellectual and strategic legacy be useful in the thawing of
U.S.-Iran relations?
Well researched and thought out answers to these questions are important for the United
States, Iran, and the rest of the world for a number of tangible reasons beyond the
theoretical discussion of hegemony and its conjunctural implications. The palpable
importance of the topic is explored in the following section.

1.3 Importance
Sour relations between the U.S. and Iran impedes enhanced security and stability
in the Middle East. Iran and the United States often engage in proxy warfare by backing
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Shia and Sunni militias, respectively. The result is stark sectarian conflict. If the U.S. and
Iran overcome their points of contention, security in the region would improve. Stability
in the Middle East is one of the United States’, let alone the entire international
community’s, greatests interests abroad. Peace, however, will not be achieved without the
cooperation of Iran.
Second, amelioration of the status quo will have economic consequences. For
example, the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and Europe on Iran restrict trade and
development. When the Iran Nuclear Deal was implemented in 2015, it cleared the way
for Boeing to win a trade agreement with Iran Air worth $16.6 billion.4 If the all
sanctions were lifted, similar agreements of greater magnitude would transpire.
Third, transcending the current stalemate would allow for improved relations with
the Global North and the Islamic World. Currently, there is a mentality that the Muslim
world and the Western world are at odds with each other ― a narrative brought into
precision by Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order. Reconstructing relations with Iran would deal a great symbolic blow to
Huntington’s thesis and deflate the rhetoric of extremist groups such as the Islamic State.
The sweetening of relations would be a victory for cosmopolitan and multicultural
projects across the world.
Fourth, Iranian people are a proud people with deep civilizational roots. They
have been a defined group since the ancient world. Consequently, they have been able to
adapt and evolve. Historically, the Iranian people have not been defined by isolation. On

4

Erdbrink 2016.
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the contrary, they have been associated with cosmopolitanism, vibrancy, and innovation.
Their current withdrawn mentality contradicts their history. Thus, they too need to
re-enter the international arena with greater confidence in pursuit of their legitimate
national interests.
More specifically, 50% of the Iranian population is under the age of 24 years. The
country’s large youthful population will be looking for opportunity in the coming
decades; opening up to U.S. and the rest of the world will provide numerous possibilities
to meet the ambitions of the Iranian people.
On a personal note, this thesis is of significance to me. I first became captivated
by Iran in 2012, as a sophomore in high school, when I read the All the Shah’s Men and
Rest: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future by Stephen Kinzer. Since then, I haven’t had
the opportunity to pursue my interest as an academic subject. I want to rekindle my
studies of this important nation. Second, state to state relations has not been part of my
main academic experience at Macalester. International Studies transcends international
borders, diplomacy, and trade, but this does mean inter-state and world politics are
irrelevant. Before I attend graduate school, I want to dabble into the field of international
politics. Third, I have recently completed a paper on the life and thinking of Henry
Kissinger. In that assignment, I discussed the main contours of his life, his greatest
achievements and failures, and the lessons one can learn from his tenure as an
international leader.
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1.4 Sources and Methodology
I use three types of literature to inform this paper: biographies, Kissinger’s
writings, and secondary sources. I will briefly describe the nature of each type of source
below, but I will not list the exact titles. For a full bibliography, see the end of the
document.
First, I have read a range of biographies that approach Kissinger’s life from
different angles. Each biographer brings a certain set of assumptions and a bias for
information and narratives that support their agenda. Kissinger is a controversial and
complex individual, so it was important to read a variety of narratives that attempt to
capture the essence of his life and his strategic thinking.
Second, I rely on Kissinger’s writings in order to discern the nature his strategic
and diplomatic thinking. I incorporate writings from different periods in his life.
Diplomacy and World Order are the texts that I most heavily rely upon. The lessons and
concepts extracted from his writings constitute the foundation on which I formulate the
policy prescriptions to overcome the impasse.
Third, I have read a wide scope of secondary sources. These sources are the heart
of the literature review. Relevant books cover concepts such as the state, leadership,
realism and idealism, and diplomacy. Moreover, pertinent secondary sources are ones
that will provide for a robust, historical understanding of U.S.-Iran relations. Finally,
recent events and current events vis-a-vis the United States and Iran, and takes at their
interpretation, are sourced primarily from Foreign Affairs.
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The methodology of the thesis is to integrate the life and philosophy of Henry
Kissinger with history, international political theory, and current events (as they pertain
to the U.S. & Iran). Through such integration, I conclude whether there is any prospect of
overcoming the impasse between the U.S. and Iran through Kissinger’s thinking and
writing.
The thesis has two main parts: (1) a critical biography of Kissinger; (2) a case
study of U.S.-Iran relations. The former is composed of historical context, the contours of
the life of Kissinger, and the assets and liabilities of his leadership style and his
philosophy of diplomacy and international relations. The latter is composed of a
historical survey of Iran-U.S. relations since WWII, the current state of affairs, and the
application of Kissinger’s thinking to the standoff in relations.

1.5 Organizational Structure
The thesis is composed of five chapters: (1) Introduction; (2) Literature Review;
(3) Kissinger: Life, Policy, and Thinking; (4) U.S.-Iran Encounters: Discourse and
Foreign Policy; (5) Prospects for Reconciliation and Balance of Power.
In the literature review, five concepts are explained at length: the state,
leadership, international relations, balance of power, and diplomacy. These five
concepts, in aggregate, form the foundation of the topic at hand. The United States of
America and the Islamic Republic of Iran are states. When they interact, they do it
through the apparatus of the state. As such, it will be necessary to comprehend the nature
of the state and the state system. International relations is the study of how states conduct

14

and formulate relations, as well as coordinate multi and bilateral ventures and
agreements. This paper is centered around the condition and prospect of Iranian-U.S.
relations; therefore, it is necessary to explicitly define international relations and the
schools of thought that make up the discipline. Diplomacy is one of the systemic tools
and a real-life articulation of international relations. The paper's main purpose is to
evaluate the merit of Kissinger’s approach to diplomacy ― in order to do this, a
conceptual cognizance of diplomacy will be helpful. Last, leadership is the means by
which great transformations occur within organized society. Considering that this paper
seeks to find a plausible path to transformation through diplomacy, strong leadership is
obligatory to the process. Therefore, leadership will be explored as a concept.
The third chapter explores the life and philosophy of Henry Kissinger. His life
will be excavated for its failures and accomplishments and his philosophy of international
affairs will be critiqued for its limitations and value. These isolated discernments will be
synthesized with the findings of chapter 4, creating a framework fit for discerning the
usefulness of Kissinger’s strategic thinking, with regard to the impasse.
Chapter four focuses on four tasks. First, it conducts a brief survey of Iran and
depicts the relations between the U.S. and Iran from the end of WWII to today. Second, it
describes the Iranian approach to world politics and how it conceives of the United
States. Third, it demonstrates how the Islamic Republic of Iran is depicted in American
discourses. Finally, it evaluates the state of the current affairs between the two nations.
The goal of this chapter is to isolate the historic sources of the impasse and to determine
the causes of tension.

15

In the fifth chapter, I juxtapose the strategic thinking of Henry Kissinger and his
foreign policy directives with the historical development of American-Iranian relations,
the current state of affairs between the two countries, and the contemporary power
dynamics of the Middle East. Ultimately, after making the case for detenté, I lay out the
specific policy prescriptions I derive from Kissinger’s thinking that would allow for
detenté and a new balance of power to transpire and solidify.
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CHAPTER II: CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION

2.1 The State
The modern state is the institution through which humans organize society and
shape their political and social relations. Social organization and the pursuit of
technological advancement are the two historic breakthroughs that set humans apart from
other primates.5 Hence, as our approach to social organization, the state is a fascinating
subject of study. Why and how the state developed is a question that has captivated
scholarly attention since the beginning of the academy. Such a task, however, is outside
the scope of this piece of work. What is attempted are answers to the questions of: what is
the state and what are its defining features? What were its main stages of development
leading up to its contemporary rendition? These questions are be explored below.

2.1.1 Power and the State
Scholars of politics disagree on the nature of the state; that is, what its chief
purpose is, or what it should be, as the overarching architecture of organizational life.
Yet, there is general consensus that power is fundamentally connected to the state and
without it, the state would not exist.
Gianfranco Poggi―a sociologists specializing in modern and ‘classical’ political
institutions― wrote a book titled The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects.
5

Stavrianos 2015, p.17.
17

Within his book, Poggi masterfully dissects the state: he expounds on its components,
development, controversies, and its modern-liberal-democratic form. His tracing follows
the Western European tradition of the state. Hence, one critique is the lack of thought
given to state development beyond the region of Western Europe. Nevertheless, his book
is of high value to anyone seeking a conceptualization of the state. This section relies
heavily on his volume.
Poggi’s The State begins with a discussion of social power. Like most scholars, he
perceives social power to be the backbone of the state. He states, “...in all societies, some
people clearly and consistently appear more capable than others of pursuing their own
objectives; and if these are incompatible with those envisaged by others, the former
manage somehow to ignore or override the latter’s preferences. Indeed, they are often
able to mobilise, in pursuit of their own ends, the others’ energies, even against their will.
This, when all is said and done, is what social power is all about.”6 For Poggi, then,
power is the ability to make others do what you want.
Poggi suggests this definition, perhaps, is too generic. Consequently, he offers a
tripartite division of social power. For this, he turns to the words of the Italian political
philosopher Bobbio:
We may classify the various forms of power by reference to the facilities
the active subject employs in order to lay boundaries around the conduct
of the passive subject … we can then distinguish three main classes of
power: economic, ideological, and political. Economic power avails itself
of the possession of certain goods, rare or held to be rare, in order to lead
those not possessing them to adopt a certain conduct, which generally
consists in carrying out a certain form of labour … Ideological power is
based upon the fact that ideas of a certain nature, formulated … by persons
6

Poggi 1990, p.3.
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endowed with a certain authority, put abroad in a certain manner, may also
exert an influence upon the conduct of associated individuals … political
power, finally, is grounded in the possession of facilities (weapons of all
kind and degrees of potency) by means of which physical violence may be
exerted. It is coercive power in the strict sense of the term.7
Therefore, all power is generated from the procurement of scarce resources (capital,
social influence, and weaponry). What distinguishes political power from normative and
economic power is its paramountcy and ultimacy.8 These unique traits are derived from
political power’s unique ability to generate coercion on a large scale. By extension,
political power is emphatically attached to facilities by which violence may be deployed.
The ability to exhibit the provisions to coercion is what allows one, or an entity, to make
others do what they or it wants ― to have power over them.
The language used thus far might confuse the reader into thinking that all
commands are carried out by the constant presence of coercion. This not the case.
Legitimacy ― the willful conformity to authority ― is what allows for “stabilised
political power relationships”9 that do not heavily rely on the pervasive use of violence.
Today, political power is legitimate when it is regulated by principles that are codified
into a body of laws. Variations in law and its application are what allows for a variety of
political experiences.

Ibid., p.4.
Paramountcy of political power ― political power safeguards its claimed territory from
external aggression, thereby allowing economic and normative power to assert their
authority over a population. Ultimacy of political power ― political power is the last
resort in dictating what is an appropriate formulation of interpersonal relations; that is,
physical force is the ultimate facility when normative and economic sources of power fail
to sufficiently order relations internal to the claimed territory. Ibid.
9
Ibid., p.7.
7
8
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What is the relationship between the state and political power? The state is an
entity by which political power can be institutionalized. Hence, the state is not the only
body in which political power is located. It is, however, the most predominant form.
Throughout the centuries, the state has widened in scope and scale, thereby stretching
political power and its institutional manifestations into realms previously unimaginable
― this is one of the key components of the modern state. Before a discussion on the
development of the state takes place, its main components and modern features will be
exposed.

2.1.2 Components of the State
For this paper, the relevant components of the state that Poggi highlights are
eightfold: the state is (1) an organization; (2) demarcated; (3) a monopoly on violence;
(4) sovereign; (5) a territory; (6) centralized; (7) a coordination of parts; (8) a member of
the state system.
One, the state is an organization. As such, the state is the instrument ― or
organization ― by which political power is invested. In principle, the state is one
organization. Yet, Poggi suggests that it is “implausible” to render the modern state as
one organization “in view of the enormous expansion and internal diversification of
contemporary states.”10 Poggi attempts to reconcile the aforementioned discrepancy by
insisting that while the state has expanded and come to consist of separate organs, its
oneness is maintained through common purpose and a set of political interests.

10

Ibid., p.19-20.
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Second, for an organization to be a state, it must be demarcated from all other
organizations. Its central point of divergence ― “at a maximum” ― is that it “performs
all and only political activities.”11 It is helpful here to conceive of religion, enterprise, and
civil society as spheres that are separate from the state, but still develop and maintain
organizations to pursue their own interests. Social and economic organizations can
influence the political process; however, they do not possess the prerogative of coercion
that allows the state to execute collective, political activities.
Third, coercion is the sole privilege of the state (i.e. monopoly on violence). This
component does not need much explanation, as it has been addressed intermittently
throughout. Though, it should be said that while a state exercises control over a
population typically through coercion, there is “ultimacy” attached to state compulsion.
That is, “the state specialises in last-resort control” after the possibility of pain and
imprisonment does not deter illegal action or after economic and normative organizations
fail to control the population by their own means.12 ‘Other organizations’ include
religious and education organizations, as well as labor obligations. In other words,
violence is used as a last resort.
Fourth, an organisation is a state when it is sovereign. In short, this means that the
state is outside the control of any other organization or state and, thus, the state at hand is
the only power exhibiting control or influence over the population. Not only does it claim
such entitlements, but it is also willing to prove its sovereignty, if necessary, by the
method of war. It is subject and bound to no outside rules. In fact, sovereignty, in part, is
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the ability to make rules and enforce them, irrespective of other states in the state system.
Finally, sovereignty implies that a state is free to conduct an independent foreign policy
that is line with its national interests.
Fifth, the components discussed thus far ― particularly the notion of sovereignty
― have an implicit assumption: the state is the one and only state within a definitive
territory. This does not mean a state needs to be the only state in the state system, as this
would constitute a universal empire. Nevertheless, it does insinuate the need to be the
only organization holding claim to sovereignty within a explicit territory. Borders
demarcate a state and within these borders, the state “exercises jurisdiction and law
enforcement...and… it is committed to protecting against encroachment from any other
political power.”13 Furthermore, Poggi evokes the thinking of an Italian jurist to convey
the relationship between the state and territory: “the state does not have a territory, it is a
territory.”14 Without a defined and internationally recognized territory, an organization
cannot be a state. States can exist de facto, however, if it controls a territory but is not
recognized by the international community.
Sixth, to be a state, political power and political activities must originate or refer
to the organ of the state that ultimately legitimizes activities carried out by bodies beyond
the epicenter of power. For example, the office of the presidency and the legislative
branch bestows the privilege to the Department of Homeland Security to use force and
the Department is ultimately accountable to the Presidency and Congress. That is,
members of the population “cannot exercise power, except in the capacity of agents of
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the state itself, or by influencing the activities of such agents.”15 Hence, the use of force is
perceived as plausibly legitimate or excusable only when violence is authorized by the
state. While the state might very well consist of many specialized and distinguishable
organs, the power to make decisions at the collective level or the use of coercion is not a
prerogative of all agents or organs of the state, but only the elite who have such
entitlement assured by the institutional dictates of the centralized state. In short, a state is
an organization where power is centralized. An important caveat, however: it can be
distributed and checked.
The seventh component of the state is what Poggi titles “formal coordination of
the parts.”16 As the state developed from its initial form to the modern state of today, the
organs of the state grew in size and in number. In order to remain a centralized and
unitary organization, the organs of the state and their faculties need be integrated and
coordinated through some interconnecting mechanism, such as hierarchy and
bureaucracy. The organs of the state do not exist as independent power hubs, but rather as
entities that enhance and support the centralized state.17
The eighth condition of a state ― membership in the state system ― is not
inherent in a state’s own singular existence, but, rather, brought about by the presence of
many states. The state system is comprised of all sovereign states ― the fact that there is
not a singular, unitary state, gives rise to inter-state relations. Though these states lie next
to one another and are similar in nature, “these units do not consider themselves, and do
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not conduct themselves in relation to one another, as organs of that wider entity, as they
would if the latter had established and empowered them and were in a position
authoritatively to regulate their conduct.”18 The regulation of inter-state conflict would
demand a world government with the authority to arbitrate disputes. The existence of any
such government would result in the decline of the state ― according to the definition
laid out here ― because requirements, such as sovereignty, would not hold. These
conditions are the impetus behind international diplomacy. While no one state has direct
power to make decisions on the behalf of another, diplomacy, war, coercion, and
sanctions can be used as tools of persuasion and compromise.
The account of the state detailed so far applies, according to Poggi, “[to] the
advent of the modern era, [so] then in later stages of that era states acquired features not
comprised within that definition.”19 Nationhood, democratic legitimation, citizenship,
law, and bureaucracy are the ‘features’ Poggi emphasizes. In the following paragraphs,
these “features” are regarded as contemporary-modern features, or simply contemporary,
in order to distinguish them from the eight components of the modern state that were
summarized above ― these components are simply referred to as modern components.
Accordingly, what is expounded upon below characterizes and differentiates the modern
state from the contemporary-modern state.
Nationhood is a defining feature of the contemporary state. Nationhood is
succinctly conceptualized as the sense of mutual belonging amongst people of many
walks of life. As states grew in size, their borders increasingly encompassed a

18
19

Ibid., p.24.
Ibid., p.26.
24

heterogeneous population, making it difficult to generate a sense of nation along ethnic
lines. Still, a few states do possess a relatively homogenous population, such as Japan. As
a result, one can detect two types of nationhood ― one generated along ethnic lines and
one on civil lines, or a combination of the two. Poggi explains the possibilities of civic
nationhood: “[nationhood] came to encompass, beside an ethnic bond, also a religious
one, or a linguistic commonality, or one grounded on the sharing of institutional legacies,
or something as vague as historical experience or a sense of destiny.”20 Nevertheless,
nationhood can be perceived, on one hand, as a tool of the state to legitimize their rule
over a population ― a means of consolidating and establishing power. On the other hand,
nationhood can be seen as a tool of the civilian population. The argument goes that a
unified populace along civil or ethnic lines will have the organizational capacity to
penetrate the state and shape its policy to reflect the interests of the people. Nationalism
and self determination, in the wake of decolonization, rearranged the state system’s
borders, which helps to explain its importance to the contemporary state.
The title of citizen bonds a person to a land and its nation. In theory, citizenship
implies a level of equality amongst all citizens, in terms of state entitlements and
obligations. When one is a citizen of a state, it is typically their prerogative to participate
in the formation of a state’s agenda, which usually transpires through the electoral
system. Yet, this is typically not the extent of involvement a citizen is entitled to ― one
can expand their participation by running for public office. In the case of a theocracy or
monarchy, citizenship might make you eligible for civil service, but the position will be
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bestowed upon you by a theocrat or monarch, not by the will of the majority. It should be
noted that citizenship began as a privilege granted to male elites ― typically those with
economic power. In the global north, women were granted citizenship only in the 20th
century. Still, there are states that deny certain demographics citizenship and, thus, its
entitlements.
The expansion of citizenship is the product of a wider phenomenon that is unique
to the contemporary-modern state: democratization. Yet, this process did not occur
universally, within all states (i.e. not all nation-states are democracies). Democratization
represents a change in the state’s purpose: while political power is vested in the state, the
constituency chooses the leaders to execute the prerogatives of the state, according to
which candidate they believe will keep their interests in mind. Thus, the state exists to
serve the people, not to serve itself. Furthermore, democratization gave impetus to the
state as a provider of services and public goods. In exchange, the people abide by the law
of the state and respect its authority. It should be noted that the way democratization has
been described above does not, ironically, necessitate a state to be democratic,
considering there are states, today, who provide services and public goods to its
population, despite a democratic deficiency.
The relationship between state and law has evolved over the course of the modern
era. For long, the state has been the enforcer of law, but it has not always been the
architect. Historically, religion, tradition, and economic interests have played a heavy
hand in the production of law, codified or oral. The advent of sovereignty catalyzed the
politicization of law and constitutionalism made law-making a deliberative affair instead
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an absolute affair. Accordingly, the state's developed legislative bodies that possessed the
right to create law.
A pattern of increased scale and scope is found in the previous paragraphs.
Today’s state is different from earlier renditions because of the general increase in its
primary activities. Initially, the purpose of the state was confined to the incubation of
political power, but, over time, the state occupied itself with broader concerns. What
emerged was the bureaucratic state. Bureaucracy alleviated the tension between a state’s
unitary makeup and its multi-part composition; bureaucracy is the thread that weaves all
the components of a state into a uniform entity. The bureaucratic model connects the
epicenter of political power to the organs of the state that carry out a diverse set of social
activities. In other words, bureaucracy allows the state to take on a larger set of activities
while harboring the ultimate control of these activities under the supreme seats of power,
such as parliament or the executive branch.

2.2 International Relations
International relations is the study of inter-state behavior. Theorists are
determined to layout ways that describe and, ultimately, predict how states interact with
one another. In today’s world, states are no longer the sole actor in international affairs―
intergovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and religious and terrorist
organizations also hold noteworthy influence. Despite the complexity added by non-state
actors, the traditional schools of international theory ― realism and idealism ― hold the
state as the main actor in the international arena.
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International relations theory, similar to all social science theory, is not predicated
on any scientific facts. Its fluid, contradictory, and often conditional. Hence, it should be
understood in relation to its particular context. No one theory should be held as a general
theory. Paul Wilkinson has a useful way of wording this predicament: “[the main schools
of thought] constitute ways of perceiving international relations, metaphors or models
which appeal to their adherents because that is the way they prefer to view the world.”21
Essentially, which theory appeals to one is often contingent on their lived experience and
how their lived experience is emulated on the international stage. With that in mind, let's
take a look at some of the most influential theories of international relations that help one
make sense of an interconnected, interdependent, and unpredictable world.

2.2.1 Realism
Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes are generally seen as the forefathers of
the modern realist school of thought. Machiavelli and Hobbes ― articulated in their The
Prince (1532) and The Leviathan (1651), respectively ― hold a worldview predicated on
human beings motivated, naturally and unconditionally, by their own self-interests. The
most precarious and enriching self-interest humans pursue is political power, which is
entrenched within the state. Whether one wants to penetrate the state or maintain their
rule over the state, the prince must accept coercion and violence as paramount to their
ends. Though Machiavelli and Hobbes thoughts are targeted at capturing and retaining
the state, the emphasis they place on power positioned them as the forefathers of realism,
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which holds power as paramount to any inter-state analysis. While they wrote in the era
before the establishment of the nation-state, their deep respect for power influenced
international relations theorists in later ages as the world became an increasingly
interconnected and interdependent.
Realism is predicated on a matter-of-fact analysis. In the international realm there
is not a overarching state who projects power over the entire globe, nor is there a grand
arbitror, or global government, to settle disputes and insecurities between states.
Therefore, the international system is defined by disorder and constant power struggle ―
a state known as anarchy. The accumulation of power is the best guarantee against
encroachment and survival ― similar to how Machiavelli and Hobbes conceived power
as paramount to human interests and a ruler’s perpetuation. Accordingly, military power
is necessary for defence, expansion, and the pursuit of a state’s raison d'etat (national
interest). Military power is conditional on wealth and population, so industry and a large
healthy population are seen as priorities for existent and rising powers. Eliminating
conflict and war are viewed as futile efforts. As long as an anarchist system persists,
realists stress the imperativeness of alliance-building, the state as the key political actor,
balance of power, and an objection to empowering international organizations and
entrusting agreements with collective security measures.
Despite these underlying commonalities, realism is not a unified theory. It has
evolved over time and has taken on many transformations and adaptations. Twentieth
century realist discourse was dominated by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Walt, who are
regarded as classical realists and structural realists, respectively. For Morgenthau, it is
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human nature that explains the behavior of a state; human beings possess a “will to
power” that is insatiable.22 States are led by humans, so the state system manifests in a
manner that evokes the behavior of humans and their appetite for power. Morgenthau
suggests that states will always be on the offensive, seeking opportunities to dominate
and extract resources that will enhance their relative power. He argues that the
international system is better served by a multipolar balance of regional and global
powers; his opinions stemmed from the perceived danger of the US/USSR rivalry.
Kenneth Walt, on the other hand, argues that the power struggle that defines the
international system is not predicated on human nature, but on the international system’s
innate disposition towards anarchy. States, therefore, assume an attitude of survival,
meaning they pursue power because it is the best insurance policy against defeat. In other
words, states seek survival, not necessarily the domination of other states. In fact, he
makes the case that most states behave defensively, in hopes of maintaining the balance
of power that created stability. For Walt, balancing is a strong counter to offensive
behavior, yet, contrary to Morgenthau, he claims bipolarity creates enhanced stability
over a multipolar system.
A noteworthy addition to defensive realism was developed by Robert Jervis,
George Quester, and Stephen Van Evera. They argue that war is more likely to transpire
when states can easily conquer each other. Thus, when defensive measures are more
attractive and accessible than offense ones, peace should become prevalent and
cooperation should flourish. The key is to get states to develop and value defensive
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weaponry over offensive weaponry ― allowing for a healthy, but tilted, balance between
offensive and defensive measures.
John Mearsheimer's theory of “offensive realism” ushered realism into the post
Cold War era. Mearsheimer’s theory is laid out in his book The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics. He argues that states pursue power because it is the requisite for survival within
an archaic international system. Offensive realism is a structural theory of international
relations and, thus, it is similar to defensive realism. However the former differentiates
itself from latter over the question of how much power states want to accumulate.23
Defensive realism holds that states wish to maintain the current balance of power rather
than to chase more. Offensive realism, however, “believes that status quo powers are
rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful
incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and
take advantage of those situations when benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate
goal is to be the hegemon in the system.”24 Offensive realism shares a commonality with
classical realism: great powers unremittingly work toward enhancing their relative power
to other contending states. Yet, there is an underlying difference. Classical realists
understand state behavior as an extension of humanity’s innate drive to dominate,
whereas offensive realists predicate state behavior on the fact that more power increases a
state’s odds of survival in an archaic system. Hence, offensive realism implies the
following: power struggle is not inevitable, but is guaranteed under a system
characterized by anarchy. If anarchy could be suppressed, the nature of the system would
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change. Nevertheless, Mearsheimer’s theory is creating a lot of noise because it predicts
China will not rise to great power status peacefully; he predicts a confrontation between it
and the United States is inevitable.25

2.2.1 Idealism
The liberal school of international relations can be viewed as a set of reactions to
the pessimistic nature of realist thought. Though there is a broad range of liberal theories,
they have in common the belief that certain measures, institutions, and organizations can
be adopted that will help prevent destructive power struggles and the wars that come with
them. Liberal theories find their origin in the time of enlightenment when the intellectuals
of Europe were constructing and advocating ideas that they thought would make the
world a better place to live if they were institutionalized within the state.26 Proponents of
this school of thought ― such as E.H. Carr and Woodrow Wilson ― tend to be optimistic
towards the possibility of making the world a safer and more peaceful place. Just as
liberals of the enlightenment were labeled utopian for their belief that a democratic
government would lead to internal harmony and national prosperity, liberals of
international relations are often pegged as idealistic and naive. Yet, they hold firm in their
belief that global cooperation and mutual exchange, as well as economic interdependence
and the spread of democracy, will alleviate the international system of its anarchic state.
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Liberal theories are supportive of three prospective institutions that could lead to
international stability: economic interdependence, democratization, and international
institutions. Supporters of economic interdependence see inter-state, economic
contingency as a force for stability. That is, if a state’s economy and its growth are reliant
on other states ― and vice-versa ― then states will be less likely to engage in conflict.
War would disrupt economic prosperity. Considering economic wealth is an input to
military power, states are reluctant to undermine their economic well being with
attritional warfare against states whose wellbeing is closely connected to theirs.
The second theory ― democratic peace ― upholds democracy as a means of
suppressing inter-state power struggle. Advocates of this theory presume democratic
states do not go to war with one another, but they stop short of considering democracies
less warlike than their counterparts. The inherent values of democracy ― liberty,
freedom, and free speech ― prevent like minded states from going to war with one
another, thereby escaping the aggressive and offensive tendencies that dictatorial,
authoritarian, or monarchical states exhibit when they face each other or democratic
states in the international arena. The democratic peace theory’s inaugural incarnation was
expressed and pursued by Woodrow Wilson, hence the term ‘Wilsonian idealism.’
Last, there is a subgroup of the liberal paradigm that argues the establishment and
the perpetual enhancement of international institutions will eventually overcome the
historic trap of international warfare. That is, international institutions will encourage
cooperation among states. These institutions and their organizational manifestations ―
the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, NATO, and the EU ― did not render
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sovereignty meaningless, but, rather, stand as a set of important organizations with the
influence to shape what is considered acceptable state behavior. Currently, these norms of
conduct are not foisted upon states; they are negotiated and based on compromise and
mutual exchange. Hence, these institutions lay out prescriptions, not proscriptions to
member states. Proponents of international institutions believe international law poses as
a strong incentive for states to prioritize collective security over the narrow mindedness
and fallibility of raison d'etat.

2.2.2 Marxism and Deconstructivism
Within the field of international relations, there is a third, less conventional field
of thought: radicalism. The most well-known of these theories ― Marxism ― challenges
the assumptions underpinning the state system by pinpointing the capitalist system as the
catalyst of international conflict. Its suggests a socialist plan of transformation that
would, in theory, bring an end to state power struggle and the exploitation of the working
class. Stephen M. Walt explains, orthodox marxist theory holds that “capitalist states
battle each other as a consequence of the incessant struggle for profits and battled
socialist states because they saw in them the seeds of their own destruction.”27
Subsequently, it was argued, and still is argued, that capitalist states exploit
underdeveloped states at the expense of the latter's well being; furthermore, these
exploited states become dependent on the capitalist state's extractive behavior. This
theory is known as neo-Marxist dependency theory. Yet, Walt states, “both of these
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theories were largely discredited before the Cold War even ended.”28 Academics point to
history to dislodge these theories as viable explanations for international conflict. First,
examples of cooperation between capitalist nations are abundant, suggesting capitalism
does not naturally lead to conflict. Second, it was shown that energetic participation in
the world economy is a better path to prosperity than isolated, socialist development and
underdeveloped nations were not without example of successful negotiation with
multinational corporations in the global north. Nevertheless, there is some truth to be
found in neo-Marxist theory ― particularly its argument of imperialism augmenting
underdevelopment ― but it hard to argue for its viability as a theory that explains
inter-state conflict.
As Marxism capitulated as a reasonable theory for international conflict, its
legacy and insight is held tight by a group of academics who were well versed in literary
criticism and social theory. Their school of thought became known as deconstructivism.
It should be noted that these theorists did not offer holistic alternatives to the mainstream
theories of realism and idealism, just critiques to these theories. Their “approach was
openly skeptical of the effort to devise general or universal theories such as realism or
idealism.”29 As a result, deconstructivism does not offer a unified theory of international
relations.
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2.2.3 International Relations in the 21st Century
The end of the Cold War marks a new era for the discipline of international
relations. Gone are the days of the bipolar and ideological delineation of geopolitics.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union it is not uncommon for Americans, including
academics, to be to be optimistic for the future of international politics. According to
their logic, a U.S. victory ended the era of great power politics and it renders obsolete the
concept of balance of power. We now live in an era of international cooperation and
mutual exchange. Some go as far as to say the new order will remain into perpetuity, as
invoked by Fukuyama's phrase “the end of history.” The realist school of thought is seen
as outdated. However, September 11th, 2001 and its aftermath diminishes the credibility
of the aforementioned word view. Accordingly, the aforementioned is no longer widely
held.
What is undisputed is international relations has indeed adapted to a time period
with a whole new set of questions and concerns. Walt suggests a general alteration of the
discipline as it embraced a new age: “non-American voices are more prominent, a wider
range of methods and theories are seen as legitimate, and new issues such as ethnic
conflict, the environment, and the future of the state have been on the agenda of scholars
everywhere.”30 In terms of how individual countries will alter the current order, China is
paramount. In fact, China’s growth might very well be the defining feature of the 21st
century ― its consequences will be felt all across the world. Of equal importance will be
America’s reaction to China’s enhancement, as the former’s economic and military
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preponderance declines in relative and, perhaps, absolute terms. Also of substance for the
21st century will be climate change, the outcome of the Middle East, and the war on
terror. Russia, Japan, India and the European project’s growing preponderance and
strength will also play a role. These issues and the policies of the aforementioned
countries will transcend borders and playout in distant regions of the world, such as
Africa and South America. The schools of international relations produce useful insight
regarding these matters. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the value of these
schools of thought to each issue mentioned above. Yet, as the reader reflects on these
issues, Walt provides useful advice that can perhaps serve as an immediate substitute:
“The ‘complete diplomat’ of the future should remain cognizant of realism’s emphasis on
the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism’s awareness of domestic forces in mind,
and occasionally reflect on constructivism’s vision of change.”31 With that said, one
should keep these schools of thought in mind as the paper approaches the section of
contextualizing U.S.-Iranian relations and Iran’s prospective role in the 21st century.

2.3 Diplomacy
While international relations is best understood as the study of how and why
states interact with each other, diplomacy is the real-life practice and manifestation of
inter-state interaction. As organizations, states do not naturally engage with one another
― state engagement is ultimately the product of a humans interacting with humans on
behalf of a state. Diplomacy, thus, brings to fruition international relations as an
31
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academic discipline. One cannot be a practitioner of international relations, but one can
be a practitioner of diplomacy: a diplomat.
In today’s world, states are not the only player in international relations;
multinational corporations, intergovernmental organizations, terrorist and crime
organizations, and religious organizations all play a role in shaping international society
and its future. For this reason, there is a growing trend to treat international relations as
obsolete and replace it with the term world politics, as it is inclusive of non-state actors.
This development has impacted the conceptualization of diplomacy. It is increasingly
seen as a tool that is of use to individuals beyond that of just statesman. These trends are
part of a larger debate on globalization and the state. Some argue that globalization is
rendering the state obsolete, while others deny the erosion of sovereignty. Nevertheless,
before prospects of the future can be more thoroughly explored, we must make sense of
where we are now by looking at the history of modern diplomacy. Its history is closely
aligned with the development of the state.

2.3.1 Peace of Westphalia, Sovereignty, and Modern Diplomacy
Diplomacy has been an integral component of organizational life for centuries.
The formation of settled populations into urban centers gave impetus to confrontation and
disagreement between neighboring settlements. Diplomacy, in its rudimentary form, was
used in the transitionary times of warfare to peace and vice-versa. Over the centuries as
empires rose and fell, diplomacy was a frequent practice that allowed for empires to
maintain relations across their multi-ethnic population ― though this manifestation of
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diplomacy was technically internal ― and support relations with other empires. As
humans and their institutions progressed and technology advanced, the nature of
diplomacy evolved. Diplomacy became a perpetual, proactive and daily practice, no
longer confined to transitional periods between peace and war or in times of
disagreement. It is no longer a reactionary tool. Today, there are different conceptions of
diplomacy and, thus, different, definitions. Yet, it is hard to deny that diplomacy has
shaped the world in which we live.
For the purpose of brevity, a relatively in depth exploration of diplomacy will be
limited to the tradition that finds its roots in the build up to the Peace of Westphalia and
its solidification in the subsequent hundred years; this tradition is still, to some extent,
practiced to this day. The year of 1648 is the typical date used to designate the advent of
modern diplomacy, as it generally marks the birth of the nation-state. More importantly,
it was at this time that states formed a common agreement on the principle of
Sovereignty, which is a defining feature of the state system. These developments were
not abrupt; hence, modern diplomacy was established in piecemeal throughout the
preceding centuries. As the nature and the structure of the state evolved, diplomacy had
to adapt to fulfill the needs of the time and place. Also, the states of Europe did not
progress along identical timelines, so it is impossible to date these developments as they
occurred at different times across Europe, according to the historical, intellectual and
political status of each, respective state.
In the Classical and Medieval periods, the principle of Sovereignty was a loose set
of ideas. Sovereignty didn’t find formal articulation until Jean Bodin (1530-1596) laid
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out the concept in detail. It would take another 50-100 years before sovereignty was
widely accepted. Medieval monarchs did not enjoy sovereignty because the feudal-state
necessitated the sharing of power with his trustis in order to maintain authority. The
Church also had a role in maintaining the monarch's supremacy. Eventually, a few
monarchs were able to escape the power limitations of feudalism and extend their reach
over larger and larger swaths of territory ― the states of England and France are
examples. These monarchs no longer needed to delegate power to the trustis to maintain
authority over a territory. Monarchs became the central authority, dependent only on its
own faculties. While the feudal aristocrats were disposed, the power of the church
remained a hindrance for a group of monarchical states across Europe or it stood as an
integral component of authority, as in the case of the Holy Roman Empire. Hence, while
some monarchical states operated free of papal authority, others were still contained by
the papacy.
Correspondingly, medieval Europe was characterized by an aspiration to
universality ― to resurrect the traditions of the Roman Empire and attach it to the
growing power of the Catholic Church. Accordingly, the feudal states of Northern Italy
and Germany were under the auspices of the Holy Roman Emperor during the 17th
century. France and England were independent states ― beacons of sovereignty ―
though they remained devoted to the Catholic Church. For most of the medieval period,
the Holy Roman Emperor lacked the ability to project his political power across his entire
empire. Hence, its claims to universality was nothing but empty posturing. The Habsburg
dynasty, however, resurrected the power of the Holy Roman Emperor through the
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acquisition of Spain; furthermore, Emperor Charles V revived the imperial authority to a
threshold capable of expanding his empire into central Europe. Such an empire would
have been so large and powerful that it would have been capable of asserting its authority
over the entirety of the European continent, perhaps even England. Yet, it was the
outbreak of the Reformation that prevented this outcome and it empowered princes to
break with the universal dictates of Rome. Supporting the emperor was not longer seen as
a religious duty. Despite the effort of the Counter-Reformation, which led to the 30 Years
War, the Holy Roman Emperor could not withstand the military and philosophical might
of its opponents. After the Peace of Westphalia, the Holy Roman Empire was divided
into hundreds of sovereign states who were free to conduct their own foreign policy.
Many of these states did not evolve into nation-states; they were subsumed by quarrels
and military conflicts.
The foundation of international society was now to be based on sovereignty. The
order is referred to as Westphalian Sovereignty and is based on three principles: (1) a
state is subject to no outside authority, so it is entitled to complete control over its
designated territory and domestic affairs; (2) no state can interfere in the domestic
policies of another state; (3) each state, no matter its resources or size, is treated equal in
international law.32 Accordingly, diplomacy had to adapt for a new age based on raison
d'etat and balance of power.
The transition from empire to the westphalian state was the impetus for a new
incarnation of diplomacy. In the time of empires, diplomacy was typically a reactive tool.
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The international order that emerged out of the Peace of Westphalia not only used
diplomacy as a response to crises, but also as a means to preemptively honor the principle
of sovereignty and maintain a balance of power. Thus, diplomacy became a preemptive
and daily affair. Organizations ― in the form of embassies and consulates ― and
positions ― foreign ministers and their deputies ― were created to allow for states to
engage in frequent dialogue.
From the propositions of sovereignty arose three institutions that shape the
composure of international society. Of the three, inter-state diplomacy is one; the other
two are realized and associated with its practice: (1) a professional diplomatic service; (2)
balance of power; (3) and treaties between states that have the status of law.33 Treaties
and congresses ― the documents and assemblies that bring balance of power into
practice ― were brought into fruition by state representatives: diplomats. In the past,
empire was the typical form of government; empires do not wish to operate within an
international system and strike a balance of power that will allow for stability; empires
aspire to be the international system.34

2.4 Balance of Power and Raison d’etat
The premier implications of sovereignty on diplomacy are expressed through the
concepts of raison d'etat (national interest) and the balance of power. These principles
arose out of the political environment of the 17th century described in the previous
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section. Raison d’etat was used as a rationale for acting out against the Church. Henry
Kissinger describes the historical necessity of these concepts:
With the concept of unity collapsing, the emerging states of Europe
needed some principle to justify their heresy and to regulate their relations.
They found it in the concepts of raison d’etat and the balance of power.
Each depended on the other. Raison d’etat asserted that the wellbeing of
the state justified whatever means were employed to further it; the
national interest supplanted the medieval notion of a universal morality.
The balance of power replaced the nostalgia for universal monarchy with
the consolation that each state, in pursuing its own selfish interests, would
somehow contribute to the safety and progress of all the others.35
France and England were faced with the prospect of destruction if they let the Holy
Roman Empire expand and consolidate its authority in central Europe. Thus, it was in
their national interest ― their raison d’etat ― to challenge the empire and the papacy.
Fortunately for France, the reformation provided rivalries to exploit in their favor.
Consequently, France backed a number of protestant states that would amount to a
coalition against the Holy Roman Empire. In other words, by supporting Protestant
German princes and the Protestant King of Sweden, France was able form a balanced of
power against the Holy Roman Empire’s ambition on the continent. For the time it was
revolutionary maneuver: a Catholic nation-state was backing the protestant apostates in
the name of national interest.
The primary statesman who conducted France’s foreign policy was Cardinal de
Richelieu; ironically, he was a prince of the Church. Kissinger describes the radicalness
of his approach and his legacy on the modern state system:
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Few statesmen can claim a greater impact on history. Richelieu
was the father of the modern state system. He promulgated the concept of
raison d’etat and practiced it relentlessly for the benefit of his own
country. Under his auspices, raison d’etat replaced the medieval concept
of universal moral values as the operating principle of French policy.
Initially, he sought to prevent Habsburg domination of Europe, but
ultimately left a legacy that for the next two centuries tempted his
successors to establish French primacy in Europe. Out of the failure of
these ambitions, a balance of power emerged, first as a fact of life, then as
a system for organizing international relations.36
Therefore, raison d’etat is adverse to restraining state behavior to a moral code. The
Habsburg dynasty of the Holy Roman Empire was unable to adapt to the rules of raison
d’etat; that is, the emperor Ferdinand II would not pursue his universal empire through
means that would not be in align with the doctrine of God and the Church. That is, he
refused to engage in treaties with the Muslim Turks or the Protestant Swedes. Essentially,
he was more concerned with obedience to God then the welfare of his empire.37 For the
nation-state, raison d’etat proved more versatile and, thus, superior to actions regulated
by strict moral law.
The pursuit of raison d’etat leads to the objective of predominance or to the
formation of equilibrium. The former often results in over extension and self destructive
military adventures, as with France at the beginning of the 19tn century and Germany in
the first and second World War. When a dominant power arises, in pursuit of its
perceived national interest, and it threatens the safety of its neighbors, they form a
coalition to resist the aspirations of the aggressor. If in aggregate these nations are able to
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check the aggressor so as to prevent imperious action, a balance of power has emerged.
The goal of balance of power is not to prevent conflict, but to limit conflict.
For the first 150 years or so after the Peace of Westphalia, a balance of power
arose de facto, not be design. The intentional and premeditated construction of a balance
of power would not form until the Congress of Vienna in 1814. Ironically, after the Peace
of Westphalia, France’s raison d’etat required it to expand in Europe. To the East, the
German States were weak, numerous, and lacked unity. To the East lay the Netherlands, a
relatively weak state. Hence, France was enticed by the prospect of expansion. England
led the effort to create a coalition to check the aggression of France; it realized if France
became the dominant power on the continent, its position would be at stake. A coalition
was formed ― known as the Grand Alliance ― to balance against France; Louis XIV
would rage constant warfare against the alliance for nearly a quarter of a century. While
France remained the strongest country in Europe, it would not dominate the continent. In
should be noted that the Grand Alliance was not established for the sake of balance of
power theory, but because it was a necessity for the Netherlands and England if they
wished to maintain independence; or, at least, that is how they calculated it.38 An
intentional equilibrium ― in the name of the theory of balance of power ― would
emerge in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars.
The concepts of balance of power and raison d'etat are the heart of the European
tradition of diplomacy. These tenets arose throughout an era of political change,
immense international conflict and conciliation; they were the products of the European
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experience in the 17th-19th century. Yet, the tenets of modern diplomacy have been
adopted and practiced by all states. The adaptation happened inorganically, initially
through colonialism and then by decolonization’s subsequent waves of nationalism, when
the nation-state was cemented as the unit of the international system and imperial empire
declined. Accordingly, state’s typically conduct international affairs with their national
interests as their prime concern (as opposed to a cooperative institution, such as the
United Nations, or a region organization, such as the European Union). While balance of
power is a proven tool of European diplomacy, it is not as widely embraced or
intentionally invoked as national interests is within the international system.

2.4.1 Alternative Tenets to Diplomacy
The United States is the only nation to have offered alternative principles to help
guide diplomacy, while, simultaneously, possessing the power to project those principles.
In fact, the United States has a tradition of antipathy towards balance of power. Woodrow
Wilson is the 20th century father of this odium, though it's prodromes are traced to the
preceding century. For Wilson, a better world comes about not be adherence to principles
of balance of power, but through the proliferation of institutions or crusades embedded
with the principles of liberty and democracy. Hence, he advocated for a messianic
American diplomacy and the construction of inter-state institutions. The American people
were not prepared to leave their position of isolationism at the time of Wilson and they
would not be for another 25 years, but Wilson did possess the political power to establish
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the the league of nations39: the institutional incarnation of his conception of international
affairs and diplomacy. Balance of power animosity was the product of the American
experience: industrialization and expansion conducted in relative isolation, with the
protection of an ocean each side. Wilsonianism has a deep legacy in American
diplomacy.40
Despite the United State’s aversion to balance of power, the U.S. has participated
in it ― as an offshore balancer ― and it has benefited from it. For the first 125 years of
its existence, the Concert of Europe ― the first intentionally designed balance of power
― helped prevent European interference in American affairs. When the Concert
collapsed, it was France, Russia, and Britain that checked the aggression of the German
Empire through military means. The United States went so far as to reinforce the de facto
balance of power through the application of its military might at the end of WWI. It
would be forced to do the same in WWII, after the league of nations failed to contain
German expansion ― in fact, there is a strong argument that the Treaty of Versailles
provoked Germany anger and expansionism. Hence, while the U.S. detests balance of
power, it is a tool of necessity in the face of aggression. Pleas to liberty and freedom do
not hold up well against empire and nazism. At its best, balance of power is design
intentionally, primarily through diplomacy. At its worst, balance of power is maintained
through military alliance and the application of military might.

The League of Nations Treaty was never ratified by congress so the U.S. was never a
member, though it did contribute to its formation.
40
For more on this topic, see Perry Anderson’s American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers
39
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2.4.2 Homogeneity and Domestic Institutions and Sentiments
Unlike the political architecture of a state, there is by and large uniformity in the
structure of international affairs. In other words, states possess a variety of political ideas
― democracy, constitutional monarchy, or theocracy, to name a few ― that produce
unique political experiences. A state within the international system, however, is faced
with the same system of organization ― or lack thereof, as conveyed by the concept
anarchy ― that all other nations confront. In a sense, then, all states will have a similar
encounter as they conduct diplomacy in the face of anarchy. International experience
differs along the lines of power, not along the lines of structure. All nations are faced
with the same structure, but not all nations have the power to dominate, reform, or
revolutionize the structure. It is the job of diplomacy to maneuver a state through an
archaic international system, all the while guarding the state's national interest
Accordingly, states do not drastically shape how they interacts with the
state-system with regard to the structure of its domestic political institutions. All states
face the hegemonic, Westphalian order of international politics, which restricts the degree
of agency they enjoy to shape their behavior in the international arena. Unless if a state
possess the power necessary to seriously challenge the hegemonic order and raise the
prospect of a establishing a new tradition of international statecraft, all states are limited
by the norms, structures, and institutions of the Westphalian order.
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Within this order, however, states are free to determine their own national
interests;41 it's the differences in national interests across states that create divergences in
state behavior. States, though, will adjust their level of involvement to the international
system based on domestic sentiments. This is exemplified by Castlereagh's failure to
convince England to commit to constant engagement on the European continent by the
means of the Concert of Europe. The House of Lords objected to England's participation;
Castlereagh was not able to ignore the representative institution of Parliament. Hence,
structural, long-term ventures are constrained by domestic opinions, particularly in
democratic societies. Within absolutist forms of government, public opinion is typically
peripheral or secondary to the decision making process. However, regardless of domestic
sentiment, states face the Westphalian conception of statecraft and its modern, liberal
democratic form. While nations defy the dictums of the order (e.g. North Korea & Iran),
they fall short of seriously challenging the perpetuity of the order. In the 21st century,
only a rising super power such as China or India would have the capacity to challenge the
status quo, which, as shown above, finds its roots in the 17th century Europe and its
contemporary guardian in the United States.

2.5 Leadership
Leadership is an integral component of organizational life. Its scope is wide:
politics, economics, religion, and culture, each of which have their own subgroups. The
If a state’s national interest challenges the hegemonic order of statecraft, the
state-supporters of the status quo will push back against the counter-hegemonic thrust
(e.g. the allies counter the Third Reich).
41
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scale of leadership varies too, with small scale, community leadership at one end and
transnational leadership at the other end. The common thread between all leadership roles
is social power. Accordingly, leaders have a greater range of assets than their peers,
allowing them to stretch constraints on resources, institutions, and circumstances. This
section will talk broadly of leadership, but it will favor political leadership and its
requisite form of social power: political power.
All great human achievements and endeavors have been headed by an individual
or a small regime, who have the authority to make decisions at the collective level.
Leadership centralizes decision making processes into the hands of a select few. At its
best, leadership can help a project of transformation in terms of efficiency and efficacy.
Yet, because leadership condenses power to an individual, poor and incompetent
leadership can have disastrous consequences. In the realm of political leadership,
institutions are implemented to ensure a leader does not have absolute power to make all
decisions at the collective level ― a bulwark against inept or totalitarian leadership.
Effective leadership begins with a clear understanding that its practice is found at the
intersection of two dual, but antithetical concepts: agency and structure.

2.5.1 Agency and Structure
Agency is centered around freedom. It implies the ability to choose an action
whereas freedom is the ability to follow through on a choice. In other words, freedom
allows one to act in response to their own dictates (agency). Agency permits one to
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choose change ― individual or collective and on a range of scales ― and freedom allows
one to drive it. Agency, however, is in constant tension with what is known as structure:
constraints that limit the range of one’s actions; they stress the composition of one’s
circumstances. Often, these restrictions lean towards the reproduction of past and current
set up. Institutions are how the past reproduces in the present. Hence, structures manifest
through political, economic, legal and social institutions (e.g. constitution, private
property, criminal law, and familial norms, respectively). Ultimately, agency and
structure pose a quandary: structure is the constraint to agency, yet it is agency that has
the ability to break structure.
As humans, we are intelligent, purposeful primates, who are capable of setting
goals and manipulating our environment. We have the ability for inner subjectivity,
which allows us to examine ourselves and our circumstances. If unsatisfied, we as
humans can dare to use our agency to reform or transform our circumstances. If a human
acts to alter a circumstance that people are faced with (e.g. lack of universal health care),
they are elevating their agency to a collective level that might ultimately affect other
people’s lives. In most circumstances, this person will need the support of others if they
wish to take on the status quo. When this occurs, an individual is on the cusp of
leadership. However the intention or desire to create change will not suffice ― an
individual must have resources to pair their agency and vision with if they wish to see
success. Resources give people the freedom to live out their agency.
In the case of political leadership, faculties of violence, intellectual prowess and
historical insight, and awe are some of resources that can help raise an individual into a
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leadership position. Academics and leaders are inconsistent on which of these inputs they
regard as paramount. I will touch on a few ― these thinkers thoughts on the matter are
largely representative of the demands of their time period, so they should not be ingested
as perennial truths.

2.5.2 Competencies, Resources, and Inputs
In The Prince, Niccoló Machiavelli lays out a series of pithy maxims on
leadership, principalities, and human nature. For Machiavelli, adept leadership arises
from the acknowledgement that power is paramount to all other faculties or traits that
could constitute a Prince’s position and character. Machiavelli’s phrase, “what men do,”
captures the human tendency to be self-invested and, above all, to do whatever we can to
escape premature death and poverty. To guard against demise, the prince must perceive
humane nature pragmatically and, thus, subjugate virtuous aims and morality to political
realities. Machiavelli summarizes the logic of his realist posture:
And many have imagined for themselves republics and principalities that
no one has ever seen or known to be in reality. Because how one ought to
live is so far removed from how one lives that he who lets go of what is
done for that which one ought to do sooner learns ruin than his own
preservation: because a man who might want to make a show of goodness
in all things necessarily comes to ruin among so many that are not good.42
Hence, Machiavelli advises those aspiring to a role of leadership to be prepared to go
against their ideals, as there will come a time when they must defy what they think
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should be in order to confront what is (i.e. the reality of the matter). Political power and
realism are the twin dictums that lead to political success for Machiavelli.
It should be noted that Machiavelli lived and wrote in a time of transition. The
feudal order of the middle ages was to be imminently replaced by an order with sovereign
nation-states at its foundation. His words were written to help restore republican
government, resemblant of the Roman Republic. Thirty-five years after his death, Europe
was plagued by the Wars of Religion. His ideas influenced the realization of sovereign
during the 100 years after the Peace of Westphalia. However, the relevance of
Machiavelli's thoughts diminished as the state transitioned from absolutism to
constitutional monarchy and eventually, to liberal democracy. As the nature of politics
transformed to a representative era, Machiavelli's maxims lost some of their explanatory
power.
As the state became increasingly penetrable by citizens, political leadership took
on a new, or at least an additional, form. While Machiavelli was concerned with rise and
glory of the prince, others became concerned with citizens and their access to the state. In
other words, in the years leading up to the French Revolution and in the proceeding
one-hundred years, intellectuals built a philosophical tradition that claimed the state
belonged to the people ― not to an absolute monarch. The practitioners of this tradition
― the soldiers of an idealised world ― took on a role of political leadership that was
largely unprecedented: leaders emerged who claimed to represent citizens and their desire
to make a unified claim to the state.
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With the democratic age on the horizon, intellectuals wrote treatises on how to
successfully penetrate the state. One such scholar was Ludwig Von Rochau, a liberal who
coined the concept Realpolitik, in response to the European Revolutions of 1848. His
book ― Foundations of Realpolitik ― explored a question of immense importance to this
day: “how to achieve liberal enlightened goals… in a world that did not follow liberal
enlightened rules.”43 Foundations of Realpolitik was a response to a liberal idealism that
lacked efficacy.
Rochau, like Machiavelli, understood power as the determining factor of politics.
Hence, he advised his liberal compatriots to accept the fact that change could not be
implemented without preponderance or without linking liberal ideals to the interests of
those who held power. Given the condition of the German Empire at his time, Rochau
advocated for the latter. He believed statesmen could be convinced to accept the ideas of
constitutionalism if they were persuaded that repression was not in the interest of the
state. That is, a constitution would give monarchs a potent method of harnessing and
balancing the powerful societal forces of the age. John Bew, a scholar of Realpolitik,
explains Rochau’s thinking: “the conditions of modernity had changed the nature of
statecraft … in previous historical eras, the state had often been able to flatten and subdue
challenges to its authority through the use of violence, as Machiavelli had described in
The Prince.”44 Technology and the rise of the bourgeoisie and the middle class had
changed the character of politics. Suppression through violence would no longer work as
it had in the days of Machiavelli.
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Ultimately, Rochau detected that public opinion now mattered in politics.
Consequently, he argued that the zeitgeist (the “spirit of the age”) is the most important
factor in determining the direction of state’s politics. John Bew expounds on this point,
using his own analysis and the words of Rochau:
The Zeitgeist was the ‘consolidated opinion of the century as expressed in
certain principles, opinions and habits of reason.’ An opinion transformed
itself into the Zeitgeist to the extent that it stood the test of time. The
Zeitgeist represented in all circumstances the most important influence on
the overall directions of politics. For a state to act in defiance of the
zeitgeist was completely self-defeating … To put it simply, liberalism and
nationalism could not be put back into the box. With the help of a strong
police force, it may be ‘possible to manipulate citizenry like puppets’ but
the ideals they held on to could not be smothered forever.45
With that said, Rochau advises one to possess a deep understanding of history and how
the past continues to shape the present and constrain the prospects of the future. Hence,
an aspiring leader learns that historical perception and a deep understanding of the spirit
of the age are necessary complements to political power if one is to be a consummate
political leader.
In summary, I encourage the reader to perceive leadership at the intersection of
agency and structure; or, in other words, at the intersection of choice and context. At this
point of convergence, resources, ideas, and opportunity come together. Leadership can
thus be defined as the possession of a set of critical competencies ― which include, but
are not limited to the ability to tactfully use violence, read into historical and current
narratives, formulate a set of ideas that inspire and resonate ― that help one drive a
process of transformation.
45
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It should be noted that leaders come in two types: revolutionary leaders and tinker
leaders. The former strives to invalidate the past by building something new ― the
creation of a new set of institutions. They devote their time, resources, and position of
power to building a new future. Revolutionary leadership is arduous to lead and very hard
to execute. Tinker leadership, on the other hand, takes a reformist approach. That is, the
leader is intent on change, and no less intrinsically so than that of the revolutionary
leader, but she is keen on driving change that does not shock the current structure, or the
current institutions under which she operates. The change is not a deep transformation
that redefines, in totality, the concept of structure as it pertains to a country, social group,
etc. Essentially, tinker leaders do not advocate for the a total rejection of the past.
Whether tinker or revolutionary leadership is appropriate depends on the circumstances,
the trajectory of transformation, and one's political orientation.
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CHAPTER III: KISSINGER: LIFE, POLICY, AND THINKING

Henry Kissinger is a statesman of unique makeup. He rose to the highest levels of
the United States government despite his rather un-American approach to foreign affairs.
Even though he spent the majority of his life in the United States, his tone and approach
never resembled America’s traditional conception of diplomacy. As such, he is a radical
and controversial figure in the American milieu.
His approach to diplomacy is not the only component that sets him apart from his
American predecessors and successors. Kissinger was an academic before he was a
statesman ― an intellectual heavyweight. His command of history and his clear
interpretation of its meaning sets him apart from other National Security Advisors and
Secretaries of State. Kissinger studied diplomacy for years before becoming the Chief
diplomat of the United States; this cannot be said, perhaps, for any other individual who
has held the same positions that he has.
All the while, his command of diplomatic history and his unprecedented approach
in the American tradition did not earn him universal reverence by the American people at
the time he exited government nor even now. In fact, his policies are a cause of
bewilderment if not outright dismissal, though individuals, particularly on the realist end
of the spectrum, do praise his tactics and achievements.
A consensus on Kissinger's tenure and legacy is nowhere to be found.
Biographies, exposés and hagiographies seek to reach a consensus but have failed to
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consolidate opinion. Perhaps a consensus will never be reached in our lifetime. In the
coming decades and centuries, posterity will define the legacy of Kissinger as it hashes
out a widely accepted narrative of history for his time period.
Like most people who leave their mark on historical development, Kissinger is a
controversial figure. Within Kissinger’s ten years of civil service, one can identify two
types of Kissinger. There is the Kissinger who constructed detenté, the arm control
treaties with Russia, shuttle diplomacy in the Middle, and the opening with China. Then
there is also the Kissinger who toppled the democratically elected president in Chile,
bombed Cambodia, prolonged the chaos in Vietnam, overlooked if not instigated
genocide in Bangladesh, as well as play a heavy hand in the domestic affairs of East
Timor, Kurdistan, Argentina, Uruguay, and Cyprus in order to fulfill his strategic
doctrine.
Nevertheless, it is easy to critique the decisions of a statesman in retrospect than it
is to actually make the decisions in the moment with asymmetrical and incomplete
information. Disaster averted is taken for granted while calamity is repeatedly expounded
as self-interest and criminality. The statesman should never be let off the hook for his
questionable actions, as that is what he signed up for ― he does not operate in a vacuum
void of criticism. Still, the paper is hesitant to choose a label for Kissinger.
Accordingly, I approach an overview of his life and policies in a rather balanced
fashion. I do not attempt to say definitively whether Kissinger should be regarded as
good or evil or worthy of reverence or scorn. What I do attempt to do is deduce his
theory. achievements and shortcomings, as well as isolate his greatests assets and
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liabilities. The aforementioned is conducted in the first section of the Chapter, which
provides a short biography and an overview of his time in office.
The second section is devoted to the philosophical and strategic thinking of Henry
Kissinger. It does not analyze Kissinger’s policy decisions in search of situations that
resemble the current deadlock between the U.S. and Iran. Rather, it seeks to derive a
framework ― somewhat theoretical and definitely conceptual ― of thinking that allows
one to examine US-Iranian relations without having to resort to particular policy
decisions that Kissinger enacted. His main foreign diplomatic convictions are isolated,
but no policies are looked at in hope of finding one that is applicable by analogy. In fact,
doing the aforementioned would be rather contradictory to Kissinger’s mode of thinking.
Finally, within the following paragraphs, one might encounter contradictions,
particularly between Kissinger in theory and in practice. These are intentional. Humans
are not seamless and consistent, let alone the statesman. I do not attempt to reconcile the
discrepancies in his actions and thought, just to lay them out as they are.

3.1 Biography
Henry Kissinger was born on May 27th, 1923 in Fürth, Germany. At this time, a
new period of Jewish repression and oppression was underway. As a Jew in Nazi
Germany, Kissinger’s liberties were restricted. Eventually, Henry’s mother ― Paula
Kissinger ― decided it to be best that her family leave Germany for the United States.
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The decision proved fateful. At least 13 of Kissinger’s close relatives were murdered in
the holocaust.
Yet, Kissinger minimizes the impact of the traumas he faced as a child on his life.
He stated to a reporter once, “‘My life in Furth seem to have passed without leaving any
lasting impressions’”46 and on another occasion he is quoted as saying, “‘that part of my
childhood is not a key to anything.’”47 Regardless of Kissinger’s demurrals, it hard to
believe his years in Nazi Germany had no impact on him. Kissinger’s mentor in the U.S.
Army ― Fritz Kraemer ― affirms the impact of his childhood:
For the formative years of his youth, he faced the horror of his world
coming apart, of the father he loved being turned into a helpless mouse…
it made him [Kissinger] seek order, and it led him to hunger for
acceptance.48
Hence, it seems that Kissinger’s childhood had, at least, a subconscious affect on his
outlook and development. Considering a close friend noticed an impact, it is possible to
connect a few notable characteristics that he displayed throughout his life to his
upbringing. I have identified a few of noteworthiness.
Kissinger’s childhood experiences instilled in him a deep distrust of people.
Neighbors and friends of the Kissinger family, who they thought they could trust, turned
their backs on them. When in office, he repeatedly acted on his unwarranted distrust of
those around him. He often conducted his diplomacy in secrecy (i.e. Paris Peace Accords)
and instituted a series of measures to spy and keep tabs on his colleagues (i.e. secret
wiretaps).
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A second legacy of Kissinger’s upbring is insecurity. Growing up, Kissinger was
exposed to forces that sought to convince him that he was worthless and inferior. These
forces came to have an imprint and influenced the complex of Kissinger, leaving him at
times socially fragile. Furthermore, Kissinger’s self-doubt is part of the reason why he
would attach himself to a series of patrons with strong personalities. Colonel Fritz
Kraemer, Professor William Elliot, and Nelson Rockefeller helped both to curb
Kissinger’s insecurity and foster his intellectual arrogance.
Furthermore, growing up as an outcast in his own country and being an refugee in
a foreign country, Kissinger was concerned with being accepted. Throughout his career,
Kissinger went out of his way to win the approval or persuade those who opposed his
ideas and actions. One of Kissinger’s longtime friends ― Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, ―
deemed his constant quest for social acceptance a manifestation of “‘his refugee’s desire
for approval.’”49
One can postulate that another legacy of his childhood was the appeal of
philosophical pessimism. The grievances he experienced as a child made him adverse to
thinking grounded in Idyllic naiveté. He came to favor the status quo over idealistic
notions of what could and should be. He opposed revolution. He had seen too vividly the
repercussions of transformation and the ensuing disorder.
At the age of 15, Kissinger arrived in New York City in 1938. Unlike his family
and his immigrant friends, Kissinger was more directed, more ambitious, and more
serious about assimilating and succeeding in America. He was looking for a way to
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escape his tight-knit Jewish community when he received a draft notice on his 19th
birthday; the year was 1943.
Kissinger was made a citizen of the United States at Camp Croft in South
Carolina. Over the course of the next three years, citizenship would transition from what
might have felt like a gift bestowed upon him, to an honor that he earned. Kissinger
conceded that the army “‘made [him] feel like an American.’”50 In addition to
Americanization, the army helped Kissinger ground himself as a practical man and it
exposed him to Fritz Kraemer, a Colonel and the individual who claims to have helped
Kissinger find himself. The two bonded on conservations that linked theory with history.
Impressed by Kissinger’s intellect, Kraemer became Kissinger’s patron. He help secure
him the role of administering captured towns and helped him ease his way into the
Counterintelligence Corps. In this position, Kissinger casted anger on his subordinates
who showed anti-German sentiments. He found it impractical to perpetuate the same kind
of hate that had given rise to Nazism. Hence, his realistic and practical orientation shined
through from an early age. At the end of Kissinger’s tour in 1946, Kraemer convince
Henry to go to Harvard.
Henry Kissinger received his Bachelor of Arts, Master of Arts, and PhD at
Harvard. While an undergraduate student at Harvard, Kissinger attached himself to
Professor William Elliott. He was similar to Kraemer in persona and he would act as
Kissinger’s benefactor at Harvard. Under his guidance, Kissinger’s realist and
conservative orientation evolved into a holistic and personal philosophy. His intellectual
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development culminated into a B.A. thesis titled the Meaning of History: Reflections on
Spengler, Toynbee, and Kant.
After completing his undergraduate, Elliotte placed Kissinger at the head of a
project that would remain in his hands for the next seventeen years: the Harvard
International Seminar. The program invited young leaders from around the world to
spend their summer at Harvard, where they would take classes in politics and humanities.
Some treat the International Institute as significant to the rise of Henry Kissinger, as it
helped him build a network of influential contacts.51 When in office, Kissinger would
often make use of the contacts he developed at the Institute.
Kissinger wrote his doctoral dissertation on a subject that would seem outdated in
1955, when the Nuclear Age was commencing. His thesis was titled, A World Restored:
Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22. Nevertheless, Kissinger
produced a piece of work that was more relevant to the Nuclear Age than one might
deduce from the title. The thesis laid the foundation for his approach to diplomacy:
balance of power by design and the pursuit of the national interest. The approach endured
throughout his career. To this day, he has not rebuked his method. Once he successfully
completed his PhD, Kissinger was reluctantly awarded a professorship in the Department
of Governance.
In 1955, Kissinger secured a job at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he
would analyze the impact of nuclear weapons on foreign policy with a study group of
specialist. The job proved consequential for direction of Kissinger’s ambition. The
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exposure to the inner workings of the New York foreign policy scene caused Kissinger to
realize that pursuing a career at Harvard would always leave him in on the fringes of
power. More importantly, it helped him realize that he did not want to be a professor for
the rest of this life. He yearned for power.
Before Kissinger returned to Harvard to resume teaching, he met a man by the
name of Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller. Mr.Rockefeller was the grandson of Standard Oil
scion John D. Rockefeller. He hired Kissinger as a part time consultant and aide.
Rockefeller became Kissinger’s third patron and the one with the most influence and
power. Their relationship was pivotal; it exposed him to realms of political power that he
would have unlikely had access to without a personal connection.
Between 1959 and 1968, Kissinger continued his professorial responsibilities at
Harvard while also participating in the political scene in Washington D.C. His heart was
truly in Washington. He worked as an advisor to Kennedy and then Lyndon Johnson,
while simultaneously working for Nelson Rockefeller. In 1967, Kissinger began his first
encounter with secret diplomacy. He single handedly discovered a channel to engage in
secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese while on a trip to Paris ― what became
known as the Pennsylvania Negotiations. Kissinger’s willingness to provide Presidential
Candidate Richard Nixon with back-channel insights about the Paris peace talks
provoked Nixon to pay heed to Kissinger.52 Thus, when Nixon won the Presidential
election of 1968, he offered Kissinger the position of National Security Advisor.
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The move was not as seamless as the paragraph gives off. Kissinger was quite deceitful in the
process of switching his allegiance to Nixon after the defeat of Rockefeller in the Presidential
primaries. For a full exposé of events, see Greg Grandin’s chapter “Ends and Means” in his book
Kissinger’s Shadow.

64

Kissinger accepted, enticed by Nixon’s desire to set up a strong National Security
Council staff in the White House, in order to seize the role of developing foreign policy
from the State Department.53 Kissinger would remain in office from 1969 to 1977, where
he would assume the role of National Security Advisor and, eventually, Secretary of State
under the Nixon and the Ford administration.

3.1.1 Historical Context
Henry Kissinger came into power at a time of international upheaval. Thus, the
climate for international transformation was ripe. It is generally understood that placated
environments inhibit direct and efficacious challenges to the status quo. Three main
historical dynamics were at play at the time when Kissinger assumed the role of National
Security Advisor in January 1969:54
1. The Vietnam war was at an impasse: victory was not insight and
withdrawal was difficult. More than 31,000 Americans had died in the
War. The ill conceived war was inciting a wave of American Isolationism.
The nation had to adjust to a new era of limits. It was the first time
Americans had to face the fact that foreign policy has innate limits.

The development and deepening of the national security state ― characterized
by imperialism, warfare, and unaccountability ― is the overarching argument of
Greg Grandin’s book Kissinger’s Shadow. He asserts that Kissinger’s policy and
style enabled “the ascendance of the neoconservative idealists who took
America into crippling wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.” Grandin argues that
America’s perpetual state of warfare is a direct result of Kissinger’s mode of
thinking and style of leadership.
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2. America’s rejection of the PRC was becoming outdated. The PRC and the
Soviet Union were becoming increasingly antagonistic towards one
another, so the U.S. began to pivot away from viewing communism in
monolithic terms. The division created the conditions for a new global
balance of power.
3. The nature of relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. were due
for reconsideration. The nuclear arms race became less meaningful as
nuclear arsenals reached a point where incremental additions were
inconsequential The time had arrived for both nations to avidly pursue
arms control negotiations.
In his approach to these historical currents, Kissinger marked a break in how American
foreign policy was conducted ― a departure from typical Cold War strategy and a
withdrawal from integrating Wilsonian idealism into foreign policy. He disfavored
diplomacy based on what Americans like to believe are the traditions of their country’s
foreign policy ― a respect for human rights, international law, democracy, and other
idealist values.55 He sought to redirect American foreign policy from a moral crusade
against Soviet-communism to an unsentimental de-escalation of relations through
cooperation with Moscow and to open up of relations with Communist China.
Unfortunately, theses successes did not transpire in isolation. At the time,
Kissinger linked detenté and triangular diplomacy to what transpired in other corners of
the world. The battlefields of the Cold War were located in what was then considered the
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‘Third World’ and today the Global South. He took a hawkish and often an imperial
stance towards these countries that amount, in retrospect, to his greatest failures.
Kissinger argues that what are often regarded as failures were the in-the-moment price
for securing what in retrospect are considered his accomplishments. Regardless, he
redefined the orientation of American foreign policy, even if it was just for his time
being. Given the historical climate, I will now commence with a survey of Kissinger’s
greatest achievements and failures.

3.1.2 Accomplishments and Failures
Determining the achievements and failures of a statesman is no easy task. What
one individual might deem to be a foreign policy success, another might deem it to be a
failure; it depends on one’s philosophical orientation. Hence, I have judged Kissinger’s
foreign policy from the baseline of order. Which policies amounted to heightened levels
of stability and which led to chaos? The essence of Kissingerism is the pursuit of stability
― stability can be achieved without domestic or transnational justice. It should be noted,
that Kissinger strove to create, first and foremost, international stability, not domestic
stability. Yet, I judge his policies on international steadiness and their implication on
domestic cohesion. A statesman should not only be judged on geopolitical ramifications,
but also on the implications of his policies on the domestic stability of foreign nations.
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3.1.2.1 Accomplishments

Rapprochement with China
The creation of strategic and diplomatic ties to the PRC was one the greatest
foreign policy achievements since the Marshall Plan or the creation of Nato.56 Kissinger
headed the endeavor. The opening up of China, in the words of Henry Kissinger,
“transformed the structure of international politics.”57 Rather than the binary power
struggle between the Soviet Union and the U.S. that had defined world order for about 25
years, the new triangular system between U.S., China, and the Soviet Union would give
way for a new, more complex, balance of power. The triangle presented the opportunity
for creative diplomacy and the manipulation of delicate leverages.
Henry Kissinger was initially skeptical of the idea of opening up to China.
However, as the hostility between China and the Soviet Union started to heat up during
196958, Kissinger and Nixon started to pursue the idea. After two years of flirtation,
China invited a U.S. envoy to visit Beijing. Kissinger was tasked with charting the path
of the new relationship. While Kissinger did not single handedly improve relations with
China, he did indeed play a significant role in the transformation. He was the visionary of
the Soviet-China-America triangle and he skillfully executed his visit59, so as to lay the
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Throughout 1969, the two countries frequently exchange of gunfire on border.
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On Friday, July 9, 1971, Kissinger and his party landed in Beijing. He was welcomed
by Premier Zhou Enlai. Over the course of the visit, Kissinger and Zhou held talks for 17
hours. The discussions were not formal. They discussed mutual interests, the state of their
nations, and world affairs. The only practical piece of business Kissinger had to settle
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foundation for the gradual fruition of the triangular balance of power and Nixon’s
Presidential Visit in February 1972 ― the first official American Presidential state visit
in history.
The spearheading diplomacy of Henry Kissinger helped promote world stability.
First, the opening of relations with China made the Vietnam War seem like a historical
holdover. The U.S. had just ameliorated relations with a communist country, so it made
the ideological component of the Vietnam War seem outdated. The U.S. was ready to end
the violence in Vietnam and it was not considering military conflict with China.
Moreover, the reworked cooperation between the U.S. and China would contain Soviet
aggression and make them more interested in Détente60 (instead of looking to prolong
American anguish in Vietnam). Third, the renewed relations between the two nations
made the need to stop the advancement of Chinese Communism in the region less
pressing. The perceived spread of Chinese communism was one way the Vietnam war
was initially justified, so the easing of the relations between the two countries decreased
the likelihood of conflict. The world had become a more stable place through the new
triangular fixture. Hence, the opening of relations with China was indeed one of
Kissinger’s greatest achievements.

was to convince Zhou and his counterparts to invite President Nixon for a summit in
Beijing. The two reached an agreement, which was typed up into a formal document,
stating the summits purpose: “to seek the normalization of relations.”
60
Detente is defined as the easing of relations between the Soviet Union and US.
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Soviet Union Relations: Détente
Détente was one of Kissinger’s signature foreign policy achievements. Détente is
defined as the United States’ effort to ease the strained relations between it and the Soviet
Union. It is not represented by one agreement or one meeting, but rather it was a general
policy pursued in a series of fashions, such as summit meetings, arms control
negotiations, and other bilateral agreements. The U.S. did not want to further militarize
its relations with the Soviet Union. Instead, the U.S. wanted to pivot from a pattern of
hostility and force, to a new pattern of diplomacy and negotiations. The Cuban Missile
Crisis had shown the potential dangers of a nuclear attack. The scare was still fresh and
alive at the time. A new policy was needed to detract from the nuclear option. Détente
was the solution and Kissinger was the mastermind and executor.
The backbone of the Nixon and Kissinger Détente policy were the arm control
negotiations. These negotiations were held in a piecemeal fashion, over the course of the
first few years of Nixon’s administration. Kissinger was largely at the head of the
negotiations and at the head of fostering improved relations between the two countries.
For example, Kissinger laid the groundwork for the acclaimed SALT I agreement of 1972
while in Vienna for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in the year 1970. Moreover,
Kissinger, from 1969-1971, wonderfully molded his relationship with Anatoly Dobrynin,
the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, so as to breed the formulation of a Moscow
Summit in the year of 1972.
The Moscow Summit is the hallmark of Détente. It took place in May 1972 and
marked the first visit of a U.S. president to Moscow. The Strategic Arms Limitation
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Talks (SALT I) were the center achievement of the Summit. While the agreements had
little effect on the world’s nuclear arsenals, the Summit represented a turn in Soviet-U.S.
relations. Two countries with competing ideologies, who had been keeping the world on
edge for a quarter of a century, were able to come together, cooperate, and form a new
relationship based on realism, not ideological emotion.61
Kissinger and his style of leadership deserves credit for the pursuit and
implementation of Détente. Kissinger had usurped the traditional powers of the Secretary
of State. That is, Kissinger was conducting Nixon’s foreign policy in every corner of the
world except the Middle East, where Secretary of State William Rogers was largely in
charge.62 With the unorthodox power he had attained, Kissinger created a diplomatic
environment ripe for the easing of hostility through secret, back door diplomacy.
Operating in the West Wing, he was able to avoid the bureaucracy of the state
department. On a different note, Kissinger’s statecraft that lead to improved Chinese-U.S.
relations helped to manipulate the Soviet Union into following the U.S. policy of Détente.
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The Soviets feared the combined Strength of the U.S. and China.The policy of Détente

did indeed ease tension between the two Cold War adversaries. Therefore, it deserves to
be recognized as one of Kissinger’s finest successes.

Ibid., p. 437.
This would change once Kissinger became Secretary of State and conducted what is
now referred to as shuttle diplomacy throughout the Middle East.
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Vietnam: Success or Failure?
The Vietnam War is one of the greatest points of contention in American history.
Nixon and his administration inherited a war that the majority of the American public
found frivolous and an act of imperialism. Kissinger assumed the role of leading the
effort to end the Vietnam war, mainly through a series of secret peace negotiations with
the North Vietnam representative Le Duc Tho in Paris. The negotiations took place over
fours years, but they never truly created peace. The Paris Peace Accords of January 1973
were the negotiations best attempt for peace. The accords created the pretense necessary
to end direct U.S. military involvement, but the agreement only temporarily stopped the
fighting between North and South Vietnam. The fighting between the two Vietnam
factions would continue and not cease until the fall of Saigon in April 1975.
One of Kissinger’s maxims of realpolitik was that military force and diplomacy
must work together64― an emulation of Machiavelli's concept of Virtù (i.e. The
combination of virtue and vice). In the case of Vietnam, this maxim brought disdain to
Kissinger’s name. The military might that he employed did not give him the upper hand
at the negotiation table that he was looking for; instead, it created instability and domestic
abomination. The consequences of the secret bombings of Cambodia, the invasion of
Cambodia, and the Christmas Day bombing were too antithetical to stability that they
overshadow the secretive diplomacy he conducted in Paris.
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The Guardian of American Hegemony
Nevertheless, Kissinger’s success in Vietnam is found not in his direct handling
of the war, but in the way he reshaped American foreign policy in response to the
isolationist sentiments at home.65 He maneuvered and manipulated the complexities of
the Cold War, so as to preserve American influence in the post-Vietnam era, without
relying solely on American military resolve.
Since the onset of the cold war, American foreign policy was self-defined by the
willingness to assure the wellbeing of liberty throughout the world. However, Americans
were starting to consider the limits of American interventionism due to the Vietnam War.
Henry Kissinger did not want to see America retreat into isolationism; at his core,
Kissinger was an internationalist.
In order to preserve America’s globalism, Kissinger pursued a triangular balance
between the Soviet Union, China, and the United States and he integrated Détente. In
aggregate, these policies conveyed that the United States was redefining its role in the
world. It was looking to create stability, cut back on intervention, and co-operate.
However, the stalemate in Vietnam was impeding the commencement of the new era.
It was clear that there was not a military victory in sight for the U.S. Nixon was
not interested in maintaining an indefinite military presence, since his reelection counted
on military withdrawal. In the eyes of Kissinger, however, troop removal would not only
weaken the possibility of a diplomatic solution, but it would damage the United State’s
legitimacy. Furthermore, it would compromise the success of Detenté and the opening up
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of relations with China. If the U.S. pulled out unconditionally, it would appear that the
U.S. was retreating into isolation, giving in to domestic sentiments. Its legitimacy would
be lost and, by extension, its hegemony.66 Hence, Kissinger provided tension to Nixon’s
policy of Vietnamization ― a plan that reduced the number of U.S. troops in the country
― in order to reach a diplomatic agreement before military removal was complete
Kissinger managed to sign the Paris Accords before U.S. troops were completely
pulled out of Vietnam. While the agreement did collapse, it provided the pretense that the
time was right to remove all U.S. troops from Vietnam. Hence, U.S. credibility was not
damaged to the extent that it would have been had it extracted all of its troops in absence
of a peace agreement. The historic holdover was over and a new era had begun; the U.S.
could now comfortably situate itself within the Triangular balance. Kissinger’s leadership
deserves credit for reorienting the U.S. in the post-Vietnam era and preventing the nation
from retreating into isolation. The U.S. remained hegemonic.
It is worth noting that one might not consider this new course of path as a success.
The United States’ position in the post-Vietnam era simply assured the continuance of
American imperialism. It could have reverted to a more isolated position in world affairs
and assumed the role of an offshore balancer, as it had in both the World Wars. Counter
to that, world stability would not have necessarily improved with the implementation of
American isolationism. The relations between China and the Soviet union were heating

Hegemony is defined as the functioning balance between domination and consent.
Hence a country needs to have power in order to be hegemonic, but the position also
requires more than power. Nations give consent to U.S. domination when their needs are
meet to a high degree. When needs are meet, legitimacy is bestowed upon the United
States. If permission to rule is obsolete, than dictatorship is what remains.
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up and tensions in the Middle East were rising (i.e. Yom Kippur War of 1973). Kissinger
believed a global America was integral to stability. The avoidance of isolationism
deserves to be at least considered a success of Kissinger’s leadership.

3.1.2.2 Failures
While Kissinger achieved success as the leader of American diplomacy, he also
pursued policies that were detrimental to stability, antithetical to human rights, and
imperialist. His quest for international stability and the protection of American interests
at times resulted in what some deem to be immoral calculations. Furthermore, he failed to
consider ― or he chose to ignore ― the domestic consequences his policies would have
on foreign nations. I have isolated three such policy scenarios that exhibit the
aforementioned. The cases I outline are by no means exhaustive.

Callousness: Invasion of Cambodia
Kissinger’s moral callousness arises in his support for the invasion of Cambodia.
His support for the invasion arose out of his concern that the internal upheaval of
Cambodia would interfere with his containment of Vietnamization. After Norodom
Sihanouk ― the King of Cambodia ― was deposed by his subordinate Lon Nol,
Kissinger advised Nixon to back Nol, since he was avidly pro American. Sihanouk
refrained from expressing allyship with foreign powers out of the fear that it would
subvert the delicate balance of his country.
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Nol took a hardline stance against the North Vietnamese, demanding that they
abandon their sanctuaries on the Cambodian side of the border. In response, the North
launched an attack. Crippled, Nol pleaded for American military assistance. After much
deliberation with his staff and academic friends, Kissinger was convinced that they only
way Vietnamization could proceed unhindered and the only way American credibility
could be preserved was through a military invasion composed of U.S. and South
Vietnamese troops. The invasion, Kissinger thought, would prevent Cambodia from
becoming a conduit for massive communist infiltration and resupply. The invasion lasted
from May to July of 1970.
The consequences of the invasion were devastating. The invasion only widened
the war in Cambodia: it initiated the spread of North Vietnamese troops throughout half
of Cambodia and it encouraged them to begin arming the local Khmer Rouge ― a
fanatical cambodian communist group. The American invasion would only last three
months, but the war in Cambodia lasted until 1979 ― four years beyond the end of the
Vietnam war. During this time, the Khmer Rouge committed a genocide that few
countries have endured during the modern human history. More than 3 million people
were killed.
It is forcefully argued that Kissinger and Nixon created the conditions necessary
for the growth of the Khmer Rouge and, thus, the execution of the group’s genocide.67
Yes, the Khmer Rouge bear the brunt of the moral responsibility for their unspeakable
actions; Kissinger never intended for the genocide to take place. Yet, a statesman of
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Kissinger’s caliber should not only be judged by his intentions, but also by the outcomes
of his policy. Kissinger was warned by his advisors and academic cohorts of the possible
implications of the invasion. His outlook lacked sensitivity and moral responsibility for
the civilian population.
Kissinger and Nixon express no regret for their decision to invade; in fact, all they
regret is that they did not go far enough.68 Kissinger’s leadership style, perhaps, too
heavily prioritized his grand vision: ushering the United States into a redefined position
for the post-Vietnam War era. The consequence of his primacy of realism and his disdain
for moral deliberations in the case of Cambodia deserves to be listed as one of his
greatest failures; his policy indirectly transpired into the greatest form of instability:
genocide.

Detest of Moral Considerations: The Bangladesh Genocide and The Indian-Pakistan
War
Kissinger’s dismissal of Pakistan’s genocidal, political crackdown and his
backing of Pakistan in India-Pakistan War are additional displays of unfettered
realpolitik. The Bangladesh Genocide and the Indian-Pakistan War are intimately
connected. In both situations, Kissinger backed Pakistan, despite its brutality against east
Pakistan. He did so because he perceived his global vision to be conditional on U.S.
support for Pakistan, since Pakistan was providing the channel of communication with
China.
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What became the Bangladesh Genocide was Yahya Khan’s ― the President of
Pakistan ― solution to the political victory of the Awami League in East Pakistan that
favored autonomy from West Pakistan. The Bangladesh Genocide, overtime, became a
general repression of separatist sympathizers. The suppression began in March 1971;
within a year, the death toll would amount to a half a million people. Despite the
senseless killing, Kissinger condoned the killing in order to keep the secret back channel
with China open.69 According to Kissinger, Pakistan’s cooperation was integral to
creating a triangular relationship with China; hence, the strategic issues at hand
outweighed immediate moral concerns.
The India-Pakistan War was indirectly caused by the Bangladesh Genocide. Ten
million refugees sought safety from the Genocide by fleeing across the border into India.
The influx of refugees caused India’s prime minister, Indira Gandhi, to call for the
autonomy of East Pakistan. The environment was prime for conflict between the two
neighboring nations. According to Kissinger’s geopolitical analysis, India was likely to
use the Bangladesh Genocide as an excuse to annex part of its neighbor.70 If India made
the first act of aggression, Kissinger predicted the Soviets would come to back India and
that the Chinese would come to back Pakistan. Therefore, Kissinger did not want to
alienate the U.S. from the situation and allow the Soviets to stand unchecked by
American competition by casting harsh words of criticism upon Pakistan. Hence, his
geopolitical analysis persuaded him, yet again, to disregard the state's act of genocide.
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In aggregate, the two conflicts convey two basic maxims of his leadership style:
the priority of geopolitics over humanist concerns and the proclivity to see world
dynamics solely through the lense of Soviet-American confrontation. While these two
maxims might have resulted in international stability, the cases of Bangladesh and
Cambodian Genocide convey how the maxims simultaneously contributed to intrastate
instability and violence. One these grounds, his handling of the Bangladesh Genocide and
the India-Pakistan war deserve to be labeled as leadership failures. The handling of these
events represent a larger failure too: Kissinger’s inability to reconcile geopolitical
strategy with the advocacy for a higher set of moral principles that transcend international
border and set targets for the development of humankind.

Imperial Kissinger: The Fall of Allende
Kissinger’s support and intent to subvert the democratically elected Chilean
President Salvador Allende stands as one of his most explicit acts of imperialism while in
office. In the cases of Pakistan and Cambodia, Kissinger did not seek to control or sway a
political outcome. In Chile, Kissinger meddled in national politics in order to achieve an
outcome favorable to his desire to destroy the success and consequent expansion of
socialist governments.
Salvador Allende ― a democratic socialist ― was elected President of Chile on
the 4th of September 1970; he won a narrow plurality of 36.2%. The CIA tried to ‘buy’
votes in the Chilean Congress in order to block Allende.71 It was fruitless. Thereafter,

Ibid., p. 290.

71

79

Kissinger handled the orchestration of subversion efforts himself. Kissinger viewed Chile
as linked to a web of trials of American geopolitical resolve. If Allende stayed in power,
it would be an infiltration of the Western Hemispheres bulwark against socialism. Hence,
to Kissinger, it was imperative that the U.S. depose the democratic socialist.
Kissinger began to avidly pursue a more brutal form of sabotage: the promotion
of a military coup. He instructed the CIA to approach Chilean military commanders about
the possibility of a coup.72 The climate was not right; the military was committed to
refraining from political involvement. Under the guidance of Kissinger, the U.S. reverted
to economic measures (investment discouragement and credit blockage) and funneled
money to anti-Allende activities. Moreover, Kissinger refused a policy of
accommodation, even when faced with Allende’s amazing gesture of inviting a U.S.
aircraft carrier to make a ceremonial stop at the port of Valparaiso. Kissinger demanded
that the invitation be declined. Hence, he turned down an opportunity for improved
relations. Kissinger favored meddling in Chile’s political system.
The U.S. played a direct role in the coup that lead to the death of Allende. In the
aftermath, Chile entered a period of violent dictatorship and social instability. Kissinger’s
approach to the rise of Chilean socialism was not doubt imperialistic in nature: he sought
to dominate Chile through political manipulation and degradation. Kissinger’s binary
view of the east-west struggle caused him to treat a peripheral country as disposable in
his quest to eradicate South America of what he deemed to be soviet influence. For
Kissinger, imperialism was a valuable tool of diplomacy, not a liability.
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3.1.3 Assets and Liabilities
As shown, Henry Kissinger’s policies resulted in success and failure. It is
worthwhile to deduce lessons ― positive and negative ― from the policies he
implemented. The following points will help guide the fifth chapter as I attempt to size up
Kissinger’s assets without overlooking his shortcomings when formulating a policy to
upend the deadlock between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Intellectually Secure, yet Socially Insecure
Henry Kissinger was intellectually brilliant and self assured. He had a mind
capable of conceptualizing unobvious patterns and seeing connections between different
events that others had a hard time deciphering. He could decrypt how an action in one
corner of the world reverberate in a different corner of the world. Moreover, he was
intellectually poised, so he often sought having his ideas and theories debated with aides
and academics. Hence, the following lesson: be thoughtful, attuned to detail and
interconnectedness, and so familiar with a idea or theory, that you can defend it to the
point where you can disprove the opposing argument.
Simultaneously, Henry Kissinger was socially insecure. His social uncertainty
was connected to his habits of secrecy and deceit. For example, he unnecessarily tapped
the phones of his colleagues, aides, and adversaries in order to have an upper hand in
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persuading the president to implement his geopolitical vision.73 The tactic wasn’t even
particularly effective and it almost led to Kissinger’s resignation. Moreover, Kissinger’s
social diffidence manifested in his constant quest for approval. He tried to seduce a broad
spectrum of people in order to be liked and admired. He was socially thin skinned, but
also charming. His social maneuverings resulted in a reputation of duplicity, which not
only hurt him at times in the hierarchy of government, but also in his diplomacy. A lesson
can be derived from his social insecurity: while social fragility is not innately a liability,
one needs to contain and examine the impulse to act on it; if introspection is absent,
one’s secretive actions could backfire and result in downfall.

Master Geopolitical Architect, but Inconsiderate of Domestic Implications
Henry Kissinger was attuned to global dynamics, history, and political nuance.
Hence, he was adept to overarching geostrategic frameworks. Testaments to this are his
creations of Detenté and Soviet-Chinese-American triangular relations. Both policies
sought to intrench international stability. These geopolitical frameworks required
patience, manipulation, and clairvoyance. The aforementioned qualities are ones
imperative to a statesman of the highest caliber.
While a geopolitical visionary, Kissinger too often overlooked and
underemphasized the domestic implications of his policies on foreign countries. For
example, his advocacy for the invasion of Cambodia indirectly created the conditions that

The wire tappings were initially justified on the basis of deducing the source of the leak
on the U.S.’s bombing of Cambodia. The practice, however, remained in place for nearly
two years.
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allowed for the Cambodian Genocide. An important lesson is derived here: while
visionary thinking is fundamental to leadership in the international realm, one should not
downplay the consideration of domestic implications that could potentially amount to
internal instability.

Unfettered Realism
Kissinger’s greatest successes were derived from his realpolitik disposition. He
vehemently believed the prime responsibility of diplomacy was to establish international
stability. He detested foreign policy guided on moral principles and considerations.
Basing policy on ideals made a nation seem dangerously unpredictable. This philosophy
led to a reorientation of the U.S.’s stance towards the Soviet Union and China.
Kissinger's realistic strategy of containment and cooperation with Moscow allowed for
the internal contradictions of the Soviet system to play out. In an age of idealistic
diplomacy, it is imperative to reconsider the underlying value of Kissingerian realpolitik:
it diminishes unpredictability by prioritizing stability through the balance of power.
Simultaneously, Kissingerian realpolitik was often left unconstrained by morality.
He failed to strike an appropriate balance between values-based idealism and realism.
While it is imperative to deduce the reality of a situation, it also useful to conceptualize
idealized outcomes. Stability and the support for values-based idealism are not inherently
at odds. Kissinger, however, pushed a foreign policy that denied the use of American
hegemony to advocate for ideals ― such as inclusive institutions, free media,
sovereignty, and self-determination ― on the global stage. Hence, aspiring leaders must
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recognize the importance of striking a balance between realism and idealism; the pursuit
of one at the denial of the other ignores the nuance and complexity of geopolitics in the
contemporary world.

3.1.4 Final Thoughts
I have distilled two possibilities as to why Kissinger remains a pivotal and central
figure in American Foreign Policy debates: (1) Kissingerian realpolitik was
unprecedented in modern American foreign policy, yet it managed to enhance the
stability of geopolitics ― though at a great cost; (2) Kissinger ignored or overlooked how
detrimental American policy can be to the internal stability of the nations on the receiving
end of his policies ― his decisions amount to crimes against humanity.
To his enthusiasts, his legacy is that of a realistic strategist whose policies ushered
in a newly defined role for the United States, a role defined by containment and
cooperation, not by the unconditional protection of world liberty. To his critics, his
legacy is that of a immoral tactician whose policies were imperial and callous; while he
might have stabilized the international realm, Kissinger's policies destabilized entire
nations. Of course, there are those who sit somewhere in between.
The next section challenges the position that Kissinger was adverse to morality
and ethics. An analysis of his theoretical thinking and philosophical disposition conveys
that he was well attuned to conceptions of morality and ethics. His takeaways, however,
are markedly different than American notions of moralism. While completing his B.A.
and PhD at Harvard, Kissinger thought considerably about these topics. The section lays
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out a moral positioning that is perhaps hard for some to recognize from Kissinger in
practice: the circumvention of war through a constructed and legitimate balance of
power.

3.2 Kissingerism: Strategic Thinking and Philosophical Disposition

3.2.1 Kissinger on Order
Henry Kissinger’s latest book is titled World Order. It strives to articulate
regional conceptions of order that have heavily influenced the evolution of the modern
era. In aggregate, his geopolitical analysis amounts to an attempted framework on which
to build World Order, but stops short of prescribing explicit piecemeal policy proposals.
His experience with the complexity of the world leaves him with the state of mind that
in-depth policy needs to formulated by today’s statesmen operating the power structures
of government. On another note, Kissinger’s decision to write, what might very well be
his last book, on the concept of world order conveys the state and direction of his
thinking in the final years of his life. Hence, from this book, I attempt to distill the
up-to-date state of Henry Kissinger’s strategic thinking.
As a statesman rooted in the European tradition of diplomacy and philosophy,
Kissinger devotes the first chapter of his book to an overview of the European experience
and isolates from it what he finds to be the most likely path to World Order: a
contemporary rendition of the European tradition of pluralistic international society. The
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task of world order requires a framework of thinking that transcends borders, yet gives
credence to the role of the state in cultivating a universally accepted international order,
and avoids universal prescriptions other than those agreed upon as the governing
principles of inter-state relations.
What, precisely, does the concept of order entail? How does it change with
variant contexts, such as world, international, and regional order? Kissinger defines his
overarching concept using a tertiary scale of differentiation:
World order describes the concept held by a region of civilization about
the nature of just arrangements and the distribution of power thought to be
applicable to the entire world. An international order is the practical
application of these concepts to a substantial part of the globe ― large
enough to affect the global balance of power. Regional orders involve the
same principles applied to a defined geographic area.74
Hence, the notion of World Order rests on a set of overarching principles on which the
international system is predicated and a distribution of power that holds off conflict and
preserves stability. For a world order to reach beyond conceptuality, it needs to be backed
by power and accepted as legitimate. Today, for many, the liberal international order is
supreme. However, when Kissinger references the quest for World Order, he implicitly
rebukes the efficacy of the current liberal international order. In fact, there are some who
claim it has collapsed entirely, such as the Historian Niall Ferguson. Finally, a regional
order is not necessarily incompatible with an international order of a different mold,
though it helps if there are clear points of similarity. This is exemplified by the European
Union and its participation in the liberal international order.
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In the quest for World Order, the multifacetedness and contradictory nature of the
human experience will need to be reconciled. In the words of Kissinger:
Can regions with such divergent cultures, histories, and traditional theories
of order vindicate the legitimacy of any common system? Success in such
an effort will require an approach that respects both the multifariousness
of the human condition and the ingrained human quest for freedom. Order
in this sense must be cultivated; it cannot be imposed...In our time, the
quest for world order will require relating the perceptions of societies
whose realities have largely been self-contained. The mystery to be
overcome is one all peoples share ― how divergent historical experiences
and values can be shaped into a common order.75
Inevitable in this process is the capitulation of ideals and historical conceptions of justice
and order. As countries rise in power, such as China and India, there perceptions of
morality and order that “have [hitherto been] largely self contained” will be placed onto
the crucible of diplomacy. If the resulting mixture of principles is rejected, diplomacy
will fade and war will decide the outcome of the new status quo.
However, if nations compromise on the principles that they hold as universal,
what are they getting in exchange? They receive stability through a “set of commonly
accepted rules that define the limits of permissible action and a balance of power that
enforces restrain where rules break down, preventing one political unit from subjugating
all others.”76 This will not emerged naturally but, rather, through persistent cultivation
and compromise.
Take, for example, the conflicting claims over proprietorship of the city of
Jerusalem. Any future Israeli-Palestinian peace deal will necessitate a compromise over
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Jerusalem, as both parties claim the city to be their rightful capital. Each claim the city is
rightfully theirs. Regardless of who should have it from a moral standpoint, the statesmen
is forced to treat dictums of divinity as bargaining chips. A recent Atlantic article
reporting on Trump’s decision to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem
nicely frames the palestinian and jewish orthodox position ― or at least a rendition of the
possible positions:
When Jews all over the world pray, they face Israel. Those in Israel face
Jerusalem, and those in Jerusalem face the Temple Mount, the site of
Judaism’s two ancient sanctuaries, which once stood on the same patch of
land now occupied by the Al-Aqsa mosque. “This is all because we
believe this is our capital,” said Arieh King, a right-wing member of
Jerusalem’s City Council. “For the Orthodox Jew like me, Jerusalem is not
just a place to live. It’s a way that you live. It’s in a place close to where
everything important of our history happened … also in the future,
[where] we believe the third Temple will be built.”
Palestinians feel just as strongly about the city’s religious significance.
“Jerusalem is part of our faith. It’s the first place where Muslims started
praying,” said Ziad Abu Zayyad, a lawyer and former minister of the
Palestinian Authority. Not only is Jerusalem a symbol of national identity;
it’s the home of one of the most important sites in Islam. “Al-Aqsa is in
the heart of every Muslim,” Zayyad said. “It’s a red line. It’s the third holy
place,” after the Saudi Arabian cities of Mecca and Medina.77
The task of statesmen is daunting, evidenced by the absence of a resolution on the
palestinian-Israeli conflict for decades. How does one go about reconciling such
divergent and seemingly incompatible aims? Another pertinent question: does world
order depend on a resolution of the conflict? If yes, the order will have to be considered
just by both and accurately assess the balance of power in the region. Moreover,
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statesmen must convince the people and state they ultimately represent that order is
acceptable, otherwise it will not be sustainable.
World order is a scheme for the statesmen. However, an order that is successful in
the long-run is contingent not only on the support of elite statesman, but also the citizens
of the states invested in the system. Acceptance is based on the perception of a just
system. As a result, World Order cannot be imposed. In the words of Henry Kissinger:
Any system of world order, to be sustainable, must be accepted as just ―
not only by leaders, but also by citizens. It must reflect two truths: order
without freedom, even if sustained by momentary exaltation, eventually
creates its own counterpoise; yet freedom cannot be secured or sustained
without a framework of order to keep the peace. Order and freedom,
sometimes described as opposite poles on the spectrum of experience,
should instead be understood as interdependent. Can today’s leaders rise
above the urgency of day-to-day events to achieve this balance?78
While often criticised for overlooking domestic sentiment during his tenure as Secretary
of State and National Security Advisor, his words, here, do not convey negligence
towards domestic institutions and sentiment. Rather, Kissinger defines the role of the
statesman, in part, to bridging the gap between domestic maxims held as universal and
those of other nations. Kissinger seems to believe reconciliation will arise out of what he
calls “the ingrained human quest for freedom.”79 He suggests in World Order to frame
order and freedom as interconnected and not as two opposite poles. While Kissinger
offers no specific blueprint for striking an equilibrium, he contends that an order that
incompasses the whole globe will have to have pluralism as its guiding and unabiding
tenet. Pluralism is the best means to satisfying the “the ingrained human quest for

78
79

Kissinger 2014, WO p.8.
Kissinger 2014, WO p.8.
89

freedom.”80 In the context of states, no region is ripe with a traditional of pluralism as the
European experience.
Henry Kissinger believes in the validity and prospect of the pluralistic
international order that arose out of the European experience after the end of the Roman
Empire. The order amounted to little other than diversity for centuries; it was defined by
the makeup of many different polities, but lacked a commonly accepted set of rules that
maintained relative peace between regional states. Hence, disorder and warfare was
prevalent. The European experience is unique in that competing powers did not display
examples of “political contests [that were] fought for control [over]...established
framework[s] of order,”81 unlike in China and Islam; “dynasties changed, but each new
ruling group portrayed itself as restoring a legitimate system that had fallen into despair.
In Europe, no such evolution took hold.”82 Though Europe is denoted as a general
geographical area, its political complexion was defined by a range of governance styles
and identities. In addition, when one leader defeated another, the principles by which rule
was established were typically different than that of their predecessor.
When the Roman empire disintegrated, a new empire did not rise to take its place.
The unity of the Roman empire was replaced with the Church. Yet, the relationship
between Church and state was never synthesized, despite the fact that the two mutually
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reinforced one another for centuries. Ever since, Europe has been composed of a
multitude of polities, some of which were ironically titled empires.83
Accordingly, order, under the European Experience, was conceived as not only an
internal matter, but also contingent on the equilibrium among states. This differs
drastically from the empire/imperial conception of order, where it is conceptualized as
being contingent on the state of internal governance. As such, the farther the empire
reached, so did the prospect of complete order. In other words, total order was feasible
when an Empire had all people and all land under its domain.
In Europe, Kissinger holds that it was the inability of anyone state to dominate the
others that resulted in a plural regional order. He states:
It is not that European monarchs were more immune to the glories
of conquest than their counterparts in other civilizations or more
committed to an ideal of diversity in the abstract. Rather, they lacked the
strength to impose their will on each other decisively. In time pluralism
took on the characteristics of a model of world order. Has Europe in our

Kissinger admits a partial caveat, but attests it is not incoherent with his argument:
“Aspirations to unity were briefly realized on Christmas Day 800, when Pope Leo III crowned
Charlemagne… as Imperator Romanorum (Emperor of the Romans), and awarded him the
theoretical title to the former eastern half of the erstwhile Roman Empire, at that point the lands
of Byzantium...But Charlemagne’s empire did not fulfil its aspirations...After Charlemagne’s
death, his successors sought to reinforce his position by appeal to tradition, by naming his
possessions the Holy Roman Empire. But debilitated by civil wars, less than a century after its
founding, Charlemagne’s empire passed from the scene as a coherent political entity (though its
name remained in use throughout a shifting series of territories until 1806)” (14). Furthermore,
Kissinger recognizes “the rise of the sixteenth-century Habsburg prince Charles (1500-1558)” as
the only period when “a full flowering of the medieval concept of world order was envisioned [a
concept based on universalism].” In fact, “a Chinese or Turkish visitor to Europe at the time
might well have perceived a seemingly familiar political system: a continent presided over by a
single dynasty imbued with a sense of divine mandate. If Charles had been able to consolidate
his authority and manage an orderly succession in the vast Habsburg territorial conglomerate,
Europe would have been shaped by a dominant central authority like the Chinese or the Islamic
caliphate.” Ibid., WO p.16.
83
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time transcended this pluralistic tendency ― or do the internal struggles of
the European Union affirm it?84
The “model of world order” that Kissinger references has largely proliferated across the
world. This model is based on national interest and balance of power. The means of
proliferation were colonialism. Hence, the system’s spread out to be thought of as
inorganic. If regions of the world were free to develop their own model of world order, it
is possible that the foundational tenets would have been at odds with the pluralistic nature
of the European experience. Henry Kissinger frames this development with less explicit
language:
The modern era announced itself when enterprising societies sought glory
and wealth by expanding the oceans and whatever lay beyond them...sixty
years later, the European powers sailed from a continent of competing
sovereign authorities; each monarch sponsored naval exploration largely
in the hope of achieving a commercial or strategic edge over his
rivals...the age of three centuries of preponderant European influence in
world affairs had been launched. International relations, once a regional
enterprise, would henceforth be geographically global. With the center of
gravity in Europe, in which the concept of world order was defined and its
implementation determined...Their global competition for territorial
control changed the nature of international order. Europe’s perspective
expanded ― until successive colonial efforts by various European states
covered most of the globe and concepts of world order merged with the
operation of the balance of power in Europe.85
It is unlikely that Kissinger disavows colonialism on practical grounds, and perhaps
ethical ones as well. Though never stated explicitly by Kissinger, it is possible that he
conceives colonialism as a means ― intentionally or not ― to subsume areas of the globe
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to the international organizational structure of the nation-state. Decolonization and the
simultaneous tide of nationalism instituted the state as the unit of the international system
― a unit averse to universal conceptions of order.
What, precisely, is the Westphalian conception of order? At its base, it holds each
nation as equal, regardless of its power or domestic system of government. As such, each
state recognized by the international community is, in theory, granted the right to exist in
its own right into perpetuity. The state’s guiding principle is its national interests.
Accordingly,
The Westphalian concept took multiplicity as its starting point and drew a
variety of multiple societies, each accepted as a reality, into a common
search for order. By the mid-twentieth century, the international system
was in place on every continent; it remains the scaffoldings of
international order such as it now exists.86
The Westphalian order does not escape the fact that nation-states are possessed by power
and perennially fearful of their neighbors, but it does help subdue universal inclinations
or quests of force by prioritizing the cultivation of a balance of power. This balance
provides a kind of insurance against hegemonic aspirations. Before the Westphalian
model of order, balance of power was not sought after intentionally. It incidentally
emerged when empires were incapable of establishing a comparative advantage in
violence, resulting in military stagnation. For the Westphalian model to have legitimacy,
nations need to exhibit a degree of reservation when contemplating or adopting conquest
as the rock of national interest. It is the job of diplomacy to establish a suitable and
efficacious balance of power where war is not a desirable means to a country’s aspired
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ends. If a balance of power is legitimate, grievances are expressed and settled through
diplomacy. The Westphalian concept attempts to adjudicate within the existing system.
Kissinger distinguishes between a balance of power as a fact and balance of
power as a system. As a system, balance of power must be established and, eventually
reestablished. As history attests through the rise of and fall of empires, power is never
fixed. Hence, a balance of power of a certain configuration will not last into perpetuity.
Typically, warfare readjusts a balance of power, but it is also the later that limits the
former’s extent. A readjustment to balance of power is typically enacted by a challenge to
the status quo. This happens in at least two ways according to Kissinger:
The first is if a major country augments its strength to a point where it
threatens to achieve hegemony. The second occurs when a
heretofore-secondary state seeks to enter the ranks of the major powers
and sets off a series of compensating adjustments by the other powers until
a new equilibrium is established or a general conflagration takes place.
The Westphalian system met both tests in the eighteenth century, first by
thwarting the thrust for hegemony by France’s Louis XIV, then by
adjusting the system to the insistence of Prussia’s Frederick the Great for
Equal Status.87
Thus, a challenge to the system does not amount to an automatic adjustment and
it is plausible to achieve great power status without challenging the status quo with force.
While a state’s national interests might amount to a tour de force to upset the current
balance of power, it is more common for a state’s national interests to be aligned with the
preservation of the current balance of power. Secondary powers with little hope of
augmenting substantial power to be a threat or a current major power falls into this box.
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The appeal of balance of power is that it is practiced under the assumption that the
international system would not tolerate hegemonic aspirations.
Nonetheless, the concept of balance of power arose out of the historical
conditions of Europe; for nearly three hundred years, it was the guiding principle of the
international order. In past, balance of power transpired as a necessity ― one power was
not able to augment enough power to overcome their foe. Under the European
experience, balance of power became proactive, something that was sought after.
Kissinger undoubtedly supports balance of power. He sees it as the most plausible path to
a World order. Yet, he is hesitant, if not against, the assumption that it’ll automatically
transpire on the world stage.
On this note, Henry Kissinger likes to raise Kant’s idea of perpetual peace. To
reach such a state, according to Kant, a voluntary federation of republics, united under
the premise of goodwill and transparent domestic and international conduct, would
cultivate world peace. Humans would “reason [their] way toward ‘a system of united
power, hence a cosmopolitan system of general political security’ and ‘a perfect civil
union of mankind.’”88 While the state has become the unit of international system, each
society had its own set of unique historical circumstance that result in a diverse
institutions and approaches to order that differentiate it from its peers. As such, is the
world too complicated and diverse to rationally approach the conception of world order
as something that can be invented by apt thinkers and instituted by statesman?
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Kissinger seems to deny the viability of the rationalist tradition that arose out of
the enlightenment as a means to international order. He seems to embrace a different
approach, “requiring a kind of intuition and an almost esoteric element of statecraft.”89
He claims such a modus operandi aligns with the organic view of political evolution. On
these grounds, the ideas that emerged out of the enlightenment ― the very ideas that
constitute the foundation of Western political tradition ― are not the requisite to world
order. Each nation possess its own perception of legitimacy and national interests, so as
to make “a perfect civil union of mankind” impossible. One cannot rationally reconcile
contradictory ideals. World Order is the realistic substitute to Kant’s theoretical ideal of
perpetual peace. Therefore, for Kissinger, World order is something that needs to be
cultivated, but not solely through the rational tradition of statesmanship that holds
federal, republic institutions as it guiding principle. In order to overcome varying
cultures, histories, and ideas of morality, esoteric leadership, based on intuitive
perceptions of reality, is keen. Any such conception of reality is not avoiding reality as
much as it is creating it. The statesman, using his or her position to align divergent
experiences, seeks to create conditions and principles for a common system of world
order that is vindicated by all participants in the system. Conjecture is an essential
component of the leadership style that Kissinger embodies and advocates.
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3.2.2 Kissinger on Hegemony
Kissinger’s denial of historical determinism is relevant to American hegemony. In
his B.A. thesis, Kissinger incorporated Spengler heavily, but rejected the cyclical nature
of his thinking ― that is, that civilizations inevitably rise and collapse. For spengler,
culture is the period of becoming, while civilization is what has becomes once the
impulses of culture become static. This cannot be escaped. Kissinger denied its
inevitability, but recognized the validity of the signs emblematic of societal decay.
Namely, it is when the “fact-men” take over a civilization that its position is put in
jeopardy. At this point, the heyday of dreams, myths, and risking taking that inspired a
society in its early days fade. The intellectuals, political leaders, logicians, and
rationalists become overly concerned with questions of why rather than how. Greg
Grandin explains this point nicely:
Spengler wrote (referring to the rationalism of modern society, which
strives for every more efficient ways of doing things), “is a time of
decline.” The intuitive dimensions of widom get tossed aside, technocratic
procedure overwhelms purpose, and information is mistaken for wisdom.
“Vast bureaucratic mechanisms,” Kissinger said, develop “a momentum
and a vested interests of their own. Western Culture was history’s highest
expression of technical reason: it “views the whole world,” Kissinger
wrote, “as a working hypothesis.”...At Harvard, the Vatican of American
positivism, filled with the country’s high priests of social science,
Kissinger looked around and asked: Would American leaders command or
fall slave to their own technique? “Technical knowledge will be of no
avail,” the twenty-six-year-old student-veteran warned, “to a soul that has
lost its meaning. 90
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A soul that lost its meaning is prone to soul searching. In the case of civilizations, they
stumble outward, conducting conquests and implementing imperial projects to fill the
soulless void. The wars that great civilizations get tangled in result in exhaustion and
eventually demise. In the words of Kissinger: “‘Imperialism is the inevitable product’ of
this final stage… ‘an outward thrust to hide the inner void.’”91 Yet, decay is not
inevitable.92 It is the job of the statesmen to spare a nation from this impending abyss.
According to this strain of thinking, American hegemony will not necessarily
fade, but it does need be continuously cultivated in order to be sustained into the future.
Positivism and its cause-and-effect analysis will not resurrect the United States’ position.
An imaginary and innovative population and statesmen who rely on intuitive and
instinctive conjecture are the means to a revival of American hegemony. Retreat into
isolationism, similarly, will not sustain american preponderance.
There is a Caveat to Kissinger’s thinking, as it regards to America in the post
Cold War order. American will never be able to revive the economic, political, and
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Greg Grandin makes an interesting note to this point. He possess the thought that if
Kissinger realized war and imperialism help, if not cause, the process of a civilizations
decay, then why did he wage and prolong war while in office. In other words, he claims
Kissinger’s philosophical stance seems to be at odds with Kissinger in practice. Grandin
writes: “Based on his reading of Spengler (and other philosopher-historians, such as
Arnold Toynbee, who warned of the “suicidalness of militarism”), Kissinger might have
come to the conclusion that the best way to avoid decline was to avoid war altogether, to
put America’s greatest resources to building a sustainable society at home rather than
squander them in adventures in places far and wide. But Kissinger took a different lesson
from Spengler: it wasn’t war that was to be avoided but war fought without a clear
political objective. He in fact advocated fighting wars far and wide ― or at least advocate
for a willingness to fight wars far and wide ― as a way of preventing the loss of purpose
and wisdom that Spengler identified as taking place during civilization’s final stage.”
Ibid., p.22.
91
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military dominance it experienced at the end of WWII. Other nations are progressing and
increasing their might vis-á-vis these metrics. The United States will remain absolutely
relevant and improve its condition, but it will not make drastic relative gains. It will have
to define its place in world where China, the EU, Russian, and India too are emblematic
of preponderance in their regions of the world. To be sure, the United States remains the
regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere and will remain so for the foreseeable
future. World hegemony is a far fetched dream, considering the rise of these growing
civilizations.

3.2.3 Kissinger on Diplomacy & Foreign Policy
Kissinger’s magnum opus ― Diplomacy ― weighs the realist and idealist foreign
policy perspectives. In the introduction and conclusion, he speaks generally, with no one
diplomatic episode tracing the section. In the intermittent 29 chapters, Kissinger devotes
each chapter to a theme he recounts and analyzes in detail, amongst them are those
Kissinger personally partook in. Kissinger gives credence and appreciation to ideals, but,
nevertheless, favors a diplomacy first and foremost guided by national interest.
Take democracy for example and the american experience. Democracy and
liberty are the cornerstone of the historical development of the United States.
Accordingly, it is intimately connected to the nations foreign policy formulations.
Kissinger holds the ideal of democracy has created “two contradictory attitudes toward
foreign policy.” He writes,
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The first is that America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at
home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind; the second, that
America’s values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around
the world.93
Kissinger seems to generally favor the former. A national interest that prioritizes direct
threats to the nation’s physical security is more sustainable than a national interest that
emphasizes the defence and spread of democracy through threat and force. This does not
mean American ideals are irrelevant, but it does means they should not constitute the
linchpin of American foreign policy. Ultimately, a balance must be struck that favors the
absence of sentimental notions in favor of the reproduction of the status quo (i.e. An
international environment that allows America to perfect its democratic system).
For Kissinger, contingency is the prerequisite of a solid foreign policy. He writes,
“the essence of policy is its contingency; its success depends on the correctness of an
estimate which is in part conjectural.”94 Foreign policy based on conjecture is
diametrically opposed to foreign policy rooted in rationalization (i.e. if one does y, the
numbers or facts concretely predict x). Kissinger thinks the world is too complicated and
humans too irrational to depended on fixed policy informed by facts. For Kissinger,
“profound policy thrives on perpetual creation, on a constant redefinition of goals.”95
Hence, one must be creative in the implementation of foreign policy, resorting to
conjecture based instinct, intuition, and history. Foreign policy is dynamic, not static.
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If one’s estimate is incorrect, they must adapt. Time and its pressure demands the
statesman to act “on assessments that cannot be proved at the time that he is making
them.”96 The decisions at hand must be made partly on conjecture and partly on one’s
understanding of what worked and failed in the past and why. In accordance with such
thinking, the one who sits in front of a page typing cannot lay out a precise blueprint for
what foreign policy should be, but they can outline a general, overarching framework that
contains necessary voids, left to be filled by the conjectural thinking of the leaders of
foreign policy.

3.2.4 Kissinger on America’s Role in the 21st Century
An international system free of an overarching ideological landscape, delineated
along binary lines, is the fundamental difference between the contemporary international
system and its Cold War predecessor. In the new order, states enjoy more flexibility as
they execute their foreign policies and possess rather individualized national interests.
The world is no longer dominated by two superpowers, but, rather, five or six major
powers and an abundance of smaller ones; the system is now multipolar.97 In a sense,
then, the world we live in bears resemblance to the European, pluralistic order of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.98 In accordance, order will not emerge through a
balance of wills between the Soviet Union and the United States, but by the means of
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The five, maybe six superpowers of the 21st century are the United States, China, Russia,
the EU, India, and maybe Brazil.
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reconciling and balancing the national interests of a number of nations. The unique
feature of the 21st century is that never before has the modern world experienced major
centers of power distributed around the world.
The United States has yet to determine how to transition from its experience in the
20th century to the new power dynamics and realities it faces in the 21st century. Its
attempts to adopt a position and strategy for the 21st century have largely failed.99 Its
approach has been too heavy handed on the military end, particularly considering that its
use of force has been applied to situations that do not directly jeopardize its national
security. From the fall of the Soviet Union to the eventual backlash of the Iraq War, the
United States attempted to police the world. With no immediate or direct threats after the
fall of the Soviet Union, blunt calculations of national interest were ignored largely
because they did not exist beyond the need to exercise restraint.
Having entered an international landscape emblematic of the 19th and 18th
century Europe, but on a global scale, the United States is fronted with a set of practices
that were used successfully during these two-hundred years. These practices, however,
have been questioned or dismissed since the establishment of the United States of
America (i.e. national interest and balance of power). While still preponderant and
capable of projecting power anywhere on the globe, other nations, too, are gaining the
ability to exercise power far and wide ― markedly China. At this point in time, China
has largely kept their military reach within the confines of their territory and their
immediate peripheries. Economically, the United States is projected to be passed, in
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terms of magnitude, by China, at the turn of the 5th decade of this century. This is
remarkable considering that the U.S., at one point, possessed 35% of the world’s total
economic output.
Given the greater distribution of power throughout the world, Kissinger argues
“America’s ability to employ [power] to shape the rest of the World has actually
decreased.”100 With power diminishing in relative terms, American foreign policy
conducted on the basis of Wilsonian Principles is becoming less viable and progressively
dangerous. In 1994, Kissinger wrote, “As the twenty-first century approaches, vast global
forces are at work that, over the course of time, will render the United States less
exceptional.”101 As the basis of Wilsonian foreign policy, the decline of American
exceptionalism in real terms needs to be accompanied by a change in mindset regarding
America’s role in the world. American policy makers have not adequately adjusted to
these new realities.
Kissinger argues that with rise of multiple centers of power, balance of power
becomes paramount over the spread and adaptation of American principles.
Wilsonianism requires preponderance at a level where coercion leads to a desired
outcome, or, at the very least, where its perception and its potential consequences result
in the fruition of America’s strategic plan. However, America does not enjoy such power
and, perhaps, it never did. When the U.S. conducts itself on the world stage as if the
aforementioned is true, the U.S. gets bogged down in conflict and becomes overstretched.
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It is a regional hegemon, not a global one. Thus, America should prioritize inter-state
peace instead of the universal adaptation of its principles ― these are secondary.
With the dictates of Wilsonianism becoming less practicable, this question arises:
“on what principles ought America to base its foreign policy in the coming century.”102
Kissinger provides no answers to this question, but he recommends the nation would “do
well to consider the era before Woodrow Wilson and the ‘American century’ for clues
about the decades to come.”103 Kissinger believes clear and proper principles are
necessary in order to restrain the scope of the nation’s urge to police the world.
Simultaneously, he insists on the cultivation of an equilibrium in order to protect against
a great power’s capacity to insist and crusade on their respective principles, including the
United States. Nearly a fifth of the way through the 21st century, the United States
remains strongly committed to Wilsonian principles and often ignores the long term
perils of resorting to force without direct threats to national security. With the rise of
additional centers of power, the price of conducting a crusading foreign policy will rise,
as it will irritate other major powers when it occurs in their backyard.
This is not to say Wilsonian idealism is to be abandoned. It is to say that
democratic crusades and state-making missions are to be reconsidered, as they come at
the detriment of national security and the overall geopolitical balance. Support and
preference for democratic governments is not at odds with the role Kissinger envisions
for America in the 21st century; nor does he object to paying some price for the U.S.’s
moral convictions. However, the difficulty of the matter is determining the amount of
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resources that can be devoted to moral convictions and to other American interests that
do not amount to supporting and spreading democracy. The proliferation of democracy
and human rights are to be embraced and advocated for, but their implementation through
force is a questionable practice that ruins the standing and influence of the United States.
In addition, these efforts largely fail.104
America’s moral precepts are best served by posing as a beacon of freedom,
democracy, and liberty. That is, using America’s soft power to ignite the values it holds
dear ― letting them manifest throughout the world organically, not by imposition. The
cultivation and establishment of inclusive institutions ― the very institutions that make
America exceptional ― must emerge organically within the countries that have yet to
implement them. America can assist, but it must do so free of coercion and military force.
Otherwise, America takes on a rather imperial project as it pursues the creation of a world
from its own unique, domestic mold.
Defining America’s role in the world as such is not out of line with the historical
experience of the American people. America’s exceptionalism has resulted in oscillations
between two positions: “the notion that America must remedy every wrong and stabilize
every dislocation, and the latent instinct to withdraw into itself.”105 The Cold War brought
America out of its historic shell, but today its in a position where its reach is too heavy.
While America should retain the prospect of exercising its ability to reach far and wide, it
should not be constantly put to use. Hence, what is needed is a set of criteria that can be
used to select appropriate situations to deploy its massive resources.
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Power calculations and national security is a large component of the criteria that
Kissinger advocates for. The United States should be keenly adverse to the establishment
of a regional hegemon in any of the power centers of the world. That is, one power
subduing, by force, the surrounding countries in the area. In such a scenario, a
superpower would have the territory and resources necessary to threaten the United States
in its rather isolated position if it desired. Yet, realpolitik will not suffice on its own. “To
be true to itself,” Kissinger states, “America must try to forge the widest possible moral
consensus around a global commitment to democracy. But it dare not neglect the analysis
of the balance of power.”106
The United States would do well to minimize its reliance on military power to
execute its fidelity to its principles. Its economic and cultural power, if properly
employed, will do a finer job, in the long run, in cultivating a world order with
democracy and liberty as two of its hallmarks. As the only nation ever founded on the
concept of liberty, the United States provides a heavy thrust of soft-power capable of
permeating the ideals of the United States without any use of force or treasure.
Accordingly, the United States should rely primarily on its soft-power to cultivate what
Kissinger titles a “global commitment to democracy.”
In addition to soft power, american Diplomacy and the balance of power that it
can help cultivate should aim to build a series of overlapping economic and political
structures that act as an alternative to direct and forceful impositions of American ideals
and institutions. “The most creative solutions [to the new world order] will be to build
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overlapping structures,” Kissinger say, “some based on common political and economic
principles as in the Western Hemisphere; some combining shared principles and security
concerns as in the Atlantic area and Northeast Asia; others based largely on economic ties
as in the relations with Southeast Asia.”107 These structures, perhaps, will help realize,
world-wide, what America holds dear, but only through “ accumulation [in] partial
successes.”108

3.2.5 Kissinger On Iran
Kissinger captures his published views on Iran and Iran-U.S. relations in his most
recent book World Order. Like most, he takes issue with Iran’s revolutionary language
and, at times, practices. He does not attack outrightly Iran’s theocratic political structure,
but he does take issue with the rhetoric and practices that undermine the pluralistic,
westphalian order Kissinger so deeply values. He frames the implications of the Iranian
revolution on the liberal international order as such:
a theocratic wielding supreme spiritual and temporal power was, in a
significant country, publicly embracing an alternative world order in
opposition to the one being practiced by the world community. The
Supreme leader of contemporary Iran was declaring that universal
religious principles, not national interests or liberal internationalism,
would dominate the new world he prophesied.109
Despite the declarations of Khomeini and their revolutionary challenge, they have yet to
transpire out of the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hence, while Iran labels
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non-Islamic political institutions as “illegitimate” because they “do not base themselves
on divine law,”110 the state has not been able to ― our zealously strove to ― cultivate
these institutions abroad, nor has it posed as a viable model of direct emulation for the
wider region. Iran’s most noble and influential characteristic, perhaps, is its willingness
to endure isolation in order to protest against the hierarchical world order governed by the
United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, the U.S. in the first 20 years of
the post Cold War, and, currently, the U.S and Russia and maybe China.
Iran’s revolutionary spirit has largely translated into support for militias,
paramilitary groups, and militant Islamic groups that challenge Iran’s adversaries
throughout the Middle East. This support has amounted to little other than instability and
higher degrees of influence in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. Islamic institutions
have not arisen from Iranian support in the aforementioned countries, but support has
heightened attritional conflict. This reality has led to Kissinger to the following
assessment of the Iranian Republic since the revolution: “Yet thirty-five years of
repetition had all but inured the world to the radicalism of these sentiments and the
actions backing them. On its part, Iran combined its challenge to modernity with a
millenial tradition of statecraft of exceptional subtlety.”111
Furthermore, Kissinger suggests there is an inherent paradox in assuming the role
of a revolutionary theocracy while also operating within the Westphalian system (albeit
reluctantly). That is, by institutionalizing the tenets of the revolution into the apparatuses
of the state, the Islamic Republic of Iran automatically loses a degree of its revolutionary
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zest. In fact, by proclaiming the title Republic, one is evoking westphalian principles that
are at theoretical odds with the official dictums of the revolution. As a result, a “paradox
took shape,” says Kissinger, “in the form of a dualistic challenge to the international
order.”112 He goes on to elaborate:
With Iran’s revolution, an Islamist movement dedicated to overthrowing
the Westphalian system gained control over a modern state and asserted its
“Westphalian” rights and privileges ― taking up its seat at the United
Nations, conducting trade, and operating its diplomatic apparatus. Iran’s
clerical regime thus placed itself at the intersection of two world orders,
arrogating the formal protections of the Westphalian system even while
repeatedly proclaiming that it did not believe in it, would not be bound by
it, and intended ultimately to replace it.
This leaves the international community in limbo ― what is the true posturing of Iran? Is
reconciliation plausible considering the export of revolution is an explicit dictum of
regime? Its leaders use language that is rather universal, resemblant of the age of empire
when polities were determined to be the system rather than a participant within it.
Similarly, the position of supreme leaders casts itself as the head of the Islamic
Revolution and the leader of the Islamic Ummah and Oppressed People.
Regardless, Kissinger believes that the current state of affairs between Iran and
the U.S. and Iran and the international order is not necessarily permanent.113 He points to
Iran’s flirtations with the Westphalian framework of international affairs as reason to
believe that its reformist undertones of the general revolutionary-reformist dualism can
be cultivated in a manner that successfully incorporates Iran into the international system
as a devoted and active member. Furthermore, Kissinger pinpoints Iran’s “coherent
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experience of national greatness and the longest and subtlest strategic tradition”114 among
the states in the Middle East as addition reason to believe that Iran is ripe with the
historical DNA necessary to partake in the established, international framework.. Finally,
he signals the cordial relations between the U.S. and Iran before the Islamic Revolution
as additional evidence that the two countries can perhaps maintain cooperative relations.
Kissinger goes as far as to state that “the United States and the Western
democracies should be open to fostering cooperative relations with Iran.”115 Hence,
Kissinger does not align himself with the rather militaristic approaches advocated by a
number of neoconservative voices or the hawkish positions of Israel’s Likud party and
Saudi Arabia’s monarchy. In other words, diplomacy is Kissinger's favorable course of
action given the current situation. If and when the U.S. pursues actions symbolic of
reconciliation, Kissinger provides instrumental advice on dealing with a significant
power that holds a world view quite different than those of the Western democracies:
What they must not do is base such policy on projecting their own
domestic experience as inevitably or automatically relevant to other
societies’, especially Iran’s. They must allow for the possibility that the
unchanged rhetoric of a generation is based on conviction rather than
posturing and will have had an impact on a significant number of the
Iranian people. A change of tone is not necessarily a return to normalcy,
especially where definitions of normalcy differ so fundamentally. It
includes as well ― and more likely ― the possibility of a change in tactics
to reach essentially unchanged goals. The United States should be open to
a genuine reconciliations and make substantial efforts to facilitate it. Yet
for such an effort to succeed, a clear sense of direction is essential,
especially on the key issue of Iran’s nuclear program.116
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Accordingly, the statesman tasked with these issues must reconcile an Iranian worldview
that holds the current hierarchical order as unjust with what the U.S. sees a front to the
overall consensus on the way states should behave and act. In the pursuit of
reconciliation, goals can remain unchanged, but tactics must change. Inevitably, each
nation will have to partially compromise on its ideals in order to commence the beginning
of a cooperative relationship.
Regarding the nuclear question, Kissinger considers nuclear armed Iran
unacceptable. He makes the argument that a nuclear Iran would have uncontrollable
proliferation ramifications in the most tumultuous region in the world ― a region where
nonstate actors can acquire and control large swaths of territory and conventional organs
of the state. World Order was written and published in the midst of the fruition of the
Nuclear Deal. With the deal having yet to fully manifest at the time of publication,
Kissinger devotes a sizeable section of his chapter to the Nuclear Question. He foresaw
the essence of the agreement; he states, “the quest for an agreement must contend with
the prospect that Tehran will be at least exploring a strategy of relaxing tensions just
enough to break the sanctions regime but retaining a substantial nuclear infrastructure and
a maximum freedom of action to turn it into a weapons program later.”117
Improving relations with Iran is contingent on timing. In other words, a
transformation in relations is predicated on the state of domestic affairs and, thus, the
physiological comfort of the regime, as well as how the regime perceives the relationship
between external forces and the state’s geopolitical position. Moreover, the matter weighs
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heavily on the strength of the reformist position over that of the hardlined establishment.
If Iran feels secure domestically and externally, it will be rather difficult to get the regime
to capitulate on the principles that are essentially directly in opposition to western
dictums of international affairs. On the other hand, if the regime is insecure ― due to
domestic sentiment, Sunni jihadism on its borders, or economic instability ― then it will
be more willing to adjudicate its oscillation between “reform” and “revolution” and
participation and confrontation in favor of the former positions, thereby appeasing the
United States and allowing it to take a less confrontational stance. “Which option[s] Iran
chooses will be determined by its own calculations,” Kissinger says, “not American
preconceptions.”118
As a participant and advocate of the international pluralistic order, America, in
principle, should be prepared to overcome the deadlock with Iran on the basis of the
Westphalian principles of nonintervention and to be willing to work alongside Iran in
developing a regional order that rids the region of proxy warfare and manipulation.
Kissinger rests the next step ― from principle to action ― on Iran acknowledging that it
too needs to operate under the principles of nonintervention and the gradual rescindment
of its support for non-state actors throughout the Middle East. The ultimate test for
U.S.-Iran relations is whether Iran considers the chaos throughout the region as a threat or
opportunity as it seeks to fulfill its millennial asspirations.
Ultimately, a series of questions emerge that will determine the future of
U.S.-Iran relations in the coming years and decades. If we assume a fundamental change
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in the driving agenda of Iran, what brought about these changes in its national interests
and how can the United States reform its policy in order to take advantage of the new
conditions? Will the conflict be solved through a change in the attitude of the United
States or a reform of its policy? And if the latter, what is the modification that should be
sought? If the answers to these questions are favorable to a change in posture on both
ends, though not necessarily a transformation of goals, then there is a chance that the
spirit of the age is ripe for overcoming the nearly 40 year deadlocke. If not, the U.S. will
continue to contain Iran through a combination of sanctions, rhetoric, and proxy warfare
that will only prolong instability in the region. It would be an unwise to assume the
Islamist forces and movements of era will fade anytime soon. The task before us is not
only about reconciling U.S.-Iran relations, but about attempting to construct a pluralistic
international order that is capable of accommodating a range of polities of unique,
historical development.
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CHAPTER IV: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN-IRANIAN ENCOUNTERS IN
WORLD POLITICS AND DISCOURSE

4.1 Iran: Country Overview
Home to one of the world’s oldest civilizations, the Islamic Republic of Iran
occupies a territory rich in history, tradition, culture, and identity. Contemporary Iran is
located in Western Asia and shares a border with a number countries and bodies of water.
To west lies Iraq and Turkey; to the northwest is Armenia and the Republic of
Azerbaijan; directly to the north is the Caspian Sea; Turkmenistan is to the north east; to
the east is Afghanistan and Pakistan; directly to the south is the Persian Gulf and the Gulf
of Oman. Iran has an area of just under 1.7 million km; the second largest in the region.
Tehran is the Capital and the largest city, and it is the economic and cultural hub of the
state.
Iran is home to over 81 million people, making it the 18th most populated country
in the world and the 2nd most populated country in the Middle East. Over 60% of Iran’s
population is under the age of 30, though it is aging. The nation is composed of
predominantly Persians, though Azerbaijanis and Kurds make up sizeable minorities.
Shia Islam is the principle religion. The majority of the population speaks Farsi.
After Saudi Arabia, Iran possesses the second largest economy in the Middle East.
Its GDP for 2016 was $412.2 billion and its main impetuses are oil, agriculture, and
service sectors. The state has a large presence in the economy, particularly in the
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manufacturing and financial services sector. Moreover, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps is quite active in the private sector, using revenues to fund adventures abroad.
Despite the sanctions lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran remains
subject to an international sanctions regime that limits the possibilities of economic
growth.
Iran is a theocratic republic. The unique political makeup of Iran is
institutionalized in its 1979 Constitution. The Leader of the Revolution ― the Supreme
Leader ― is the state’s ultimate authority. All major decisions demand his approval. He
is not only the political leader of the nation, but also the religious leader and the
commander-in-chief, thereby providing him with the sole power to declare war and
peace. The Assembly of Experts elects the Supreme Leader. To date, the Assembly of
Experts has never publicly challenged the decisions of the Supreme Leader. The
Guardian Council vets and approves all presidential and parliamentary candidates, though
the Supreme Leader selects all members of the council. The President is designated as the
highest authority of the state, albeit his secondary stature to the Supreme Leader. The
position is determined through a process of universal suffrage, though popular complaints
of interference have occured. The legislature ― the Islamic Consultative Assembly ―
drafts legislation, ratifies treaties, and approves the national budget. Though power is
centralized at the hands of the supreme leader, there are multiple centers of power within
the state.119 The government of the Islamic State is by no means apolitical.
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In effect, there are three domains of power: the Supreme Leader, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Presidency and its administration.120 Though
power is concentrated in the hands of the supreme leader, not one center has a monopoly
on power, making the others irrelevant. The IRGC is weakened by the fact that it has the
lowest level of political function and empowerment. The presidency often butts heads
with the IRGC, as the latter is heavily ingrained in economic, domestic and foreign
policy. Furthermore, the IRGC is unique in that is not a component of the formal Iranian
military, making it, technically, a paramilitary group. The supreme leader has the most
sway over the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. With a force of 125,000 soldiers, the
IRGC is a substantial military force. Finally, the IRGC is the entity that oversees Iran’s
extraterritorial and clandestine operations. Today, the group has a substantial presence in
Iraq and Syria.
The IRGC and the Presidency and the Ministries of government are rather
dichotomous. In Tehran, the latter two are framed as the technocrats, while the former is
conceived of as the guardian of the revolution. Both are committed to the tenets of the
revolution, but each have their own means or ideas of how to faithfully fulfill their
commitment to it.121 In addition, each have their respective vision of reform. The
technocrats, in part, are weary of the components of the revolution that might precipitate
international isolation; they do not see confinement as sustainable for the regime. The
former, however, fear Western capital, ideas, and technologies will endanger not only the
stability of the regime, but also jeopardize the spirit of the revolution.
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Iran is often referred to as a state sponsor of terrorism. This title has built up
legitimacy throughout the years largely due to IRGC directed programs. Domestically,
the IRGC is known to have led oppressive and violent campaigns targeting Kurdish and
Baluchis disent throughout the 1980s, as well target figures of the Iranian civil reform
movement. For example, in 1999, the IRGC dismantled student protests and, in 2009, the
paramilitary group crushed the Green Movement by arresting thousands of descendants.
In both cases, civilian deaths occured.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps international workings have attracted the
most attention. Attacks are not carried out directly by the IRGC, but by its proxies. The
most infamous of attacks in American memory are the 1983 bombing of a U.S. Marine
compound in Lebanon, killing 283 personel, and the 1996 Khobar Tower bombing in
Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 American service members. Ever since the U.S. implanted
a large U.S. military force in the Middle East, Iranian munitions and Iranian-trained
forces have repeatedly harmed American service members.122 The Revolutionary Guard
conducted its first attack on American soil when it attempted to assassinate the Saudi
Ambassador to the United States at a restaurant in Washington D.C. Eric Holder, the
Attorney General at the time, claimed the plan was “‘directed and approved by elements
of the Iranian government, and, specifically by the senior members of the Quds force.’”123
With such a track record, figures in Washington argue heavily for placing the
Revolutionary Guards on the U.S.’s Designated Foreign Terrorist List, while others hold
that doing so would raise hostilities without providing any concrete benefits.
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4.2 American and Iranian Encounters: 1953-Today
The roots of American-Iranian hostility date back to the fateful 1953 Iranian coup
d’état.124 The American CIA, along with its British counterparts, orchestrated a covert
operation, known as Operation Ajax, to help organize the overthrow of the
democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. At first, the coup failed,
but was followed by a second attempt which succeeded. To this day, there is debate
around why the United States felt the need to topple a democratically elected prime
minister. Nevertheless, the immediate consequences are clear: the Shah would reassume
power and maintain an oppressive state unitil the 1979 Iranian revolution. While in
power, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was one of the closest allies of the United States. The
U.S. provided the Shah will monetary aid and training for the secret police that would
keep his regime in power. Ironically, the U.S. helped Iran establish its nuclear program
and provided it with weapons grade enriched uranium in 1967. The United States
engineering of the Coup of 1953 and its explicit support for the Shah throughout his
twenty-six years in power made the Revolution of 1979 a reaction against not only the
monarchical regime of Pahlavi, but also the United States influence in the country and the
region.
The Iranian revolution of 1979 shocked the world. It ousted the Shah and
instituted the Islamic Republic of Iran with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini at the head of
government. After the fall of the regime, when the United States temporarily allowed the
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Shah to enter the United States for cancer treatment, the validity of the narrative that the
Shah simply constituted an American puppet was solidified and it weaved a fierce and
invigorated anti-americanism into the flames of the revolution. The act was perceived as
an attempt to shield the Shah from facing his crimes under the new government. This, in
addition to every other American act of subversion in the country instigated the storming
of the American embassy by students loyal to Khomeini. The coup of 1953 had come to
complicate America’s position in the region twenty-six years after it made the initial
mistake. The deadlock in American-Iranian relations has remained in place ever since
1979.
American foreign policy towards Iran ― since the revolution ― has been aimed
at subversion, aggression, containment, or some combination of the three. On the other
hand, Iranian foreign policy, concerning the United States, has sought to challenge
American aspirations in the region and the hierarchical order it champions. As a result,
there is a deep level of distrust between the two nations that makes reconciliation
extremely difficult. Simultaneously, both countries contain powerful domestic factions
who outrightly deny engagement and, therefore, only consider subversive policy options
as aligned with their respective national interests. It should be noted that though Iran and
America remain suspicious of one another, they do engage in occasional and limited acts
of cooperation.
During the Iran-Iraq war, the United States provided military, intelligence, and
logistical support to Iraq. There are reports that the U.S. also supplied information to Iran,
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as America simply wanted the war to end in a stalemate, so as to preserve the balance

of power in the region. American support of Iraq, however, outweighed it assistance to
Iran. Moreover, because Iran was bogged down in attritional warfare, it was not in a
position to seriously challenge the United States, despite its desire to. Iran remained
dormant for a few years after the war. Meanwhile, the belief that the United States
disproportionately supported Iraq during the eight year war exasperated Iran’s perception
of the United States as the “Great Satan.”
The Iran-Contra Affair ― arranged in the mid 1980s ― is an act of engagement
intent on improving relations. Yet, the act violated a United States arms embargo. The
Ronald Reagan administration hoped that by selling Iran armaments the U.S. might
obtain Iran's influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon and, therefore, secure the release of
American hostages being held in Lebanon. The affair received additional scrutiny when it
was discovered that the proceeds of the weapons sale went to fund Contra rebels fighting
the revolutionary government in Nicaragua. Ultimately, no hostages were released by
Hezbollah, so the deal failed to enact meaningful change.
In 1988, the United States launched a naval raid on Iranian waters, sinking two oil
platforms, one frigate war boat, and one gunboat. The United States launched the attack
in retaliation for Iranian mining in the Persian Gulf. In April 1988, the USS Samuel
Roberts struck a mine while in the Persian Gulf. The naval raid, known as Operation
Praying Mantis, was the U.S.’s response to the destruction of their boat. A few months
later, on July 3rd, 1988, the U.S. Navy shot down an Iranian commercial plane on its way
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to Dubai. It killed 290 civilians from six nations, most of whom were Iranian. Together,
the acts aggravated anti-american sentiments within the regime and the country
The bush administration’s refusal to follow through on its promise to match
goodwill with goodwill added yet another instance of distrust to the track record of
Iranian-American relations. The Bush administration approached President Rafsanjani
with a proposal: use its influence and leverage over Hezbollah to secure the release of the
remaining American hostages being held in Lebanon in exchange for a reciprocal gesture.
The administration was considering easing sanctions, taking Iran off the terrorist list,
compensating Iran for the shooting down of the Iranian airbus, and allowing the sale of
badly needed airplanes. In the end, the Bush administration did not respond to
Rafsanjani’s effort and ultimate success in securing the release of the hostages.
Intelligence suggesting Iran was seeking Nuclear Weapons and planning terror attacks
convinced Bush to reconsider. Rafsanjani was further irked when the United States
excluded Iran from the Madrid and Oslo peace processes.
Perhaps the fullest expressions of mutual respect and possible cooperation
transpired under the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, who was president from 1997 to
2005. He put forward the idea of a “dialogue of civilizations” as a first step towards
political rapprochement. He believed engagement would best be served through an initial
apolitical encounter. Thus, a team of American wrestlers traveled to Iran to compete
against their Iranian counterparts. The easement in relations did not continue, however,
due to pushback from Iranian conservatives and American preconditions for discussions.
Another gesture of easement occured in the days following the attacks of September 11th,
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when the President and the Supreme Leader condemned the attacks. There are reports
that Iranian citizens gathered in front of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, in an expression of
mourning and solidarity. Finally, when the United States invaded Afghanistan, the
Islamic Republic of Iran cooperated with the U.S. by providing it with intelligence and
targets for its air force. American airpower backed the ground force of the Northern
Alliance ― Iran’s main ally in Afghanistan ― which led the effort to take Kabul back
from the Taliban.
Collaboration, however, did not last. On January 29, 2002, President Bush
presented the annual State of the Union Address, where he labeled Iran, along with North
Korea and Iraq, as an “axis of evil.” President Khatami claims this rhetoric brought
American-Iranian relations to, perhaps, their lowest point since 1979. In the aftermath
and in anticipation of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iran, in a display of realpolitik, offered to
provide the United States with the intelligence it held on Iraq; the gesture was enticing
considering that the intelligence the U.S. received on Afghanistan proved reliable and
consequential. In the end, the Bush Presidency ignored the offer, remaining firm in his
position that Iran constituted a substantial threat to the United States and, therefore,
would not cooperate with it.
Over a year later, Iran sent the State Department a document titled the
“Roadmap,” which suggested direct talks between Iran and America take place in order
to improve relations ― everything was on the table. The mainstay of the document was
that the U.S. would refrain from supporting regime change in Iran and it would abolish
all sanctions in exchange for Hezbollah becoming an exclusively political and social
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organization and for Iran’s acceptance of the two state-state approach to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Iran favored because its content respected and acknowledged
Iran as a regional power ― an absent feature of relations in the past. Moreover, the
Supreme Leader agreed with large swaths of the paper’s prospective, making the
“Roadmap” viable in the long run. In the end, Washington said no ― a decision made not
by the President, but by the State Department. Washington’s rebuff was likely based on
its intelligence suggesting Iran was pursuing nuclear capabilities. For the remainder of
the Bush Presidency, diplomacy with Iran was left to the European states.
When the Bush administration closed the diplomatic channel provided by the
“Roadmap,” interactions were fraught and confrontational. The two sides exchanged
accusations of the other’s wrongdoings. The U.S. has been accused of covert operations
in Iran, including support for the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK) and
Jundullah. Furthermore, the U.S. government was said to have supported the minority
Ahwazi and Baluchi groups in hope of instigating dissidence. There were suspicions, too,
that the U.S. Special Forces conducted cross-border operations for intelligence purposes
from Iraq. In 2007, the U.S. raided an Iranian Consulate General in Erbil and arrested a
number of staff members. Iran, on the other hand, has been accused by the United States
of supporting Iraqi insurgency groups that killed American troops stationed in Iraq during
the height of the Iraq War.
The Obama administration ushered in a period of American-Iranian relations that
differ quite substantially from Obama’s predecessors. The Obama presidency was the
first to receive a congratulatory message from an Iranian president since 1979. In
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addition, Obama and Rouhani talked on the telephone on September 27th, 2013 ― it is
often regarded as the highest political exchange between the two countries since the
Islamic Revolution. The product of Obama’s reformed approach was the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) ― the agreement that restrained Iran’s nuclear
ambitions in exchange for the removal of the sanctions regime.

4.3 Iranian-American Discourse in America
America’s general, historical position towards Iran ― since the 1979 Revolution
― can be accurately characterized as an oscillation between limited confrontation,
antagonization, and subversion; indeed, there are brief moments of cooperation
intertwined throughout the years. Hostilities between Iran and the United States were at
their highest levels during the presidency of George W. Bush. Rhetoric during these eight
years aimed to showcase Iran in a particular light. It is argued by authors such as John
Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Arshin Adib-Moghaddam that American enmity
towards Iran ― during the Bush Administration ― rose to unproductive levels due to the
heavy influence of the neoconservative mindset and the Israeli Lobby. These authors
pinpoint the influence of the Israel Lobby and the neoconservative ideology on American
foreign policy as a crucial reason ― if not the reason ― why the United States has
historically and consistently opposed detenté or cooperation. Mearsheimer and Walt
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attest that America’s avoidance of engagement “has been harmful to the national interest
[of the United States].”126
Adib-Moghaddam builds an argument around the idea that one cannot separate
facts “from a manufactured context.”127 Indeed, facts are sometimes fabricated. He
contends that narratives around world politics are often socially engineered in order to
push forward specific agendas or interests. For Adib-Moghaddam, the image of and
narrative about Iran that permeates the American milieu are the ones “manufactured” by
neoconservatives. The guiding interest and agenda for the neoconservatives is “to subvert
the Iranian state and, by extension, to recode Iranian behavior in accordance with
American and Israeli interests in West Asia and beyond.”128 Neoconservatives, typically,
welcome aggression, rationalize war, and prioritize militaristic foreign policies. In order
to use these means, they engineer narratives that legitimize and frame the aforementioned
means as appropriate.
Iran is considered a rogue nation by the hardliners in America’s foreign policy
establishment; it is unpredictable, irrational, and defiant, as the narrative goes. While this
version does, perhaps, hold some evidence of validity, it is pushed as irrefutable and
reinforced with misinformation and fabrication. Invalid stories,129 characterizations, and
simplifications foster a public and political sentiment where militarism or hostility is seen
as suitable or even wise. In other words, national discourse is centered around the
assumption that Iran is a rogue. Adib-Moghaddam refers to this step as “writing the
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script, the speech, the terminology of a specific political discourse…(e.g. The ‘axis of
evil’ invented by David Frum). The ‘writing’ is followed by two additional layers of
scaffolding ― what he refers to as “decision-maker” and “strategic value.”130 The former
are the individuals who take the script and elevate it to policy. Where as the script writers
are tasked with setting discourse and therefore occupy media, think-tank, lobbyist, and
advocacy positions, the decision-makers are “part of the day-to-day affairs of politics in
Washington.”131 They hold positions of power that elevate discourse to action. “Strategic
value” is the point where day-to-day is ingrained into “the long-term state interests;”
therefore, it is stubborn, ingrained, and “not easily discarded or altered.”132 It is at this
third level that discourse is elevated to an ontological position.
For Adib-Moghaddam, the ontological positioning of Iran within the United
States is completely distant from Iran’s own ontological content. Hence, “the facts”
regarding Iran and its character within the foreign policy establishment of the United
States deviates quite heavily from the ontological reality in Iran. War is, therefore,
pushed as the only reasonable means to overcoming the Iranian threat and the only way
to reconcile divergent ontological positions. It is such a discrepancy between “the facts”
permeating the United States and the reality on the ground that made the invasion of Iraq
feasible. Military action against Iran is cultivated under similar conditions and
circumstances. Though the Bush presidency and the heyday of neoconservatism are
behind us for now, the “strategic-value” of their discourse remains pervasive (e.g.
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Trump's refusal to reinstate the Iran deal despite its effectiveness). The legacy of
neoconservatism is its inscription of preemptive war into the composition of American
foreign policy. Thus, we can understand Trump’s antagonism toward the Iran deal as a
personal affinity for war as the suitable alternative for an already efficacious diplomatic
solution to the global interest of nonproliferation ― the very interest the argument for
war would claim to defend. Let us now take a look of how one might conceive of the
ontological position(s) of the Iranian state vis-á-vis its approach to world politics.

4.4 Iranian Foreign Policy Milieu
Iran’s political, structural, and ideological disposition makes it arduous ― if not
impossible ― to securely ingrain it within the general framework of the Westphalian,
pluralistic international order. On one hand, Iran calculates its national interests based on
the reality that power is the ultimate factor in the international realm. That is, despite its
revolutionary character ― devotion to undermining the unequal scafeldoling of the
international order, though not limited to this tasks ― international relations operates in a
specific manner that the state is not able to escape. As a result, it behaves like any other
state in the system: adopts policies that increase its relative power (e.g. supporting the
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq). Simultaneously, Iran’s national interest is
constructed in accordance with the guiding principles of the 1979 revolution ―
anti-hierarchical world order and anti-imperialism ― and, therefore, takes on an idealist
undertones. The main challenge to overcoming the current deadlocke between the United
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States and Iran, let alone the Western World, is how to incorporate Iran into the
international system without violating Iran’s institutionalized precepts and historical
memory (i.e. incorporation through regime change or other forms of coercion).
The following section seeks to critically examine the Iranian milieu vis-á-vis
world politics in hope of configuring a possible path forward. Coming from their own
unique tradition, it is difficult for Americans and other foreign statesman to comprehend
the convictions of the Iranian regime. As a result, the convictions of the United States and
Iran often come to a ferocious grind that ultimately leads to political inertia between the
two nations. If American statesmen can come to comprehend the Iranian complex, they
will, perhaps, be in a better position to engage with the regime in a manner that does
place irrationality at the forefront of the policy decisions making process.
Similar to the U.S., the Iranian government considers its founding principles as
relevant and desirable to all people ― liberating. At its conception, the Iranian revolution
was proclaimed to not solely belong to Iran, but to the entire world. “Islam [was]
revealed for mankind and the Muslims,” the Ayatollah stated, “…An Islamic movement,
therefore, cannot limit itself to any particular country, not even to the Islamic countries; it
is the continuation of the revolution by the prophets.”133 Accordingly, the Islamic
Revolution is central to how Iran imagines its purpose on the world stage. Because the
revolution was just as much about challenging the hierarchical world order as it was
about domestic and political discontents, the revolution extends beyond domestic policy
into Iranian foreign policy.
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When the revolutionary flare subsided and the new government consolidated
power, dictums of the revolution were institutionalized into the state. Of these precepts,
the challenge and denial of the international order, headed by the United States, is the
most important in the context of the present argument. The new regime set out to fulfill a
central component of the revolution: “[a] redefinition of the country’s identity and
redirection of relations with the whole world; Iranians wanted to reinvent both
themselves and the way they saw the outside world.”134 However, Adib-Moghaddam
attests that the very action of institutionalizing revolutionary ideals “established Iran as a
revisionist power in international affairs.”135 That is, after toppling the Shah and
establishing the Islamic republic, the latter became the new status quo. What was once
the counter-hegemonic force became the hegemonic force in Iran. By using the
apparatuses of the state to fulfill the mandates of the revolution, the government
automatically assumed a reformist approach to the fulfillment of its ideals. Throughout
the 1980s, the Revolution became hegemonic in the domestic sense. Internationally,
however, Iran remains a counter-hegemonic force, intent on subverting the regional and
global status quo. Simultaneously, its disposition towards world politics takes on
theocratic undertones, keen on spreading the Islamic mandates of its revolution. The two
― anti-hierarchical world order and Islamic theocracy ― are not at odds, but in harmony.
Central to “exporting” revolution abroad was the use of the notions ‘oppressed’
and ‘oppressors’ (Mostazafan and Mostakbarab in Farsi).136 This language came short of
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explicit religious connotation, which mattered in the context of the Palestinian liberation
movements, but not in the context of Latin America during the 1980s. Oppressed and
oppressor fit into a larger anti-imperialist narrative, thereby linking what was happening
in the Iranian Revolution with the liberation movements occurring all over the world.137
Accordingly, the constitution is ripe with notions that promote the triumph of the
oppressed over the oppressors. The constitutions holds that Iran “provides the necessary
basis for ensuring the continuation of the revolution at home and abroad.” This is an
example of the institutionalization of revolutionary precepts.
Upending the international status quo, support for liberation movements, and
export of revolution were not to be pursued through “aggressive intervention in the
internal affairs of other nations” and not by the means of force according to Khomeini.138
He aspired to export the precepts of the revolution, but was weary of force as the means.
Hence, on the one hand, Khomeini framed the task as such:
We have set as our goal the world-wide spread of the influence of Islam
and the suppression of the rule of the world conquerors we wish to cause
the corrupt roots of Zionism, capitalism and communism wither
throughout the world. We wish, as does God almighty, to destroy the
systems which are based on these three foundations, and to promote the
Islamic order of the Prophet in the world of arrogance.139
Despite the harsh and confrontational language around liberation, the subtlety with which
Iran conducted its revolutionary aspirations in the years after the revolution makes such
statements appear bombastic and simply rhetorically confrontational. Furthermore,
Khamenei warns that Iran’s position “does not mean that we intend to export [revolution]
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by the baynet. We want to call [dawat] everyone to Islam [and to] send our calling
everywhere.”140
It is under this context and critical analysis that leads Arshin Adib-Moghaddam to
conclude that in the initial years of the Islamic Republic, portraying the country as a
beacon of hope for the toppling of an unjust world order was more central to its mission
that any military support it may have provided. Adib-Moghaddam states:
Although convert backing for liberation movements in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Lebanon, Latin America, Africa and Palestine was sometimes justified
openly, exporting the idea of the Islamic Republic without military
aggrandisement was rather more central. Reliance on dawat (calling) and
tabligh (propagation, advertisement, dissemination) was hence substituted
for the militaristic coercion periodically characteristic of the Shah’s reign.
In accordance with that attitude, the Islamic Republic cancelled the Shah’s
multi-billion dollars defence contracts with the United States and Western
Europe and abandoned Iranian military installations in Oman.141
In theory, the revolutionary era assumed a position, then, where Iran’s radical
independence from both superpowers would catalyse a process that would liberate the
oppressed from an unjust world order. Essentially, what Iran and, by extension, the
Revolution stood for would ― by itself ― have the power to export the revolutionary
spirit abroad. Iran intended for the liberation movements throughout the world to look to
Iran as example of a nation breaking from the shackles of foreign powers.
During the time of the revolution, a particular phrase rose in prominence: neither
Eastern nor Western, only the Islamic Republic. The revolutionary generation was
willing to accept this knew identity, even if it meant that Iran was to be casted as a rogue
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state or an outlaw. A number of immediate foreign policy decisions can be explained
with the narrative so far provided. Iran abdicated its membership to a number of Cold
War institutions. It fought an attritional war with Iraq, drawing its motivation, in part,
from the belief that the war was a global effort to subdue the revolutionary spirit of the
nation. The country immediately supported the PLO and offered solidarity for leftist
movements throughout the world. With the severance of ties with Apartheid South
Africa, and bellicose language and posture to the United States, a foreign policy culture
emerged where the ideals of the revolution were perfectly aligned with the states national
interest.
Yet, societies and cultures, after all, are not static, but dynamic. Hitherto, I have
laid out a narrative that portrays Iran, in its initial years, as a nation that was in part
founded on the precept of indignance ― directed towards the hierarchical world order, its
absence of equity, and imperial manipulation. This dissension to the international system
persists, but a competing posture has arisen in the foreign policy establishment that seeks
different means to what are essentially the same goals. Since the death of Ayatollah
Khomeini, positions, practices, and stances have been incorporated into the culture of the
regime that deviate quite drastically than those preached by the first supreme leader (i.e.
nonintervention, weariness around the development of nuclear weaponry, and
anti-militarism). Today, regime practices in the region are more emblematic of security
concerns and sphere of influence than the direct fulfillment of an ideological agenda
based on the principles of the revolutions. Nevertheless, the leitmotif of opposition and
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challengement to international system ― particularly the United States and its role in
sustaining the system ― persist.
The modifications of the perspective that defined the Iranian state throughout the
first 15 or so years after the revolution emerged and developed throughout the end of the
20th century and the 21st century. At the moment, it is quite robust and contends for the
highest positions of government. Internally, the counter thrust “has manifested itself in a
multi-dimensional movement for a pluralistic democracy” and, this thrust, “has already
had an impact on the country’s foreign policies.”142 The dialogue among civilizations,
detenté with Europe, engagement with Saudi Arabia, its pressure on Hezbollah for the
release of American hostages, dialogue with the U.S. on Afghanistan and Iraq, and the
Nuclear Deal are prime examples.
Author Arshin Adib-Moghaddam warns his reader, however, not to perceive the
aforementioned policies solely through the lense of a power struggle between reformists
and conservatives, calling such a mistake reductionist. He attests that “Iranian foreign
policy elites have remained committed to certain core strategic principles of the state.”143
He finds it helpful to think of the Iranian foreign policy establishment as coherent around
“grand strategic preferences that transcend the faultlines of day-to-day politics.”144 Those
who do take on a reformist approach remain pro-palestinian, anti-zionist,
anti-imperialism, and demand cultural and political independence ― all of which were
integral dictums of the revolution. For the reformist, more so than the conservative, there
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is no contradiction between detenté and engagement and the spirit of the revolution. The
reformist takes on a less aggressive approach to their grand strategic goals. Moreover,
Adib-Moghaddam asserts that the reformists in Iranian society generally conceive of the
millinearian aspect of the regime’s theological disposition in relation to foreign policy as
evolutionary rather than immediate. He offers yet another point of distinction:
progressive versus fundamentalist Islam. Despite these differences, both camps prioritize
the preservation of the revolutionary cause, all the while projecting Iranian power both
regionally and globally. Finally, the reformist forces are most prominent within civil
society. High officials often oscillate between both camps, depending on the issue at hand
and the center of power (i.e presidency or IRGC). With all that said, Arshin suggests
Iran’s moments of “seemingly eclectic pragmatism” should be seen within the
aforementioned context. He states:
Iran’s seemingly eclectic’ pragmatism during times of crisis with the arms
deals United States and Israel (the Iran-Contra affair), the diplomatic
backing of the US invasion of Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, relative
silence about Russian war crimes in Muslim Chechnya and Chinese
suppression of Muslim primarily in the Western provinces of the country,
mute support for the war against Saddam Hussein in 2003, and efforts to
engage with the US diplomatically should be seen within that context.145
Such foreign policy decisions should be interpreted as times when Iran took advantage of
world politics, outside of their control, to further their grand strategic preferences; they
are not an abandonment of the foreign policy agenda of the post-revolutionary era. They
are acts of realpolitik.
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In summary, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 ushered in a set of precepts that were
institutionalized in the years after the revolution. Markedly, the regime consolidated a
strategic doctrine around political and cultural independence, ant-imperialism,
anti-zionism, the persistent challenge of Western expansionism and the established world
order, and anti-americanism. Having been institutionalized into the DNA of the state,
these ideals are not easily disregarded. A counter-hegemonic force has emerged,
generally signified through the term reformist — though it would be reductionist to
consider the reformist bloc as uniformly opinionated. It is best to frame the counter forces
as residual convictions of the revolution, not as an effort to diverge from the original
tenets of the Islamic Republic ― a posture that seeks their gradual, evolutionary
achievement rather than its immediate imposition.
When the U.S. formulates policy directed towards Iran, it would do well to
recognize this reality and not perceive Iran’s actions as irrational or completely
unpredictable. While the culture behind the foreign policy establishment cannot explain
all that is occurring in the world regarding Iran’s foreign policy decisions, it is an
important, overarching leitmotif that the U.S. would do well to consider as it formulates
policies that protect vital U.S. interests as they relate to confronting and cooperating with
Iran. It is the reformist position that is perhaps most likely to give way to an opportunity
for the gradual improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations. In fact, it was the rather
un-raucous presidency of Hassan Rouhani during which a deal was struck to temporarily
curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions; the deal was also secured by the absence of hawkish
undertones to Iran-U.S. relations.
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CHAPTER V: PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION AND BALANCE OF
POWER

From Kissinger’s thinking, one can isolate a number of valuable diplomatic
insights that are relevant to an international system defined by multiple centers of power.
His perspicacity, I argue, is of great utility to the prospect of diplomatic reconciliation
between the United States and Iran. The components of Kissinger’s thinking that could
potentially help usher in an age of conciliation are numerasized below.
One, Kissinger’s thinking posits the avoidance of war through the balance of
power. For Kissinger, this is the highest moral attainment that can be pursued at the level
of the international state-system. Two, pluralistic and liberal internationalism is the ideal
scaffolding on which to construct a stable state-system. It respects nonlinear conceptions
of historical development, thereby appreciating differences in international historical
sociologies. Three, power is not a static phenomenon; therefore, balance of power
necessitates adjustments on behalf of the participants of the balancing act. The inability
of one or more states to adjust to a new power reality, precipitated by a rising power,
results in the eventual recalibration of the balance through force. Four, multipolarity
demands not the proliferation of domestic precepts, but the establishment and
safeguarding of the balance of power. Hence, America should be cautious when
formulating diplomacy on the basis of its ‘universal’ ideals. Instead, ideals can be
self-perpetuated through the construction of overlapping economic and political
structures and domestic civil societies. Five, Kissinger asserts that a nuclear Iran is
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unacceptable due to the proliferation consequences it would have across the region.
Accordingly, the nuclear question is a starting point when determining criteria that would
necessitate a military response. Six, efficacious diplomacy is conditional on timing and
other external conditions. In other words, in order for a political deadlock to be
surmounted through diplomacy, timing is particularly crucial. The final point is used as
the point of departure for the next section.

5.1 Timing and Posture
The direction of Iranian-American relations is in limbo. The new source of
uncertainty stems from the Presidency of Donald Trump and his antagonism towards the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). His bombastic and confrontational
language is jeopardizing the possibility of a serious period of detenté ushered in by
President Obama. Hence, the current political environment does not appear well suited
for the continuation of engagement, let alone detenté. Regardless of recent events and
American politics, Iran, domestically, is within a period of suspense and it is anticipating
a period of transformation (i.e. the selection of a new Supreme Leader). Ultimately, the
transition of power will represent a sound adjudication on the direction of Iranian politics
and foreign policy for the foreseeable future. The JCPOA represented a victory for
Iranian moderates (i.e. those not necessarily opposed to engagement with the West). The
fact that Iran agreed to the treaty on the grounds of sanction relief conveys the
importance the regime, and particularly Ayatollah Khamenei, places on economic
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development and growth. It recognizes that the health of the regime is partly contingent
on its socio-economic conditions. Yet, nearly three years since the completion of the deal,
Iran has still to benefit to the degree it thought it would. It is now clear that economic
development necessitates engagement with the United States and other economic centers
of the world. This gives the United States a high degree of leverage and a clear set of next
steps in the general pursuit of detenté, but the opposite directions is being pursued by the
Trump administration.
To raise and answer the question in the previous section Kissinger On Iran: can
one isolate a change in posture from the Iranian regime and, if so, what brought about
these changes in its national interests? Yes, we can identify a change in Iran’s posture: its
willingness to engage the West, and particularly, the United States, on the matter of
Iran’s nuclear program. What brought about this change in posture? In part and overtime,
the counter-hegemonic voices in the country established political power through the
electoral system. For some time, the majority of civil society was willing to endure the
consequences of political and economic independence in the name of revolutionary
ideals. No doubt, to this day, portions of the population are still willing to endure the
negative externalities of such a position. Political and economic independence, in the case
of Iran, has resulted primarily in a lack of political freedoms and insufficient economic
opportunity. Devotees come in two general types. There are those who are willing to pay
the price because they are largely politically and economically secure, to the point where
autarky is not overwhelming. On the other hand, enthusiasts of the Islamic Republic’s
isolation, despite its overwhelming impact on socio-economic conditions, persists due to
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their unwithering devotion to a set of ideals. Those of the latter, particularly, are
increasingly far and few, as the revolutionary generations is reaching the end of its
life-cycle.
The revolutionary generation is subsiding and the costs to the precepts of the
revolution are rising. The Green Revolution and the December 2017 and January 2018
protests portray a frustrated populace, economically and politically. The latter protests are
particularly noteworthy due to the fact that their participants included the rural population
― not just the liberal, educated elite of Tehran. In the future, the discontent of the Iranian
people could potentially encourage the government to assume a stance that is favorable to
reconciling relations with the United States because of the socio-economic opportunity it
would catalyze. In return, the counter-thrust to the regime would potentially subside. The
fact of the matter is that the Iranian government needs the passive and agreeable language
of the U.S. government in order for U.S. and international capital to flow handsomely
into the country. The confrontational language of the United States ― “no option is off
the table” ― will not provide the reassurance and stability capitalists require in order to
lend large sums of capital. Hence, if the regime feels uneasy about the implications of
civil society’s discontent on the longevity of the Islamic Republic, the regime could be
encouraged to further reconsider its posture towards the United States if the proper
incentives are provided by the former. Such a prospect is not guaranteed ― the U.S. and
the reformist positions in Iran would be going up against Iranian fundamentalists and the
hawks and warmongers of the United States.
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The JCPOA should not be interpreted as the Islamic Republic of Iran’s
abandonment of the spirit it was founded on, despite Tehran’s slight pivot away from
isolating itself from the West to its reluctant engagement with it. The Iranian regime
remains committed to its founding precepts whether one is a reformist or conservative, as
chapter four argued. The reformist and fundamentalist divide is emblematic of a larger
divide between a set of contested means for a shared set of goals. The “pivot” I suggest
above is driven by the rise of the reformist bloc. To be clear: they remain devoted to the
revolutionary zest the regime hopes to cast into perpetuity.
The impending end of Khamenei’s reign will potentially further shift Iran into the
international orbit if a centrist or a moderate is chosen as successor. There are
unconfirmed reports that Khamenei has been battling cancer for a number of years.146 At
his age, there is no doubt he is laying the groundwork for his successor’s smooth
transition, despite the fact the next Supreme Leader is chosen by the Guardian Council.
Moreover, Khamenei will most likely seek a successor who simultaneously embodies his
conservative views and his calculated willingness to sparingly indulge the reformist
agenda. The forthcoming transition of power will inevitably pose a shock to the Republic
of Iran; this will by only the second time the country has gone through a transition of
power and it will mark the first time in nearly thirty years. Khamenei should know that
any transition that seeks to block out the reformist stance will most likely anger a large
block of the Iranian people. However, the bellicose language of the United States helps
reinforce anti-american voices in the regime, thereby limiting the prospects of detenté in
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the future by positioning hardline voices as attractive. Consequently, the United States
should assume a foreign policy that does not increase the desirability of Iran’s hardlined
positions, as these are the voices that make rapprochement next to impossible.
Concerning the transition of power, America’s antagonistic rhetoric could possibly help
Khamenei and the Guardian Council feel politically secure to a point where the Council
feels secure sidelining moderate positions.
If cooler heads prevail in the future, the policy prescriptions detailed below might
be able to build on the JCPOA and the general and gradual ― yet not guaranteed ―
repositioning of Iran, thereby instituting a long-term shift to detenté and ultimately
reconciliation. Hopefully, when more moderate or attuned leadership prevails, it will not
be too late to make use of detenté in order to help overcome the impasse between the
United States and Iran.
Now that it has been conveyed that the spirit of the age is different than in the
previous era, it will be argued that detenté is the best way to take advantage of the
anomalies in Iranian posture. After, specific policy recommendations are laid out that will
allow for a successful manifestation of detenté.

5.2 The Case for Detenté
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is remarkable considering it is the first
instance of a substantive pivot toward faithful compromise and engagement between the
United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979. The JCPOA is by no means
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perfect, but it marks a triumph of diplomacy. The deal secured, at the very least, a
postponement of Iran’s nuclear weapon program without resorting to force. At its best, it
will lay the necessary foundation for the continuation of nonproliferation to Iran and the
Middle East once the deal expires in the next ten to fifteen years. The deal is
extraordinary considering two foes ― Iran and the U.S. ― were able to compromise on
their national precepts and overcome the hardlined voices trumpeting against the deal
within each countries political scene.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action does not amount to an overcoming of
the deadlock between Iran and the U.S., but it gave way to a substantive break in their
relationship that has nearly always been confrontational. Iran has largely complied with
the requirements of the deal ― minus a few minor slips that were quickly corrected.
Since the change in administrations in the United States, the U.S. cannot say the same.
The trump Administration is threatening to pull out of the deal due to his general distaste
for the deal and because of Iran’s support of “terrorism” and its ballistic missile program.
Trump’s rhetoric is jeopardizing the true value of the deal: the opportunity to rebuild trust
and lines of communication and engagement with Iran. Remaining committed to the
JCPOA is in the best interest of the United States. The other options ― regime change
and aggressive containment ― are bleak and, ultimately, they would not lead to regional
stability nor would they help establish a sustainable balance of power with the least
amount of carnage.
The United States has three general options when it comes to dealing with Iran,
now and in the future: containment, regime change, and detenté. I argue that all but the
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third option will result in a degeneration of relations and regional destabilization. The
first ― containment ― is contingent on a successful sanctions regime and a stable and
all-embracing coalition. The heart of the United States containment policy, then, rests on
economic sanctions and support for a coalition of Arab states that will address fears of
Iranian hegemony. The coalition needs a regional leader, and while it has one in Saudi
Arabia, it does not appear up to the task. It is bogged down in domestic strife and reform
and it is stuck in the Yemeni Civil War, which has no clear end in sight. As a result,
Saudi Arabia does not appear to be in a position to efficaciously lead. Moreover, a
coalition of Arab states would require a solid sense of cohesion and commitment between
its members. The Saudi-Qatari upheaval shows the limitations of Arab unity and Egypt’s
domestic problems make it disinterested. Finally, the absence of serious Turkish fears of
Iranian hegemony in the region make its participation in a coalition doubtful. Also, at the
moment, it seems that Turkish and Iranian interests align, as they both possess sizeable
Kurdish populations and they are economically interdependent.147 Without Turkey’s
involvement, a coalition would lack credibility and military muscle.
The second major component of a containment policy is sanctions. While they
proved vital in getting Iran to the table to negotiate its nuclear program, sanctions would
not enjoy the success they did in the years before the JCPOA. In order to be successful,
sanctions need to be multilateral. With Iran complying with the nuclear deal, the U.S. will
have a hard time convincing the E.U., Russia, and China to support an international
sanctions regime similar to the one in place before 2015. Moreover, a renewed sanctions

147

Biglari 2017.
144

regime would undermine Iran’s reformists and boost its hardliners political positions.
Considering the latter is the backbone to Iran’s outright opposition to the United States,
the re- imposition of sanctions would come at the detriment of the United States.
Regime change is the second plausible, but mistaken, option for the United States.
It could pursue such a measure by the means of covert action or a full scale military
operation. The former would necessitate dissident factions or popular support . The only
functioning opposition group is the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK). This organization,
however, is minuscule in size and most of its adherents reside outside of the country.
Furthermore, the group is not supported by the public, as the MEK sided with Saddam
Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war. The MEK lack the political and social power necessary to
overthrow the regime. Even if this were not the case, it would not be wise to repeat the
history of the 1953 Coup d'etat, sponsored by the CIA. In addition, it does not seem that
the U.S. could ferment popular opposition to the State; U.S. interference in 20th century
Iranian history looms too large. As long as the regime does not brutally subdue the
reform movement, change by force is unlikely. The brutal civil wars in the region cast too
strong of an aversion to popular uprising for the youth of the country to stir dissent.
Finally, if the United States invaded Iran with a full scale military operation ―
similar to the 2003 invasion of Iraq ― the U.S. would repeat the ills of the past. Iran does
not possess weapons of mass destruction and, under the JCPOA, they will not for the
foreseeable future. In addition, an invasion would require a long term military presence in
Iran and U.S. military forces would not only face a good fight from Iran’s military, but
also extreme hostility from the Iranian people. An invasion could also precipitate wider,
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regional instability. The situation in Iran and throughout the region does not necessitate a
U.S. military invasion of Iran.
That leaves us with detenté ― a politically unpopular option, but best aligned
with America’s long term strategic interests. Detenté is a two sided project; hence, both
parties would have to agree that the easing of hostilities is in both of their interests.
Fortunately, this is the case. With Iran’s nuclear program on pause for the next ten years,
the U.S. has the comfort of knowing that a policy of engagement is not a gamble aiming
to suspend Iran’s nuclear development. Moreover, the current limbo in U.S. foreign
policy ― that is, its combination of containment, hostile rhetoric, and cold war tactics ―
taxes U.S. resources. Detenté raises the possibility of long term stability in region,
thereby constraining the environments that breed militant extremism ― the main interest
of the United States in the region, outside the geopolitical game of power politics.
Together, these conditions and prospects make detenté in the interest of the United States.
Iran, on the other hand, is well suited for a phase of detenté. Its support for proxy
groups throughout the Middle East divert funds from domestic priorities. Long-term
overextension is a fear of the Iranian regime. The fate of the Soviet Union has to play a
psychological toll on the Iranian regime. Yet, Iran will likely not riscend support for its
military proxies unless it receives a reliable alternative to its current security structure.
The stability of the regime relies on a delicate balance between economic health and
security. The United States can assist on these fronts in exchange for a regional posture
that is more accommodating to American interests and regional stability. Hence, detenté
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is in the interests of the Iranian regime if it leads to an alternative security arrangement
and enhanced economic health.
While I argue detenté is directly in line with each country’s national interest,
there is no guarantee that it will prevail. Detenté is contingent on a few additional
preconditions. First, it will depend on how Iran approaches statecraft in the coming years
and maybe even decades. If Iran does not adhere to the Westphalian conceptions of
statecraft and, therefore, acts as a cause and not as a country, the United States and Iran
will be approaching foreign policy from two different ontological positions that will
render detenté irrelevant. In the case of Iran, the approach it takes might, in the end,
depend on the strength of the reformist or progressive position. In the United States,
dententé is contingent on un-maximalist and compromising dispositions. The Trump
administration seems to be pursuing the opposite trajectory.
Assuming Iran, in the future, practices statecraft in a manner that is aligned with
the Westphalian tradition, I contend the U.S. needs to assume a new and updated position
in the Middle East that will allow for the gradual improvement of relations between the
United States and Iran, as well as prepare it for a less tumultuous journey throughout the
21st century. Before relations can become cordial, hostilities will need to cool. Detenté is
the aim, but what are the means?
The United States, I argue, should base detenté on six prescriptions. In other
words, the U.S. needs to do the following in order to usher in age of conciliation. One,
the United States needs to recognize the substantive role it played in the 1953 Coup d'etat
and offer an official apology. Second, the United States should accommodate or tolerate
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Iranian influence in the region. Third, the U.S. should work to wean Iran from its reliance
on instability as a means to regional influence and, instead, work with it to establish
alternative levers of sway. A first step to the aforementioned is the tolerating Iranian
regional influence. This will help Iran come to the calculation that stability is in its
interest and it will allow for Iran to establish and ultimately yield non-military
mechanisms of power. Four, the United States must accept Islamism as heterogeneous
and not necessarily at odds with Westphalian traditions of statecraft. Five, American
foreign policy should be constructed in a manner that does not seek to manipulate
foreign, domestic situations to align with the domestic precepts of the United States. This
means overlooking the internal conditions of non-democratic states when the balance of
power is in disarray. By doing so, the United States will assume a less imperial role and
abstain from heavy handed policies that prevent the United States to take on a facilitating
roles in the region. Six, the U.S. should accept a neutral role in the Middle East for the
coming decades. Hence, it should abdicate its favoritism for Israel and Saudi Arabia.

5.3 American Policy Prescriptions

1. Apology for the Coup d'etat of 1953.
The original divide between the United States and Iran is the former’s
participation in the Coup d’etat of 1953, its subsequent assistance in reinstituting the
Shah as the head of state, and the police state that it help construct to keep the Shah in
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power for over 20 years. Hence, the first step in reconciliation between the two countries
must begin with the United States offering an official, congressional resolution
apologizing to the Iranian people for violating its sovereignty. By doing so, the United
States would send a strong signal to the people and the government of Iran that it
sincerely aspires to shift away from the paradigm that has left the two countries in
deadlock for nearly four decades. As shown in Chapter four, the deficit of trust between
the two countries is inhibiting engagement. An official apology, however, would be a
sincere step towards rebuilding trust, particularly due to the fact that the gesture would
not be transactional. The JCPOA was a concrete step that allows for trust to be built up
over time, but it is rather transactional: the lifting of sanctions in exchange for the
temporary abolition of Iran’s militaristic nuclear program. An apology is rather apolitical,
and, perhaps, it would appeal to the deep generosity and maturity of the Iranian people.
Such an act will also reassert American leadership and welcome its presence in the
region.

2.

Tolerating Iranian Influence
America’s status quo position is poorly attuned to the realities of the power

dynamics in the region. The reality of the matter is that Iranian regional power status is
stubbornly being denied ― this comes as the expense of regional stability. Accordingly, a
serious push for detenté will require the United States to recognize Iran as a regional
power, which means, by extension, accommodating Iranian influence in the region.
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Hence, American-Iranian detenté and the future of the regional balance of power are not
at odds.
Regional powers extend influence into smaller states; it is a reality of the
international state system. Tolerating Iranian influence throughout the Middle East,
however, is typically against conventional wisdom in the United States. This type of
thinking is predicated on the assumption that Iran’s heightened influence is equivalent to
expansionism or it is treated as a prodrome of a tour de force. Influence and
expansionism, then, are often treated as synonymous. I contend that trying to subvert
Iranian influence is out of touch with the reconfiguration of the contemporary Middle
East Order and, therefore, harmful to future Iran-U.S. relations. Now that Iran has
solidified its reach into Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon ― through its “Axis of Resistance”148 ―
it should be tolerated to maintain these partnerships at a political and social level, and,
perhaps, a limited military extent as well. It is not within the ability of the United States
to fully undercut these ties without military force ― even then there is no guarantee such
a maneuver would help foster stability in the long run.
Henry Kissinger’s strategic thinking reminds us that power is never fixed in the
international arena. As a result, balance of power is never static or perpetual; it is
reconfigured through challenges to the status quo. Heretofore, Iran was a secondary state
in Eurasia; today, it is making its weight felt. It is putting up a fight to be accepted
amongst the ranks of the major powers. Hence, it is regularly pressing for modifications
in order to receive compensation for hitherto low levels of respect. It is insisting that the

The Axis is composed of Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas in Palestine, and, of course,
Iran.
148
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regional order adjust. Iran will not accept a balance of power where it perceives the
arrangements to be humiliating, unjust and tilted against it. It is within this context that
the growth of Iranian influence should be understood. The world powers would do well
to listen unless they can stomach a constant, but draining military response.
American foreign policy, therefore, needs to clearly differentiate between Iranian
influence and Iranian expansionism. The former does not necessarily jeopardize
American interests, while the latter ― as a possible maneuver to regional hegemony ―
does threaten American interests, as the establishment of any regional hegemon would.
Of the states where the Axis of Resistance is present, not one organ of the resistance has
absolute control of the state in which they are based. In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization
Front and Shia politicians and clerics are checked by the Sunni minority, Iraqi Kurds, and
U.S.-Iraq relations. In Syria, while Iran’s ally ― Bashar al-Assad ― remains in power,
the resources of the state are exhausted and are consumed with domestic concerns, not
external ambitions. Moreover, the United States, Turkey, and the Syrian Kurds ― all
with their own respective interests ― check the Syrian government. If Bashar al-Assad
remains in power or if a head of state sympathetic to Iran takes his place, the U.S. would
not lose a historic or regional ally. Historically, Syria’s orientation has been directed to
Iran and Russia. In Lebanon, Hezbollah remains militarily dormant and politically active.
They too are checked, by Israel. Hence, the Axis of resistance ― and in particular Iran ―
do not look fit to launch military campaigns aimed at territorial acquisition nor do they
appear to be in a position to consolidate political power. On these grounds, the United
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States overestimates the military capabilities of Iran, particularly with the temporary
pause on their nuclear weapons program.
Iran’s new position in the region could have positive implications on a future
balance of power. If Iran’s influence across the region is accepted as status quo by
regional players, Iran could potentially make the calculation that stability and
engagement is within its interest. A leading component of Kissinger’s strategic thinking
is developing ways to incorporate ill behaved states into a balance of power that restrains
expansionist behavior. In order for this to occur, Iran must feel power is fairly distributed
throughout the region. In other words, establishing Iran as a status quo power might very
well be contingent on accepting the Axis of resistance as legitimate. Otherwise, Iran will
not be content with its position in the region, making a balance unattainable. Moreover,
one should question the efficacy, in terms of stability, of having Iran withdraw its support
for its proxies in the long run. If Iran were to relinquish support for its dependent state
and non-state actors, they would not necessarily become irrelevant. Iran’s relationship
with actors such as Hezbollah and the leverage it enjoys over them could be an important
component to preventing further escalations and to establishing a strong balance of
power. For example, it was the leverage Iran held over Hezbollah that resulted in the
release of the remaining U.S. hostages that Hezbollah held captive in 1991.
Given this environment, cautiously tolerating Iranian influence in the region is not
a direct threat to America’s immediate or long term interests. Nor is accepting a degree of
Iranian influence in the region improper for a country of its magnitude and importance.
After all, it has the deepest collective history in the region and, thus, it posses a strong
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national pride. Accordingly, the United States should not predicate engagement and
detenté with Iran on the grounds that is must first cease its support for regional proxies.
Serious talks or negotiations over the nature of Iran’s relationship with these entities will
occur only after hostilities mitigate. By accepting Iranian influence in the region and
forgoing constant efforts to contain it, U.S.-Iran relations will begin to improve.
On similar grounds, the United States should not predicate engagement with Iran
on the grounds that it abandon its ballistic missile program. In the region, Yemen, United
Arab Emirates, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Libya, Israel, Iraq, Egypt, and
Afghanistan are all known to possess some form of ballistic missile systems.149 During
the Iran-Iraq war, Iran did not possess ballistic missiles while Iraq did; Iran struggled to
get their hands on them due to American sanctions. Eventually, Iran received ballistic
missiles through an arms deal with North Korea and Libya. Given the environment of
who possess ballistic missiles in the region and the historical memory of their lack of
ability during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran’s development of Ballistic Missiles should not be
viewed as irrational or improper.

3.

Source of Iranian Influence and New Prospects
For the United States, a serious and a continues push towards Detenté will depend

on its ability to ease Iran’s military support of non-state actors throughout the Middle
East. Yet, the United States will have to offer substitute security arrangements before Iran
abdicates support for these groups.
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The preliminary source of Iranian influence in the Middle East was the instability
precipitated by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Ever since these military
campaigns, Iranian influence has gradually expanded. Today, Iran yields influences
unlike anytime in the modern era. Instability remains Iran’s primary source of influence
and, thus, security; it is skilled at manipulating and injecting resources into conflicts
beyond its own borders. It is ironic that Iran’s influence is directly correlated, if not
caused, in part, by American foreign policy.
Stability in the Middle East and a sustainable balance of power will be impossible
to establish as long as conflict remains Iran’s primary source of regional sway. Similarly,
any regional agreement or treaty that excludes Iran will not be sustainable in the
long-run. Iranian participation is integral to regional stability given the leverage it has at
its disposal. In other words, regional stability is currently not in Iran’s national interest
because it would minimize the country’s influence and, thus security.
The challenge for American foreign policy ― and truly the international liberal
community ― is to find a way to divorce Iranian influence from instability and
militarism. Iran will not retract its military support for its proxy forces throughout the
Middle East unless if its feels it has other avenues of influence to resort to. Besides
military power, what other forms of power could Iran resort to? Ideological, economic,
and political power are the only options. Its founding ideology is certainly attractive to
factions throughout the globe, but it would be a form of soft power and, thus, not well
suited for the replacement of hard, military power. The nation’s soft power does little in
terms of national security and it would not hold up well against the ideologies of the
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United States and Saudi Arabia that are typically backed with military power and large
treasuries (e.g. from 2013-2016, Saudi Arabia spent $300 billion on its military while
Iran spent $45 billion). Finally, it is hard to imagine an American foreign policy capable
of convincing Iran that relying on its soft power will sufficiently protect Iran’s interests in
the region.
Economic power, on the hand, is more promising. It would hold substantial sway
across the region, but Iran currently lacks the economic muscle to act as a financial,
economic, and innovative hub with the ability to drive investment and reconstruction
throughout the war torn region. This is not to say Iran’s economic power could not be
enhanced. Iran has a relatively robust middle class, a solid education system, and an
extremely large youth population; hence, Iran has a solid set of inputs that will help it
become an economic powerhouse in the region. Such a project would take years and
require international support, thereby giving the international community a degree of
leverage. More specifically, in order to experience meaningful and holistic economic
growth across all classes, Iran needs tremendous international financing that largely only
the United States can provide. Yes, Iran could access finance from other countries, but
such sources would still be contingent on the nature of American-Iranian relations. At the
end of the day, financial institutions will not make large scale investments in Iran if they
believe there is even a slight possibility of the U.S. invading Iran or the possibility of Iran
sliding into a regional war. Large scale investment necessitates stability.
The United States and Iran should take advantage of this reality. The medium to
long term security of the regime rests on the state of the Iranian economy. It realizes this.
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Moreover, as Iran progresses economically, it will translate its growth into regional
influence by building economic structures in the region, instead of bilateral military
corridors and enterprises. It is in the absolute Interest of the United States to help Iran
economically as long as such help is tied directly to a reduction in its support for proxies.
China and its one belt one road initiative, however, could pose a threat to the U.S.’s
prospect of using economic support as a gateway to reconciliation. The longer the West
waits to help Iran beef up its economy, the more likely any leverage it might have would
fall into the hands of China and other countries with large financial industries.
Helping Iran economically is directly connected to integrating it into the
international system, so as to create a situation where Iran will seek to participate in the
system and not exacerbate from the sidelines. Henry Kissinger is adamant on the
necessity to not humiliate, punish, and belittle nations who are reinventing themselves for
the new order. For example, Kissinger criticizes the treaty of Versailles so heavily due to
the fact that it neither pacified nor weakened Germany after the end of the first world
war. He attributes this to the fact that Germany was treated too harshly throughout the
treaty, particularly in the section of what is now known as the War Guilt Clause ― the
need to pay reparations for all damages done. Similarly, after the end of the Cold War,
Kissinger stressed the importance of integrating Russia into the international system
through a series of economic and political measures. He thought it was necessary not to
reprimand and scold Russia and Germany for their past actions because it would not help
establish stability in the future.
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Of course, Iran is not recovering from collapse, like the soviet union was, or
recovering from a brutal world war, like germany. Yet, the general sentiment of
Kissinger’s tenet of reintegration holds. One can conceive the JCPOA as a diplomatic
solution or postponement to an issue that could have been dealt with militarily. The
nature of the beast is that the international community needs to ingrain Iran into a system
that, as of now, it has one foot in and one foot out. The JCPOA needs an economic plan
of support in order to help overcome the deadlock.
Political influence is more precarious, yet crucial to the needed divorce. It
threatens the Westphalian principle of nonintervention and is likely to perpetuate the fear
of expansionism throughout the region. Yet, such fears will need to be suppressed and
endured ― and addressed when legitimately threatened ― in the short to medium term in
order to allow for the cultivation of the long-term project of economic development.
Political support for factions within the axis of resistance will need to be tolerated, as
verbal and limited resource support is a better alternative than military support. It is
perhaps best to consider the Axis of resistance as an alliance that contains and suppresses
the fears of individual factions within the axis by the sense of security it provides through
the conception of alliedship and strength through numbers.
Demanding that Iran outrightly abdicate military support for its proxies is naive
and inevitably fruitless. As a main lever of influence and power, Iran will rely on these
groups for its national security as long as the policy’s negativities clearly do not outway
its benefits. In order for Iran to consider rescinding support, the U.S. will first have to
engage Iran through an overarching period of detenté and offer it alternative security
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measures. The nuclear deal is a once in a generation chance, if not a one time prospect, to
rebuild a degree of trust that will allow for fruitful engagement between the two
countries. Therefore, U.S. foreign policy should refrain from outrightly suffocating
Iranian influence in the region and, instead, gradually set up an incentive structure that
divorces Iran’s influence from the exploitation of conflict and reconnects it to political
allyship and economic influence.
At the end of the day, the enhancement of Iran economic power will not
completely satisfy Iranian security concerns, despite its plausibility as a substitute for the
military support of proxies. As the ultimate factor in inter-state relations, hard power
must be replaced with a close or comparable alternative. When and if Iran retires its
support for its paramilitaries, its relative degree of hard power will diminish. If Iran
relinquishes sponsorship, it will do so in anticipation of ― or having already realized ―
replacement channels of auxiliary national security. When is dependent on how quick
regional players are willing to seriously offer and engage Iran on issues of regional and
national security. Hence, Iran will need to be offered a seat at the table ― a sign and
respect of its regional power status. Hamid Biglari offers a step in the direction of
respecting, but addressing regional conflict and security. He states:
One possible diplomatic arrangement could be a regional security summit,
attended by Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, and sponsored by the P5+1,
building on that groups success in negotiating the 2015 nuclear deal.
Regional ballistic missile reduction as well as a ban on nuclear weapons
development would be on the agenda. Respect for territorial integrity,
mutual non-interference in each other’s affairs, safe shipping passage in
the Persian Gulf, and the eradication of terrorism and religious extremism
would also need to be negotiated.150
150
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As the three supreme states in the region, the summit would be balanced, fair, and
complete. The 2017 Riyadh Summit that took place in May is the antithesis the summit
offered by Biglari. The attendees were the statesman of 55 muslim and Arab countries;
Iran was barred from attending. During the Summit, Saudi Arabia and the United States
signed an arms treaty amounting to $350 billion dollars over the next ten years. Such
maneuvers cast hope for regional stability and action into a perpetual state of
misalignment and, even, perhaps, render a summit suggested by Biglari impossible, let
alone a sustainable balance of power in the region.

4.

Accepting Islamism as Heterogeneous
Kissinger stresses the need for states to capitulate domestic ideals in order to form

a pluralistic national order to flourish. That is, states need to restrain their urge to treat
their guiding principles and systems of governance as universal and supreme. Iran and the
United States both hold their founding principles and historical experiences with high
regard. The latter is based on liberal democracy, with an emphasis on freedom and
democracy. The former is founded on Islamic, political institutions and gives heavy
weight to political independence and antagonism towards the un-equitable international
order. The institutions of each country are quite dissimilar.
The west is particularly frightened by the political concept of Islamism. It is often
framed as incompatible with Western political traditions. International strategic thinking
based on pluralism should, in theory, be able to accomodate institutional differences
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within the international system. The aforementioned is precisely what occurred
throughout the 1970s when the United States and China went through a period of
reconciliation, despite their economic, political, and ideological differences. Throughout
the first three decades of the Cold War, the United States was accustomed to treating
communism in monolithic terms.
Today, any non-secular regime is treated with suspicion, particularly those that
combine politics and Islam. When Nixon came into power, and thus, Kissinger, a new
mindset emerged that started to treat communism less monolithically. Conceiving
communist regimes as not constituting one cohesive threat, the United States loosened
up to the idea of engaging the People’s Republic of China. Today, I argue, it would be
wise to begin to treat Islamism in, similarly, less unitary terms.
With a specific rendition of Islamism institutionalized into the Iranian state, the
international community is able to engage and negotiate with the Islamic, theocratic
government. In the case of militant Islamism ― such as ISIL and al-qaeda and other
groups ― it lacks the centrality of the state, which makes it hard, if not impossible, to
engage and negotiate with it. Liberal democracies should seek a way to accommodate
states that incorporate Islamism into their political structure in a manner similar to how
the liberal states came to terms with the People's Republic of China and its take on
communism. It is possible that the international zeal of Islamism will pass as the region
embraces alternative forms of organization, similar to the fate of communism as the
Soviet Union collapsed.
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The point of the matter is that treating Islamism in a less stringent and hostile
manner will potentially assist in the attempt to integrate Iran into the international system.
Iran’s conception of international affairs is often painted as being diametrically opposed
to the Westphalian framework of order ― that it poses a direct challenge to its guiding
principles. There is some validity in this appraisal ― as Kissinger displayed in the earlier
section ― but it is reductionist to treat the entirety of the Iranian political milieu as
emblematic of rejecting national interest in favor of universal religious principles ― as
the ideas of Adib-Moghaddam in chapter four displayed. In order to overcome the
deadlock, the U.S. needs to address the conditions of the international order that cause
Iran to challenge it ― primarily that it perceives it as unjust. The United States inability
to entertain the idea that there are other forms of political and economic organization
other than the renditions of the liberal, democratic form practiced in the global north
exacerbate Iranian challenges to the international system. Indeed, Iran confronts the
current order, but it has yet to show to show total rejection of the contemporary tradition
of the state.

5. A Smaller, but Enhanced Role: Balance of Power and American Neutrality
America’s ultimate goal in the region should be to strike a settlement where all
significant parties―Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran―are in support of the status
quo’s distribution of power and where minority parties feel protected and supported by
the balance. Within the balance, the United States, China, and Russia can pose as outside
facilitators and additional sources of structural support for the balance. In order for this to
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occur, the U.S. needs to construct close relationships with all parties, including Iran.
These bilateral relationships will need to be closer and more influential than most
bilateral relationships within the region. Such a task will take years, if not decades, and it
will be extremely difficult to execute. Such a balance is emblematic of Bismarck's
diplomatic achievements while in power. In such a position, the U.S. could wield its sway
with regional powers in a manner that accommodates and reconciles conflicting interests
and grievances. For such a balance of power structure to exist, the U.S. would have to
assume a position of neutrality it hasn’t displayed in the region for decades and all
associated parties would have to hold trusts in the U.S. Moreover, such a strategy
assumes that at some point in the future, conflicting interests in the region will be reduced
to a level where a balance would be possible to maintain. Hence, before the balance could
be cultivated, internal stability in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria will need to transpire. Finally,
the deadlock between Iran and the U.S. will need to be overcame.
In order for the United States to help construct a sustainable balance of power, it
needs to pivot its foreign policy orientation in a number of ways. Besides sticking to the
guidelines of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, it must transform its unconditional
support for Israel. Israel and its representation in America ― the Israeli Lobby ― enjoy
an unwarranted amount of influence over U.S. foreign policy. In fact, the policies of the
lobby and Israel are often counterintuitive to the national interests of the United States.
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue the aforementioned persuasively in their book
The Israeli Lobby. By distancing itself from Israel, the U.S. will take its first step in
assuming a more neutral role in the region. By no means should the United States
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abdicate its position that Israel is to be a secure state, but the U.S. must recognize the
Palestinian cause with explicit language that condemns Israel’s occupation of Palestinian
lands in the West Bank and it needs to reinvigorate its support for a two state solution
(though it should support a one-state solution should that transpire). The United States
possess quite a bit of leverage over the foreign policy of Israel, considering it relies
heavily on the United States ― leverage that is poorly exercised. The U.S. will do well to
exercises its hold vis-a-vis Israel in a manner that situates America into a centrist position
that more accurately protects its interests in the region, as pointed argued by Walt and
Mearsheimer. This pivot would deprive Iran and Islamist causes throughout the Middle
East the sources of their anti-american rhetoric, as it is largely, but partly, founded on the
United State’s absolute support for Israel and its reluctance to embrace the palestinian
cause.
On a similar note, the United states needs to reconsider its heavy-handed support
of Saudi Arabia. It can and should start with the abdication of its support for Saudi
Arabia’s war in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the United States have a complicated
relationship, dating back to the Quincy Agreement of 1945, when the President Roosevelt
promised U.S. military security to Saudi Arabia in exchange for secure access to oil
supplies. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia bred and exported its wahhabi doctrine across the
Muslim world, thereby permeating the very ideology the United States spends billions of
dollars fighting through military confrontation each year. Moreover, portions of the
monarchy helped fun and facilitate the September 11th attacks. Nevertheless, the
relationship persists. By distancing itself from the monarchy ― simply by the means of
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relinquishing unabiding support ― the U.S. will enhance its regional neutrality twofold.
The costs will be minimal and are outweighed by the long term prospects in the region
presented by doing so.
Renouncing absolute support for Israel and Saudi Arabia will allow the United
States to pursue a more flexible foreign policy in the region. Primarily, the U.S. will be in
a position where it can more likely make amends with Iran and loosen its reliance on
force and rhetoric as the primary means of dealing with a resurgent Iran. In fact, if the
relationship between Iran and the United States improved, it would likely benefit Israel
and Saudi Arabia, as the U.S. would have a diplomatic channel with which it could
mitigate the tensions between the three countries. All of this is in line with a wider
regional ambition: shaping a smaller physical presence in the Middle East region for the
United States. The U.S. should not be so necessarily intent on seeing Bashar al-Assad
removed from power or feel the need to prolong the Syrian Civil War in order to counter
Russian and Iranian expansionism. Since decolonization, Syria has been within Russian
and Iranian spheres of influence. If the War were to end with the reestablishment of the
status quo, it would not definitely harm U.S. interests in the region (albeit tragic). The
U.S. should maintain its presence in Iraq and Syria on the grounds of expelling and
cementing the exodus of I.S. as a territorial organization ― no more. By limiting its quest
in the region to stability and balance of power, the United States will assume a role for
the 21st century that I and ultimately Henry Kissinger, vehemently argue is in its long
term interest.
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5.4 Iranian Recalibration
Iran, too, must undertake a series of policy pivots if the deadlock is to be
overcome. One, if the United States releases an official apology for its role in the 1953
coup d’etat, the Iranian government must welcome it and express forgiveness. Two, Iran
needs to limit its nuclear program to civil purposes. Three, Iran needs to forgo its support
for violent extremism, regardless of the breed or the agenda it seeks to push through its
use. Four, Iran must abdicate its expansionist temptations.

1. Forgiveness
A firm Iranian expression of forgiveness towards the United States’ role in
orchestrating the 1953 Coup d’etat and its interference in its politics will be
commensurate and set the basis for a new time. For the United States, an apology would
be emblematic of introspection and of the desire for reconciliation. For Iran, forgiveness
would signal a distinct break from the anti-American fervor that the Islamic Revolution
was partly based upon.
Yet, forgiveness might very well be an unrealistic expectation. The regime’s
legitimacy is partly derived from its anti-American rhetoric. Therefore, should the
Islamic Republic of Iran accept the apology of the United States, it could mean
renouncing anti-Americanism as a source of legitimacy. The regime’s primary concern
― the continued existence of the theocratic regime ― could very well stand between the
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acceptance and rejection of an apology. How an apology will be received is ultimately
contingent on timing and the internal calculations of the regime. Accordingly, the United
States should be mindful of these contingencies when it considers offering an apology.
Accepting an apology from the United States is in the interest of the regime.
Perpetual animosity towards a foreign power is not a sustainable or desirable form of
legitimacy. The regime would do well to repurpose its authority away from American
antipathy and towards a domestic project of rejuvenation. By expressing forgiveness, Iran
will be distancing itself from its antediluvian past, which could provide a gateway to a
future predicated on regional integration and prosperity rather than manipulation and
exploitation of warring factions. The point being: forgiveness will create a space for
reinvention that will allow Iran to calibrate its place in world politics.

2. Non-Proliferation
Iran’s nuclear ambition―with the exception of Israel―sets it apart in the Middle
East region and it is the chief source of tension between Iran and the United States. The
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is the culmination of a series of none continuous
negotiations that began 12 years before the treaty was ratified in 2015. Essentially, for the
next ten years Iran will never be more than a year away from nuclear weapon capability
and after that initial decade, its capabilities will improve and it will be able to assemble a
weapon if it chooses within a shorter time frame. The temporary and tolerant nature of
the treaty and the inability of the Obama administration to link nuclear restraint to
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regional military and political restraint are the mainstay of the criticism directed at the
deal.
Henry Kissinger critiques the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on three fronts.
First, Kissinger asserts inspection and enforcement of the deal will be a perpetual and
perhaps insurmountable challenge to the deals efficacy. Second, the framework of the
agreement is predicated on the acceptance of Iranian enrichment and the logic of
multilateral nuclear deterrence, leaving Iran within close reach of a weapon and the
region still in nuclear limbo. Third, the JCPOA will not improve regional order, but
“reinforce, not resolve the world’s challenges in the region. Rather than enabling
American disengagement from the Middle East, the nuclear framework is more likely to
necessitate deepening involvement there ― on complex new terms.” Indeed, nearly three
years since the frameworks ratification, instability in the region has remained consistent
if not exasperated. Moreover, the United States has a heavier presence in the region than
it did in 2015.
Nevertheless, now that the deal is established, it is foolish to strip it of its
credence or ignore its obligations. Hence, Iran should continue to abide by it and the
United States should remain faithful to its word. If the United States abdicated from the
deal, it would tarnish its ability in the future to construct and realize nuanced, multilateral
negotiations on which the international order is increasingly predicated. Second, an
attempt to reimpose sanctions risks isolating America, as it would be difficult to restore
the international sanctions regime when Iran is abiding by the deal. Accordingly, even if
the United States fails to meet its obligations under JCPOA, Iran should continue to
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adhere to the deal, considering the p5+1 have expressed a commitment to the deal despite
the United States’ hesitancy under a new administration.
If Tehran remains faithful to the framework despite the precarious behavior of
Washington, the simple shock of a change in a Presidential administration might be
sufficiently and politically weighty to recast relations between Iran and the United States
in the direction of detenté. If Iran backs away from the deal, the United States and Iran
will no longer have common ground and will need to start from scratch. The
consequences of this are unforeseen. At worst, inter-state conflict in the region will
emerge and perhaps an outright war, as there will be no pact to mitigate nuclear agitation
and America will not be able provide the Arab states with the security they depend
heavily on. Ultimately, Iran and the United States need to remain faithful to the nuclear
framework and focus attention on their counterparts heavy hand in the region.

3. Iranian Backed Militias and Expansionism
Currently, the major threat emanating from Iran is its militant foreign policy and
expansionist behavior ― not its nuclear program which is temporarily placated. Iran has
bolstered its position in the region at the expense of prolonging and aggravating the civil
wars that have stricken the Middle East. It relies on insurgencies, milias, political
opposition movements, and terrorist groups in order to execute its foreign policy agenda
in nearly every country in the Middle East. This dependency is due to its own resource
limitations and a lack of willingness to use its own national military. These tactics have
largely been effective and have helped challenge the status quo in the region.
Unfortunately, Iran’s success in the region is dependent on unrest. Accordingly, Iran’s
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bolstered position is predicated on the Middle East’s instability. In addition, Iran is a
sufficient power to the point where steadiness in the region will require its cooperation.
A challenge presents itself: Iran depends on unrest for its influence and,
simultaneously, stability in the region depends on Iranian temperance. A roadblock to the
reconciliation between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran is that the fact
that the latter benefits from the disarray at the former’s expense. The U.S. will not
continuously and positively engage Iran when it is directly supporting the forces that
challenge the interests of the United States. The reverse also holds true: Iran will not
warm up to the United States while it forces are stationed in its backyard. The
dichotomous nature of relations makes reconciliation particularly hard.
On Iran’s part, it must treat its support for regional militias as a temporary and
ultimately negotiable. This does not mean abdicating its support in order to comply with
the preconditions of negotiations laid out by the United States. It does mean coming to
terms with the fact that it eventually needs to pivot the source of its influence from
Iranian-backed militias to other political and economic avenues (these avenues were
described in an earlier section). The issue of Iranian-backed militias will perhaps be
solved by connecting it to issues of American military presence in the region. If solved in
tandem and in contingency to the other, Iran and the United States will be on a path to
surmount the deadlock.
Finally, Iran must heavily curtail the expansionist tendencies that arise from a
belief that the nation ought to dominate the Middle East due to its historical experiences
of consolidating the wider region into a single empire. This paper has painted
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expansionism as a redline. Hence, if the Islamic Republic of Iran leads a military effort to
annex or occupy a neighboring country, an international military response will be
necessary in order to preserve the multipolar power structure of the region. An imperial
Iran would certainly suspend the possibility of reconciliation between it and the United
States until deep into the 21st century. On this note, Iran will do well to abstain from
inter-state military aggression or invasion.
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